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Abstract
Contemporary therapeutic circles utilize the concept of anxiety to describe a
variety of disorders. Emotional reductionism is a detriment to the therapeutic community
and the persons seeking its help. This dissertation proposes that attention to the emotion
of fear clarifies our categorization of particular disorders and challenges emotional
reductionism. I propose that the emotion of fear, through its theological relationship to
hope, is useful in therapeutic practice for persons who experience trauma and PTSD.
I explore the differences between fear and anxiety by deconstructing anxiety.
Through this process, I develop four categories which help the emotion of fear stand
independent of anxiety in therapy. Temporality, behaviors, antidote and objects are
categories which distinguish fear from anxiety. Together, they provide the impetus to
explore the emotion of fear.
Understanding the emotion of fear requires an examination of its
neurophysiological embodiment. This includes the brain structures responsible for fear
production, its defensive behaviors and the evolutionary retention of fear. Dual
inheritance evolutionary theory posits that we evolved physically and culturally, helping
us understand the inescapability of fear and the unique threats humans fear. The threats
humans react to develop through subjective interpretations of experience. Sometimes
threats, through their presence in our memories and imaginations, inhibit a person’s
ability to live out a preferred identity and experience hope.
ii

Understanding fear as embodied and subjective is important. Process theology
provides a religious framework through which fear can be interpreted. In this framework,
fear is developed as an adaptive human response. Moreover, fear is useful to the divinehuman relationship, revealing an undercurrent of hope. In the context of the divinehuman relationship fear is understood as an initial aim which protects a person from a
threat, but also preserves them for novel future relationships.
Utilizing a “double-listening” stance, a therapist hears the traumatic narrative and
counternarratives of resistance and resilience. These counternarratives express an
orientation towards hopeful futures wherein persons thrive through living out a preferred
identity. A therapeutic practice incorporating the emotion of fear will utilize the themes
of survival, coping and thriving to enable persons to place their traumatic narrative within
their meaning systems.
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Chapter One: Introduction, Methods and Procedures
This dissertation is a constructive examination of the emotion of fear and its
relationship to hope. Human beings are unique creatures who bear similar capacities to
other animal species (such as the ability to be afraid), but with unique complications
(such as planning and hoping for the future). My premise is simple: when human beings
experience the emotion of fear, they also experience an undercurrent of hope. This
dissertation explores the meaning of this relationship by pulling together a variety of
sources of knowledge concerning fear, human subjectivity, memory, therapeutic practice,
and hope. In order to pull these sources together in a meaningful way, constructing new
understandings of fear and hope for pastoral practice, I begin with two questions.
Why now? Why bother?
Poet W.H. Auden, in his work “The Age of Anxiety” described the world as a
constantly changing landscape where technology and industrialization wreak havoc on
our sense of meaning. I agree that, at times, anxiety plays a large role in the workings of
the world. Yet, I do not think, given the current rapid progression of technology that
describing the world as anxious is enough. What we experience, parallel to this age of
anxiety, is a culture of fear. The culture of fear is indicated by our reactions to the
threatening events, both near and far, which are experienced through our constant
connection to a variety of media and relational sources. Our culture of fear is revealed in
the unwarranted hyper-vigilance most often directed toward the other and/or the
1

environment. We witness the reporting of murder and crime during the evening news; we
witness natural disasters as they unfold; we bear the scars of national tragedy, not to
mention the personal experiences of threats and trauma we carry in our memories.
The rapid infusion of immediate access to violent and traumatic events furthered
the evolution of our current culture of fear. Since early 2002, the United States has
engaged in a “War on Terror” which, with a simple twist of language, can be reframed as
a “fight against fear.” As this fight continues, the rate of diagnosis of Posttraumatic Stress
Disorder (PTSD) for our war weary has increased dramatically. PTSD is now applied to
anyone who bears the scars of witnessing, experiencing or even hearing about a traumatic
or threatening event. Fear, it seems, has taken up its own role in the lives of persons
across the country, a role that is similar to anxiety but with its own distinct
characteristics. In the current contextual milieu it is important to acknowledge the new
things we are learning about our human capacity for fear and the resilient hopes that
accompany it.
Put simply, it is no longer enough to deal with anxiety alone. There are too many
known threats that people utilize in order to alter their relational behaviors to ignore its
use in therapeutic settings. In order to remedy this situation, I will explore some of the
distinct characteristics of the emotion of fear. To that end, I will examine evidence from
neuropsychologists, memory specialists, narrative philosophers and therapists and
process theologians. This culminates in the development of a neuro-hermeneutical
framework for understanding fear and its relationship to hope for clinical settings.
This research is necessary because dealing with anxiety alone in therapeutic
settings limits the ability of someone to connect what they find threatening to what they
2

find meaningful. This project grows out of my own observations as a pastoral counselor.
In the final chapter of this dissertation, I describe how this research changes my
therapeutic approach with one particular client, Rachael. Rachael was mugged and
subsequently withdrew from her relationships with others. At the time I saw Rachael I
practiced out of a therapeutic lens that gave primacy to anxiety as a motivator for change.
While Rachael improved with our sessions, we never arrived at a point where this event
was adequately included in her meaning system. This left her with ways of dealing with
the stress of the memory, but a lack of understanding about what the trauma revealed
about her life. I am now convinced that if I utilized lenses of anxiety and fear, I could
have helped her address her fears in ways that revealed resistance, resilience and most
importantly her stories of possibility and hope.
My inattention to the key role that fear played in Rachael’s life is indicative of a
larger problem within the current clinical context in North America. New research into
the neuropsychology of fear sheds light on the inescapability of the emotion of fear. New
paradigms of thinking about human subjectivity help us grasp the individuality of our
experience. Process theology builds a system of meaning based on the understanding that
God offers us the best possible outcome in any moment given the past circumstances that
brought us to that moment. All of these perspectives were missing when I met Rachael. I
want pastoral counselors and caregivers to have access to the resources I was missing,
resource for dealing with the emotion of fear. I want us to diversify the emotions we
attribute to various “disorders” and utilize the best strategies for a particular
circumstance. I also want to utilize meaning-oriented interpretive frames to help us
understand how all of the descriptive research we are accumulating can impact theology
3

and practice in meaningful ways. The rate at which we are learning about the human
brain is astounding. There is much more to learn. However, pastoral theologians should
be making the effort to develop connections between this new knowledge and the
theological anthropologies that guide our practice and theory-making. This dissertation
continues to build that bridge between the theological and the neurological, between the
physical and metaphysical. To better understand what I am proposing the remainder of
this chapter describes my methodology and the procedural course of this dissertation.
Methods and Procedures
I acknowledge, alongside Browning and Cooper (2004), that “no one starts the
investigative or interpretive process with a clean slate. We bring inherited assumptions to
whatever we interpret” (p. 266). The interpretive process is complicated, especially one
that seeks to examine and put forth new ideas through the critical correlation of
knowledge. I come to this project with specific ideas about how I will present an
understanding of fear. These ideas are, in large part, informed through my background as
a pastoral theologian, ordained minister and licensed clinical social worker. I served in
congregational settings and pastoral counseling centers; I have taught courses in formal
and informal educational settings. In addition, my role as a student, father, therapist,
husband and son also provide a narrative background for how I interpret and interrogate
specific theories utilized in this dissertation. Finally, I am aware that my socio-cultural
station in life affects my interpretive process. To that end, I identify myself as a straight,
middle-class, southern, able-bodied white male who studied the Reformed Tradition,
postmodern theology and process thought.
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Like anyone, I come to projects influenced by the past circumstances that brought
me to a particular moment in time. As a practical theologian, I am continuously engaged
in the process of evaluating the relevance and meaning of psychological, theological and
other perspectives as they are revealed through the experiences and observations of my
life. In addition, I continually define and redefine the theological claims that shape my
processes of evaluation. My engagement with the topic of fear stems from my desire to
not only help people survive their contact with threatening objects, but also to engage
these threats through a lens which can help them thrive. Through this work, I have come
to realize how much of an emphasis I place on the ability of human beings to utilize their
imaginations and creativity in the face of difficult circumstances.
All of my interpretive lenses have some impact on the development of this
project. They are the hidden shadows which dance in the background of my methods and
procedures. As much as possible I have tried to root out some of my pre-conceived ideas,
utilizing those perspectives that will help this project and limiting the influence of others.
Like all interpretive and creative processes a starting point is necessary. I begin by stating
what I believe this project is about and where it fits into the body of theological and
psychological literature.
This dissertation is not about adapting a psychological term for religious
purposes, nor is it an attempt to take theological meanings and make them
psychologically relevant. Instead, I am seeking to develop an interpretive milieu through
which a thick description of fear is proffered. I contend that theological and
psychological disciplines have the responsibility to interrogate and contribute to one
another in meaningful ways. Theology and psychology are disciplines which have vested
5

interests in understanding the condition of human beings, discovering the nature and
methods of the ways humans navigate the world and seeking ways of helping people live
meaningful lives.
As I write this dissertation I acknowledge that I am first and foremost a
theologian. This means that the primary lens through which I interpret the world is
theological. I follow in the footsteps of Browning and Cooper (2004) who stated that
their “thinking begins in faith, but it is a faith that submits to critical reflection—a critical
reflection that we recommend to both the faith of the modern psychologies and the faith
of those who call themselves Christians” (p 252, italics authors’). While my background
as a theologian provides a primary lens, I am also a practicing therapist and Licensed
Clinical Social Worker. This combination allows me to place my work more firmly in the
field of constructive practical theology. Practical theology is a broad discipline which
“describes an understanding of the inextricable relation of practice and theory that
presumes all of theology is finally practical in its intent” (Ramsay, 2004, p. 6). The aim
of constructive practical theology is to not be
interested in merely describing [or retrieving, or applying] what theology has
been; we are trying to understand and construct it in the present, to imagine what
life-giving faith can be in today’s world. In our case, that structure is an
inhabitable, beautiful, and truthful theology. (Jones & Lakeland, 2005, p. 2)
Constructive practical theology develops novel meaningful theological statements which
present life-giving alternatives to the experiences of a variety of people in a variety of
contextual situations.
Within the field of constructive practical theology, psychology and theology come
together in the discipline of pastoral theology. This dissertation uses a pastoral
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theological method to interpret the human emotion of fear and theorize about its
relationship to hope. Pastoral theology is the discipline whereby pastoral experiences and
observations are brought into conversation with theological and cognate secular
resources, providing a context for critical reflection in order to develop new theological
and psychological resources for pastoral practice. This dissertation is a constructive
theological project. My intent is to bring together theological, social, psychological and
physiological sources into dialogue with experiences and observations concerning fear.
This dialogue will allow me to create the space for a constructive pastoral theological
understanding of the relationship between fear and hope. These constructive claims
regarding a fear/hope relationship will provide a theoretical basis for options for care
which reframe the manner in which we think about and treat people who are afraid.
Methodology. Methodology, quite literally, means conversations with methods. In
this instance, it more specifically refers to a conversation with a variety of methods of
understanding human beings. I have already described how the methodological milieu in
which these conversations will take place are best reflected through a critical
correlational method. This method provides the context through which disciplines
converse with one another in order to provide interpretive possibilities. However, simply
identifying my mode of conversation as critical correlation does not necessarily detail
how these conversation partners interact with one another. Methodological approaches
have recently been scrutinized and evaluated as a result of postmodern approaches to
knowledge that raise questions about how we know what we know. Some methodologies
rely on empirical evidence, seeing scientific studies as presenting layers of facts about
particular subjects. Other methodologies look at the unique experiences of individuals
7

and seek to generalize from specific moments and experiences. To better understand
pastoral theological methodology I want to describe the different types of conversations
distinguished by pastoral theologians as they reflect upon what it is they do.
Pastoral theologian Jennings proposes three “languages” which provide different
meanings and categories of meanings about religious subjects. First order language
designates “the collection of phrases…, narratives…, and liturgies… which are employed
to give expression to the way in which a person or community’s life is related to God”
(1990, p. 862). These are “simple” statements which reflect the nature of things felt and
experienced. God is love is just such a statement of first order religious language. Second
order language reflects “the explication and critical evaluation or appropriation of their
[the “simple” statements] basic meaning, with the more or less provisional result yielding
a theological judgment” (p. 862). In the context of second order language, the statement
God is love might become theologically operationalized. Thus, God is love might
develop into a mission program feeding the hungry or a pastoral care program in which a
group of congregation members visit the sick or homebound. A judgment is made
concerning the expression of the relational statement. Finally, Jennings exemplifies
pastoral theology as a discipline engaged in third order reflection which examines “the
way in which such judgments are made and a critical evaluation of the appropriateness of
such procedures” (p. 862). Thus, part of what methodology in a pastoral theological
context does is evaluate the jump between first and second order language. The intent is
to develop an understanding of the intent and interpretations informing particular leaps in
language and test their theological validity.
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Jennings’ proposal helps us understand the constructive milieu in which
methodology informs theological thought. His understanding of language and reflection
is certainly reflected in the definitions I have used to describe pastoral theology.
However, while this is a pastoral theological project, it also reflects the data and
constructive conclusions reached by a variety of disciplines which will require the critical
appropriation of their statements about human beings. Therefore, while Jennings provides
a general examination of what methodology means for pastoral theological projects, I
want to turn to other methods which can further shape the reflections of this dissertation.
Psychology of religion has used critical correlational methods in order to engage
psychologies and theologies in an interdisciplinary fashion. Debates about methodology
in psychology of religion circles highlight some of the issues that arise when quantitative
approaches to psychology are brought into dialogue with hermeneutical approaches to
knowledge.
Two major methodological traditions in psychology of religion identified by
Belzen and Hood (2006) are the “empiricist-analytical and the hermeneutical
orientations” (p. 6). They see these two methodological traditions as both prevalent in
psychological research and informing the sub-discipline of psychology of religion. The
empiricist-analytical tradition has often been associated with quantitative research which
utilizes a particular scientific methodology to produce data concerning a hypothesis. The
hermeneutic methodological approach is often associated with a qualitative approach to
research and discovery. Until now the empirical tradition has dominated most forms of
psychological research. However, Belzen and Hood proposed that in order for there to be
a true revolution in psychology of religion methodology “a shift from or at least an
9

expansion of the existing paradigm could occur through a greater integration of the
hermeneutical tradition into the field” (2006, p. 8).
The most promising methodological advancement which incorporates this shift in
methodological thinking is in the levels of analysis approach. Emmons and Paloutzian
(2003) have called for a common methodological paradigm to guide the work of
psychologists of religion. The authors point to the idea of “the multilevel interdisciplinary
paradigm” which “recognizes the value of data at multiple levels of analysis while
making nonreductive assumptions concerning the value of spiritual and religious
phenomena” (p. 395). The value of exploring this approach is in its relationship to the use
of third order language in pastoral theological methodology. The non-reductive stance of
the authors towards quantitative and hermeneutical approaches to knowledge provides a
helpful frame for the work being done in this project.
As I noted earlier, in describing the constructive nature of practical theology, as
pastoral theologians we utilize a variety of experiences (clinical experiences, pastoral
experiences, theological observations, etc.) to provide the material for conversation with
a variety of disciplines (neurophysiology, psychology, anthropology, theology,
personality theory, etc.) in order to develop novel theological, pastoral and clinical
insights which can advance methods of care. The caveat relative to a multilevel approach
is that despite its nonreductive stance, it is most often psychology that informs religion
without the reciprocation of pastoral theological methodology. This is not enough to
dismiss the approach outright, but instead call for an adaptation which allows for
knowledge to flow in meaningful ways through a reciprocal relationship.
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Therefore, while there is much to applaud in this multilevel methodological
approach, the lack of reciprocity leaves much to be desired. It may very well be that the
metaphor which describes it reveals an intentional or unintentional hierarchy of
knowledge privileging psychology over religious ways of understanding the world. Thus,
when a levels of analysis approach is used by psychologists with a modern, rather than
postmodern approach to knowledge, particular sources of knowledge are automatically
thought to provide more or less authoritative input to the central themes of a project.
As I noted earlier, this project is shaped by who I am; thus, any method and
procedure, will reflect the point of view of the author. Browning and Cooper reminded
us, “While we distance ourselves from our pre-understanding, we do not forget that we
have a pre-understanding” (2004, p. 267, italics authors’). To think that the only
meaningful relationship between psychology and religion is one where psychology
informs religion is to short change the relationship. Utilizing an implicit modernist
approach to knowledge, the pre-understandings we carry with us privilege certain data.
Thus, we forget we have a pre-understanding and believe that the knowledge from one
source is more important than knowledge from other sources. From a psychologist’s
point of view, psychology can only help religion, not be helped by it. The same could be
said for religious person’s attempting to adapt this model as it is. What I propose in this
project is a re-imagining of the levels of analysis metaphor utilized to describe a
multilevel methodology of critical correlation that uses postmodern approaches to
psychological and religious knowledge.
Rather than set up a series of levels which can imply a hierarchical understanding
related to the varieties of knowledge concerning human beings, I choose to imagine my
11

method as falling under the rubric of “Spheres of Knowledge.” Most often this moniker is
utilized to describe how a person creates a unified body of knowledge related to a
specific subject. For this project, I see this approach as providing the milieu for the
critical appropriation and interpretation of heterogeneous disciplines. Used as a
methodological approach, “Spheres of Knowledge” is an attempt to create a methodology
that realizes both the pre-understanding position of the author and the search for a
reciprocal relationship between different disciplines. With this recognition, the procedure
of the dissertation will take a critical correlational approach to constructing novel insights
which challenge both theological and psychological understandings of fear and its
relationship to hope.
I see each “Sphere of Knowledge” as contributing specific knowledge which can
help provide a “thicker” understanding of the human capacity for fear, as well as
construct novel relationships between fear and hope. By utilizing this metaphor I am
proposing a visual map for the procedures of this project. My understanding of this
methodological approach can be represented thusly:

12

Central questions and observations arising
from and returning to clinical, pastoral and
spiritual care:
What is human fear? How is it related to
hope? What kind of theological and
psychological guidance can we construct
which will be based on the knowledge
gained by studying fear?

The self as reporter and
interpreter of sources of
knowledge

Biological Sources of
Knowledge:
Neurophysiology,
Neuropsychology,
Evolutionary Sciences,
Behaviorism

Social Sources of
Knowledge:
Sociology,
Anthropology, Social
Constructionism,
Constructivism

Psychological Sources of
Knowledge:
Narrative Theories of the Self,
Narrative Therapy

Theological Sources of
Knowledge:
Process Theology

This visual representation depicts the ways in which the interpreter of these sources takes
a particular position relative to the knowledge presented. The placement of the self in an
orbit around the structure implies the dynamic impact that different perspectives have on
13

the reader/interpreter as they re-encounter the central question or thesis of a project
through different sources of knowledge. When a particular source is critically read it
shapes the manner which the author reads additional sources from the same or other
disciplines. Furthermore, as each of these critically read sources of knowledge are
interpreted by an author, they impact the systemic relationships which inform any critical
or constructive response to the central question.
For example, when I critically introduce physiological understandings of fear it
impacts the interpretive milieu of the dissertation as a whole. The perspective I take on
the physiology of fear shifts my overall perspective on the central question, limiting or
expanding how other disciplines are correlated to develop a “thicker” understanding of
fear. Ultimately, this is a theological project, and my pre-understanding of this impacts
the outcomes I express. I am using a methodological approach that builds critical
relationships between seemingly disparate sources of knowledge with the intent of
providing constructive outcomes that will provide new theological insights and pastoral
practices. What I have to offer in the way of theological insights also impacts the
interpretive psychological milieu as I pull together quantitative and phenomenological
understandings of human fear and interpret them with a theological lens. Therefore, while
conversations with various partnering disciplines concerning fear will inevitably push and
pull the dissertation in new directions, the knowledge they provide will be filtered
through the theological lens that I bring with me in order to construct new insight for
pastoral practice.
Procedures. As I stated earlier, this visual model of “Spheres of Knowledge”
provides a bridge to the procedures of this dissertation. Utilizing a bio-psycho-socio14

theological approach to understanding human beings, I intend to build a thick description
of what it means to be a human being who experiences fear. In some ways I look to
Whitehead (1929/1985) who once discussed a metaphysical method of discovery as “the
flight of an aeroplane. It starts from the ground of particular observation; it makes a flight
in the thin air of imaginative generalization; and it again lands for renewed observation
rendered acute by rational interpretation” (p. 5). This dissertation begins in Chapter Two
with the observation that human beings experience fear; that psychological sources do not
always separate fear from anxiety effectively; and, our current cultural milieu necessitates
that we begin to think about ways of using fear in theological and clinical settings.
Chapter Three takes a look at the neurophysiological, evolutionary and behavioral
understandings of fear. This embodied approach to the emotion of fear provides an initial
understanding of its impact on human functioning. It also lays the groundwork for the
clinical themes of surviving, coping and thriving. These three themes are the ones I find
most helpful in helping people examine and deal with their fears.
In Chapter Four I develop a concept of human subjectivity utilizing subjective
components of experience and constructionism. In addition to understanding subjectivity
I put forth a narrative theory of the self as well as narrative understandings of change. In
this chapter, I am looking at the manners in which fears develop environmentally through
our experiences and our social contexts. This adds a distinct understanding of fear which
builds on its neuropsychological underpinnings but is manifested in the unique ways in
which we interpret threats in the world.
Chapter Five utilizes process theology as the best theological system for
understanding the divine-human relationship. It explains how that relationship plays out
15

through human activity in the world, specifically in the human experience of fear. This
chapter develops process theology as the theological system that best understands
humans through emotional, self-determination and creative lenses. Furthermore, due to
the specific concepts of power and the “initial aim” process theology provides an
additional understanding of the meaning of fear in the lives of human beings. The final
portion of Chapter Five develops a concept of hope based on theological and
psychological research.
Chapter Six introduces 15 propositions which pull together the main corpus of
research in this dissertation. Through the course of this chapter I develop a theological
anthropology that pays particular attention to embodiment, subjectivity, emotions,
theology and relationality. From there, I move to developing a pastoral theology of the
emotion of fear and its relationship to hope. This exposition leads to an understanding of
fear that is both adaptive and, at times, maladaptive. Finally, Chapter Six ends with an
examination of the themes of surviving, coping and thriving as they are seen developing
out of the research of the previous chapters.
The final chapter of this dissertation serves two purposes. First, it posits that
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) is better seen as related to fear-based memories
than as an anxiety induced disorder. Utilizing the term neuro-hermeneutical, I offer a
microcosm of the arguments laid out in this dissertation. I offer this as one way to see
how we might incorporate some of the neurological data we understand about the brain
into an interpretive framework that helps develop novel therapeutic approaches.
Furthermore, I contend that a broader definition of trauma is more useful in clinical
settings in order to help people with the particular issues they bring to therapy. I end this
16

chapter, and the dissertation, with a case study involving Rachael. Here, I apply the three
themes developed earlier utilizing a narrative therapeutic framework in order to reimagine my early therapeutic work with Rachael.
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Chapter Two: How Anxiety and Fear Shape our Culture and Life
This chapter sets the stage for the theoretical work that follows. I will draw on
psychology and sociology to posit that both fear and anxiety deserve a place in
therapeutic settings. Both emotions play vital roles in how we interpret the world. Yet,
anxiety is often the emotion most likely to be dealt with in therapeutic settings. To be
sure, large bodies of literature exist concerning both emotions and just a simple search on
either term will yield tens of thousands of articles about one or the other. 1 However,
when it comes to the clinical use of these two emotions, anxiety is by far a more preferred
emotion to examine. This leaves the emotion of fear most often tied to phobias and the
occasional panic attack. These emotional reactions are important, but do not fully capture
the possibilities of utilizing fear in the clinic. Furthermore, while it may seem obvious
that these emotions are different they are often collapsed under the term anxiety. It is my
hope to provide an examination of these two emotions which reveals their distinguishing
characteristics, allowing us to further understand the impact and possibilities of
understanding and utilizing the emotion of fear.
There are many definitions of anxiety. Arguably, the most popular definition in a
western context is derived from the most recent version of the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR). By using the DSM-IV-TR as my primary
source for a definition of anxiety, I make a statement about the usefulness of the resource
as an authority. To that end, I want to describe both my reasons for utilizing this resource,
18

as well as a variety of critiques that have been leveled towards it. The DSM in any
incarnation is a flawed document. Therefore, I want to provide the milieu through which
anxiety and fear can be seen separately. I will accomplish this by engaging this definition
of anxiety through a deconstructive lens. Following my critique of the DSM-IV-TR, I
introduce the concept of deconstruction. This provides the basic source material that will
guide my deconstruction of anxiety. By the end of the deconstructive process I will show
that anxiety and fear should not be considered collapsible terms, and they are distinct
enough to warrant clinical attention to each.
Reminding people of the separation between fear and anxiety serves the purpose
of introducing fear as an important therapeutic emotion. The question that remains is
what is the contextual urgency for distinguishing these emotions? I find the answer to this
question in the juxtaposition of the phrases “age of anxiety” and “culture of fear”. The
utilization of these two terms opens a doorway for me to reconceptualize the current state
of western culture as both anxious and fearful. By doing so, I place fear as a central
emotion to our interpretations of the world and the threats it contains. The remainder of
this dissertation will expand on the importance of fear utilizing physiological,
psychological and theological disciplines. Through this data we will come to understand
the emotion of fear and develop some meanings relative to its relationship with hope and
its usefulness in therapeutic settings.
The DSM-IV, TR
History, authority and usage.
I first became aware of the DSM-IV-TR during my preparation to become a
clinical social worker. The DSM-IV-TR was presented as an authoritative but flawed
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document. As a tool it was presented as thorough but often reductionistic in its
conclusions. While it contained significant data, it also eschewed language regarding the
uniqueness of individuals in favor of more global terms about disorder. I was taught to
think of the DSM-IV-TR as providing tentative connections between individuals in
clinical settings and others who described similarly problematized lives. This
interpretation of the DSM-IV-TR helps complicate its meanings, allowing myself and
others to use it as a tool rather than the tool to understand a person’s disordered life.
Use of the DSM-IV-TR is widespread in mental health fields in the United States.
At the same time, critiques of this definitive document are equally as widespread. Many
clinicians have critiqued the DSM and its preceding editions. Some of these critiques are
meant to diminish its authority; other critiques are intended to provide source material for
each new edition in order to solidify its support and make it both more reliable and valid.
The DSM is currently published as a text revision to its fourth version. The first
version of the DSM was conceptualized in 1952 with the intent of collecting and
classifying a variety of mental “disorders” into a system based on observable criteria. The
return of veterans from World War II with acute symptoms of distress provided the
impetus for the first DSM. This was in contrast to the lifelong types of mental illness that
were previously the focus of mental health practitioners (Malik & Beutler, 2002, p. 4).
Early versions of the DSM contained roughly half the diagnostic labels and almost a tenth
of the pages of current versions. By the third edition authors sought the incorporation and
assignment of diagnoses linked with research “rather than simply the consensus of
members or experts” (p. 4). The hope was to increase the reliability and validity of the
text. The third edition also introduced a multiaxial diagnostic system which included both
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physical conditions and stressors alongside the mood and personality “disorders” (p. 4).
All of the editions since that time focused on greater reliability through research. The
authors also reached out to other mental health professionals and special “Efforts were
made to include women and racial and ethnic minorities” (p. 7). A later “text revision”
was undertaken of the DSM-IV in order to bridge the gap between the current version and
the forthcoming fifth edition. The DSM-IV-TR corrects factual errors, keeps information
current, makes changes relative to new research, improves its didactic value, and updates
various codes (APA, 2000, p. xxix).
This brief historical account provides a basic outline of the development of the
DSM through the DSM-IV-TR. With each incarnation, work groups made attempts to
increase its reliability and validity. My reasons for using this document to provide a
definition of anxiety do not hinge completely on its historical development. Tradition is
not a good enough reason to maintain the use of a particular item. Instead, it is the
authority and use of the DSM-IV-TR that leads me to understand its importance for
clinically defining important concepts.
Social workers Kutchins and Kirk (1997) asserted that:
On the shelf of every mental health professional is a copy of the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. The American Psychiatric Association’s
900-page reference book attempts to describe and classify each one of 300 mental
disorders. Even though it is poorly organized, offers no suggestions for treatment,
presents its material in wooden prose, and costs $55, each edition of the manual is
destined to sell more than a million copies. Few other professional reference
works are so regularly stocked in trade and college bookstores, and few are read
by so many lay people. And none have so broad an impact on so many sectors of
life. (pp. 10-11)
The reach of the DSM-IV-TR is evidenced by the breadth of its reading audience. It is
used by mental health professionals, students, teachers and interested “untrained” persons
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as an authoritative document pertaining to mental illness. Its diagnoses and definitions
pervade the cultural milieu and it has developed into an answer book for all questions
related to mental illness. In terms of usage, the reach of the DSM is far and wide. It is
taught in classes, used in mental health settings, and read at local bookstores; its ongoing
role in defining the language used in debates about mental health and disorder expands
with each new edition.
In addition to the ways the DSM defines acceptable standards for mental health
diagnosis, its role in financial reimbursement continues to add to its authority.
Psychologists Caplan and Cosgrove (2004) remarked that “this manual has become
increasingly influential, due to the fact that third-party reimbursement now usually
requires that patients receive a DSM diagnosis” (p. xxi). By requiring a DSM diagnosis
for reimbursement the marketplace is an unwitting accomplice in developing the
authority of the DSM. Therapists Erikson and Kress (2005) state that “because of its
economic ‘power,’ influence, and popularity, practitioners must use the DSM system in
order to maintain an active and competitive presence in each of the mental health fields”
(italics mine, p. x). Its economic prowess and authority is unmatched in mental health
circles in the United States, and as such “it is the key to millions of dollars in insurance
coverage for psychotherapy, hospitalization, and medications” (Kutchins & Kirk, p. 12).
The power and authority of the DSM extends beyond economics into the daily
language of mental health practitioners. Erikson and Kress stated that “The DSM’s
multiaxial assessment system has become the primary language of communication
regarding client problems, offering a ‘shorthand’ for reducing complex information about
clients into manageable form” (p. ix). The DSM provides a basic language that is
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authoritative through its widespread use in mental health settings. Widespread use of the
DSM connotes acceptance, not correctness. It also reveals an undeniable influence and
authority. Adding to its air of authority are the widespread critiques of the DSM.
Controversy often breeds interest and the DSM has been highly critiqued throughout its
history. Two of these critiques are important as they shed light on concerns of this
dissertation. These critiques can be couched under the rubrics of politics and
constructivism.
Politics and constructionism.
Kutchins and Kirk characterize the DSM as “the repository of a strange mix of
social values, political compromise, scientific evidence, and material for insurance claim
forms” (p. x). For those who wish to demystify the DSM, politics is a major source of
criticism. Furthermore, postmodern thinkers challenge the DSM from a constructivist
standpoint, claiming that the knowledge contained therein is incapable of truly capturing
the phenomenological complexity of an individual.
The DSM is a political document. It is a socially negotiated text through which
varying parties use their power to gain acceptance for particular labels describing what is
“normal” versus what is “abnormal.” While its authors might contend that the DSM is an
objective tool for accurate diagnosis, it is more likely the truth that it, like any conceptual
framework, has its limits.
The major role politics played in the making of the modern DSM is in the ways
bias has crept into the work group process. Feminist psychologist Caplan’s critiques of
the DSM draw attention to the biases inherent in its creation and use (Caplan, 1991;
Cosgrove & Caplan, 2005). She is not alone in her critique of bias. Kutchins and Kirk
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discuss the role that gender bias played with introduction of a new disorder “based on
psychoanalytic theories of masochism” (p. 19). The authors devote a chapter of their
book to the debate that occurred around Self-Defeating Personality Disorder and its
eventual removal from the DSM-IV for lack of scientific evidence (pp. 126-175). Another
political battle for the inclusion of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder has been waged
throughout the years. It eventual inclusion is thought to be the culmination of
acquiescence to political pressures from outside groups.
Another political critique is drawn from an apparent conflict of interest between
the works groups for the DSM and insurance companies. Cooper draws attention to the
fact that during the process of developing criteria for diagnoses they are often adjusted in
order to provide opportunity for more timely reimbursement from insurers (2004, p. 19).
Cooper found that “the DSM committee knowingly alters the classification scheme for
insurance purposes” (p. 22). That bias and economics present challenges to the reliability
and validity is surprising given the adamant support that the DSM receives. However, the
most damning critique of the DSM may stem from its modernist assumptions about
mental health and the disorders that affect peoples’ lives.
Postmodern constructionist thought provides an additional source of scrutiny of
the DSM. Eriksen and Kress called human beings “active creators of experience, not
passive receptors of an objective reality. To know is to construct, not to find” (p. 188).
Diagnosis, from this perspective, is not an objective exercise in labeling thoughts and
behaviors. Instead, diagnosis develops through a constructive process of observation by
human beings and their experiences. The DSM is a document created by some people
with the power to name behaviors, thoughts and emotions. Through their “expertise” as
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clinicians, these people meet to describe and define particular groupings of behaviors as
deviant from “normal” actions and reactions. By drawing on research which is oriented to
a modernist scientific method, they give these labels further power and authority.
Two strands of critique develop out of a postmodern view of the DSM. Each
method of critique offers something to help us interpret the DSM and diagnosis. The first
strand of critique is social constructionism. Social constructionists understand that when
people get together and share experiences, meanings are created. This critique shares
some similarities with another form of critique derived from the social constructivist
point of view. 2 Social constructivists understand that individuals cannot fully recognize
the world for what it is. People, no matter how steeped in research cannot understand an
objective world apart from the meanings and constructions they rely on to interpret it. I
want to begin this section of critiques by talking about social constructionism. Eriksen
and Kress state that “the ‘social constructionist’ perspective relativizes meanings as
socially derived creations, rather than references to already-existing essences” (p. 188).
For example, say a work group gathers to discuss and develop the criteria for a
particular disorder. Their discussions will include some of the research about that
disorder, but it also cannot help but include their collective experiences with the disorder.
This collective experience might encompass family or friends who have symptoms
related to the disorder; it may include clients they have seen; it may include particular
psychological theories they like or dislike; it may include adopted opinions of their
mentors or testimony of experts. Regardless of how much the committee leans on
research it cannot divorce itself from the experiences and agendas each person brings
with them. Accordingly, theories of social constructionism pay particular attention to
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how outside influences impact the negotiated meanings of groups, lending some
skepticism to the process of disorder creation and dissemination. These negotiated
meanings may have some validity in a larger context; however, they do not explain or
adequately represent the complexity and uniqueness of a particular person’s behaviors.
As social constructionists think about diagnosis they are wary of a one-size fits all
package like the DSM.
For example, Psychologist McNamee sees diagnosis as a dual-edged sword. On
one hand, a diagnosis provides people with “the sense that now that the problem has been
identified, a treatment program can begin” (2002, p. 149). Thus, diagnosis provides a
language for new meanings to be constructed around particular symptoms. However,
McNamee cautions that a diagnostic label can also communicate to certain people that
they are a lost cause “by virtue of being identified as flawed, inferior, unhealthy, and
anything but ‘normal’”(p. 149). Her ultimate claim is that diagnosis is more than just
descriptive, “rather, diagnosis functions as a moral judgment. It conveys the deficit of one
to others” (p. 151).
The critiques of social constructionists reveal the need to see the DSM through
critical eyes. While DSM diagnoses are based on research, human beings with particular
clinical experiences choose which research is authoritative and conclusive of disorder;
they choose the criteria used as clinically significant indicators of “normal” versus
“abnormal”. When we use the DSM to diagnose or define particular behaviors, thoughts
or emotions, we should do so with a critical eye. Social constructionists attempt to
critique the underlying theoretical concerns of the DSM. While they do not necessarily
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point to particular diagnoses, they offer the opportunity to examine this authoritative text
through appropriate social lenses.
Social “constructivists often doubt the human ability to know the world ‘as it is’
in an objective sense that is independent of personal and social constructions” (Raskin &
Lewandowski, 2000, p. 16). Thus, while the DSM may provide some knowledge or
language, its authority should be limited to being one voice among many rather than the
sole voice about diagnosis. Raskin and Lewandowski remarked that:
Human involvement occurs regardless of whether the construction of disorder at
hand is rooted in the ideology of DSM-IV, constructivism, or some other
theoretical orientation. Because personal realities are constituted by one’s
constructions of events, fostering multiplicity in applying constructions of
disorder expands the number of possibilities open to therapists and clients and
keeps an emphasis on the constructed aspects of knowledge about disorder. (p.
20)
Their critique is not with the construction of the DSM but its use in therapeutic settings as
a crutch. This can lead to a stifling of the client and therapist’s co-creative ability to
search out or remake the meaning of particular experiences. It is not that the DSM might
be wrong, but that the ways it has been applied and referenced have given it more
authority as an objective and scientific text than it should be awarded. As a document of
human negotiation and construction the DSM has the power to name things. From the
constructivist standpoint, it is clients who make meaning from their experiences and they
should have the power to name these things.
Eriksen and Kress defined constructivism as “respect, multiple perspective taking,
humility, willingness to reconstruct meaning, and a recognition that there is no ‘essential’
diagnostic truth or theory that applies to all clients in all circumstances” (p. 189). Instead
of blanket statements about symptoms Eriksen and Kress want to ground the therapeutic
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discourse in an understanding that “every mental health practitioner, like every client, is
engaged in the act of making sense of experience” (p. 189). Thus, diagnostic categories
become provisional labels that the therapist and client use to negotiate the meaning of
experience. Knowledge contained in the DSM should not be viewed as completely
objective data that can be applied to every individual who presents certain symptoms.
Even people who share similar criteria for the same diagnostic label cannot be lumped
together due to a unique understanding of their experiences. From the constructivist
viewpoint, the person is the ultimate meaning maker in any system. While diagnostic
labels may help construct a new set of meanings they should not be used as taxonomic
categories that pathologize large swathes of a population.
Using the DSM in this dissertation is my way of recognizing the authority and
power it has to provide descriptive data about particular mental health labels. It is a
flawed linguistic tool which enables me to ground my understanding of particular terms
in language and resources that are readily available. As such, the DSM is not only useful
and authoritative, but it is also one source of information that provides insight into the
experiences of clients rather than the source of information for insight. I have two reasons
for presenting the DSM as I did. First, I wanted to provide a resource that is ubiquitous in
mental health circles in both is acceptance and use. Second, I wanted to point out that the
manner in which the DSM is constructed and used perpetuates an understanding of terms
that can be reductionistic. The reductionism in both the naming and claiming of terms is
why I will utilize the description of anxiety in the DSM as my beginning point for
deconstructing the meaning of anxiety.
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Deconstruction and Anxiety
Deconstruction is more of a process than a method. Deconstruction happens when
a text is read and a deeper reading into the meanings takes place. It is a process of seeing
into a text rather than just taking it apart through critical lenses. Royle (2000) calls
deconstruction “above all perhaps, a questioning of the ‘is’, a concern with what remains
to be thought, with what cannot be thought within the present” (p. 7). Thus,
deconstruction plays with the conceptual meanings of a word, attempting to develop what
is unsaid and how that might influence future readings of the text. Royle explained
deconstruction using the words of Derrida
Every conceptual breakthrough amounts to transforming, that is to say deforming,
an accredited, authorized relationship between a word and a concept, between a
trope and what one had every interest to consider to be an unshiftable primary
sense, a proper, literal or current usage. (as cited in Royle, 2000, p. 8)
In order for deconstruction to “work” there should be a transformation of the relationship
between a word and its associated conceptual framework. This transformation reshapes a
present meaning and carries that word’s meaning into the future. Furthermore, it attempts
to undermine the stability of the relationship between a word and its conceptualization,
allowing for new things to happen. Derrida called for deconstruction through
destabilization. He opined that destabilization is
on the move in, if one could speak thus, ‘things themselves’; but it is not negative.
Destabilization is required for ‘progress’ as well. And the ‘de-‘ of deconstruction
signifies not the demolition of what is constructing itself, but rather what remains
to be thought beyond the constructivist or destructionist scheme. (as cited in
Royle, 2000, p. 6)
By deconstructing the DSM definition of anxiety we have the opportunity to see
what it is, and also what it could mean without actually discarding the definition. To say
that this definition is useful and authoritative is to say that it is rife with meaning, and it
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provides one way of conceptually identifying anxiety and the effects it has on a person’s
life. Yet, within the ways anxiety is conceptualized much can be destabilized. Through
this process of destabilization and transformation I will show how the relationship
between fear and anxiety is conceptualized in the DSM. More importantly though, we
also may begin to see how anxiety could be re-conceptualized. This allows me to assert
that the relationship between fear and anxiety is complex and conducive to destabilization
leaving space for both to exist in clinical practice.
Deconstructing anxiety.
One of the tasks of each new generation is to build upon the foundations of what
has come before it. Language is built upon the foundations of previous languages. While
parts of words and their meanings remain the same, we can expect that a full
understanding of a term should change with their context. To use an analogy, cities are
built upon the foundations of previous cities, often expanding outward and upward,
transforming landscapes and horizons. In Denver, Colorado, older homes often have their
tops “popped” in order to add space and modernize a house. Two things occur when a top
is “popped.” First, the space the house occupies is increased. While much of the original
charm of the home is retained, the new addition can be seen as both part of the house and
separate from its original structure. Furthermore, in order to “pop” a top, the foundations
of the house must be in good order so that the older structure can handle the weight of the
additional space. In this section I plan to “pop the top” on the word and concept of
anxiety with the hope of seeing its relationship to fear.
The foundation for the exploration of anxiety and fear comes from the DSM
definition of anxiety, and its lack of attention to the concept of fear. Two sources of
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material can help us understand the foundations upon which the current DSM definition is
formed. Freud’s penultimate definition of anxiety provides one source of foundational
material. Through a close reading of these foundational definitions, I will tease out some
of the possible sources for differentiation in the definition of anxiety. 3 It is through this
process of differentiation of the terms anxiety and fear that I will show how both terms
are needed and necessary in mental health language.
There is a second case to be made as a result of this differentiation/deconstruction
process; namely, the contemporary contextual need for a separation between fear and
anxiety. It is the current cultural milieu which provides the source and impetus for this
separation process. British sociologist Furedi posited that we now live in a “culture of
fear”. From my perspective, the idea of a “culture of fear” parallels our “age of anxiety”
but required something different as a response.
The initial quest of this discussion concerning anxiety is a deeper understanding
of the relationship between anxiety and fear. I argue that anxiety is the term of choice in
psychotherapeutic circles even when fear could better encapsulate some emotional and/or
experienced content. The DSM-IV-TR (DSM) defined anxiety as “The apprehensive
anticipation of future danger or misfortune accompanied by a feeling of dysphoria or
somatic symptoms of tension. The focus of anticipated danger may be internal or
external” (A.P.A., 2000, p. 820). It is important to note that despite the inclusion of
phobias and panic as disordered reactions, there is no definition of fear in the DSM-IVTR. I surmise from this omission that the authors of the DSM believe that the term
anxiety describes the broad range of emotions, cognitions, and reactions to experiences of
“danger or misfortune”. A curious student would note that a wide variety of literature
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seems to bear a nuanced story about the emotions of fear and anxiety. This raises the
question of how an authoritative text, such as the DSM, can collapse these two terms
when distinctions between them may be more appropriate. Anxiety may have become so
“meaning-full” that it is in danger of becoming meaningless. The task of deconstruction
is to help anxiety become “meaning-less” so that it, and the other concepts it has
consumed, may once again be meaningful. The search for a meaning-less anxiety begins
with Freud’s later writings on the subject.
Freud’s understanding of anxiety evolved throughout his life. In the later years of
his writing, his work in Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety reveals the culmination of his
thought. Freud’s major transformation concerning anxiety was his move away from its
association with the libido. This later work on anxiety bears some similarity to the way in
which anxiety is conceptualized in the current DSM. Two things are revealed in Freud’s
work concerning anxiety. First, there are significant points of connection between
Freud’s definition and the DSM definition. Second, there are obvious differences between
fear and anxiety that have to do with temporal reactions, antidotes, and intensity.
Freud’s basic definition of anxiety was that it “is a reaction to a situation of
danger” (Freud, 1925/1962, p. 128). This seems simple enough; a person encounters a
danger or threat and reacts by becoming anxious. However, as compact as this definition
of anxiety is, it lacks any meaningful specificity. If anxiety is a reaction, then when does
this reaction occur? Is anxiety formed in the moment of realizing a danger or is it
something that occurs after reflection concerning the threat? When people become
anxious are they reacting to the memory of a threat, or are they anxious because a new
present threat reminds them of a previous threat? As I understand Freud, the term
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reaction relates to how a person cognitively deals with a situation. Relative to anxiety, a
reaction requires, in the words of pastoral theologian Seward Hiltner, a “perceptible
pause” (1960, p. 47). To be anxious is to re-act, to act again. Thus, a person acts relative
to a dangerous experience; and, they also re-act, they pause and act again based on a
reflection on that experience and/or first act. To think of anxiety as an emotion that
requires pause makes it unique. It also creates a specific meaning beyond just a reaction.
If this is the case, then I would separate the emotions of fear and anxiety by
surmising that fear involves the initial action and anxiety is the reaction to the action.
Freud corroborated this by stating that,
when the individual is placed in a new situation of danger it may well be quite
inexpedient for him to respond with an anxiety-state (which is a reaction to an
earlier danger) instead of initiating a reaction appropriate to the current danger. (p.
134)
Anxiety is not something felt in reaction to danger, but rather something felt when
remembering or anticipating a danger. The DSM definition corroborates this “reaction to
a reaction” by seeing anxiety as “apprehensive anticipation” related to a future threat or
misfortune. In the DSM anxiety is a reflective emotion that gives rise to present feelings
concerning a point in time when something might happen based on a person’s knowledge
about what has happened. Therefore, anxiety is different from fear, but most likely arises
through a situation where fear has been felt by the person. Put differently, anxiety is
manufactured by a person when reflecting on a dangerous situation. On the other hand,
fear is felt during a situation of perceived danger. The issue is one of temporality where
fear and anxiety are concerned. In this case fear becomes something experienced in the
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moment a danger or threat is revealed. Anxiety is felt after the threat has been
experienced and the person wishes not to have that experience again.
Hiltner’s understanding of a “perceptible pause” reveals a distinction between fear
and anxiety along these same lines. He states
a truer statement of the distinction in human beings between fear and anxiety
would be to call the first the alarm signal that is read accurately without
perceptible pause between signal and interpretation, while the latter involves
perceptible pause. (1960, p. 47)
The result of this particular destabilization of anxiety is that the concept cannot be used to
describe two separate phenomena. Therefore, what purpose does consolidating fear under
the rubric of anxiety do for people who experience both? Can anxiety really provide a
meaningful framework for explaining actions related threats and the reaction to the action
related to threats?
A second area of destabilization for the concept of anxiety is with its antidote.
Psychoanalyst Ramzy stated that “The simplest and the most accurate way of defining
anxiety, however, is perhaps to contrast it with its opposite, which is peace—peace of the
mind” (1960, p. 18). Peace, even peace of mind, is most appropriate for a concept that is
a reaction to an action towards a danger or threat. Peace of mind requires the same kind
of reflective capacity as anxiety. However, if we are talking about fear—the emotion and
action itself—then peace is provide an appropriate antidote or response. When facing a
threat, an anxious person who searches for peace of mind would not find the immediate
wherewithal to cope and survive. Peace of mind may help them feel calm about the
danger a threat poses. However, peace provides no impetus for the appropriate kinds of
actions which enable a person to behave accordingly to the value given to the threat. A
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better antidote for fear is hope. As this work progresses, I will examine the relationship
between fear and hope through two lenses. The first lens sees hope as an antidote to
maladaptive fear-based memories. The second lens develops the argument that in all
human fear-based reactions there is an undercurrent of hope that supports the emotion of
fear and directs human towards future possibilities. 4
Whether you call anxiety a reaction to a reaction or apprehensive anticipation, it is
clear that anxiety shares some relationship the emotion of fear (even the word
apprehension has, as one synonym, fear). At the same, it is evident from the beginning of
this discussion that there are helpful differences between anxiety and fear, differences
that the DSM definition ignores. Certainly, fear and anxiety share commonalities with
regard to the impact of a threat, but these commonalities are not enough for anxiety to be
the sole descriptive term. The temporal significance of the emotional action and the
antidote to a particular emotion provide an entry point for discussing their differences. I
sense there are other differences that may be helpful to this argument as well.
In Freud’s description of anxiety, he expands his understanding in ways that
closely parallel the DSM definition. He continued by saying that:
Anxiety, then, is in the first place something that is felt… As a feeling, anxiety
has a very marked character of unpleasure. But that is not the whole of its
quality… Analysis of anxiety-states therefore reveals the existence of (1) a
specific character of unpleasure, (2) acts of discharge and (3) perceptions of those
acts. (pp. 132-133)
For Freud, perception deals with the ways a person relates to their experiences. For the
anxious person, Freud explained that they will experience that anxiety “with the
respiratory organs and with the heart” (p. 132). The DSM describes this same
phenomenon as dysphoria or tension that develops through a state of apprehension about
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possible threats. In contrast, the somatic responses to fear are more diffuse throughout the
body of a person. A person who is afraid experiences the tension of fear in their muscles
as they contract and prepare for action; when we are afraid our heart rate climbs, but our
stomachs shut down as our energy is diverted towards the enactment of specific
behaviors. In Chapter Three, I will provide a more complete examination of the somatic
response to fear. It is enough to note at this point that the bodily and behavioral reactions
to the emotions of fear and anxiety are different.
One possible genesis for these different somatic responses relates to the evidence
of the existence of a threat. According to the DSM for anxiety to arise the threat can be
imagined (internally derived) or real (externally derived). To diagnose anxiety related
issues, the major requirement is a somatic response of tension or dysphoria around the
possibility that something threatening may occur. The definitive criteria set forth by
Freud and mirrored in the DSM can help us fully describe the concept of anxiety (and
thus fear). Through their descriptions, anxiety is a cognitively manufactured feeling
resulting from reflection or rumination on the possibility of experiencing a danger. No
tangible threat is necessary for the experience of anxiety to arise. This is in sharp contrast
to the feelings that result from the emotions and actions related to the experience of a
threat itself.
The final area of destabilization of the concept of anxiety relates to the presence
of an interpreted threat. Anxiety results from us thinking about the possibilities of danger;
fear develops out of an emotional reaction to being confronted with a real or imagined
threat. As I see it, tension or dysphoria associated with anxiety may be part of the
emotional aftermath of the emotion of fear, but to experience the emotion of fear is
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something wholly different. To be afraid is to be able to name and experience a threat. It
is to subjectively interpret a particular object as threatening to one’s life. Anxiety presents
around anticipated danger; fear presents during a person’s interpretation of a present
danger. Freud and the DSM do not ever point to actual threats as part of the genesis of
anxiety. As psychoanalyst Ramzy points out:
From the psychoanalytic viewpoint: “man [sic] is bound to be always anxious”,
“man [sic] has even lost the capacity to be afraid… This is probably because
Freud considered that only man [sic] can be anxious. Fear is an attribute of the
animal, which can react to danger almost like an automaton and in response to a
definite stimulus.” (1960, p. 25)
Thus, there is room in psychoanalysis for a distinction between fear and anxiety, yet
human beings do not become afraid at the experience of a threatening object. The
assumption that humans are ultimately controlled by our reasonable minds which leads us
to be only anxiety-prone does a great injustice to the embodied nature of our emotions. At
best it is an overestimation of our capacities, at worst it is unreasonable assumption born
of arrogance. The noteworthy statement in this quote is the direct reference to the notion
that fear involves a definite stimulus. In Chapter Two, I will discuss some of the
neurophysiological capacities we share with other species which help refute these claims
that fear is only the product of lesser minds. Right now, it is worth noting that we share
more neurological capacities with animals than may have been known in 1960, when
Ramzy was writing. This kind of dismissal of fear and our basic reactions to the real
presence of a threat has done nothing to help us understand how fear impacts the clinic.
In this process of destabilization four differences becomes apparent between
anxiety and fear. There is a temporal disparity between the onset of anxiety and fear; the
source of relief for each emotion differs; there is a unique set of behaviors associated
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with each emotional state; and, a real or imagined threatening object will engender the
emotion of fear, whereas anxiety relies on possible danger as its source material. The
current structure of the DSM does not give enough attention to the disparities between
fear and anxiety. Their definition of anxiety is helpful and complete, save for one thing.
There is no contrasting definitive statement made about the emotion of fear and its impact
on “disordered” thoughts and behaviors. For us to truly understand the impact both
emotions have on our lives, the creation of an all-consuming category related to anxiety
does not prove to be helpful.
What remains to be seen is whether or not this is the time to introduce such a
clinical distinction. The question we must ask ourselves is what are the reasons for
focusing on this obvious distinction, when years of history tell us that, while there are
differences, it is enough to talk about the reactions to threat and danger as anxiety? In a
prophetic moment psychologist May remarked that “Fear ordinarily does not lead to
illness if the organism can flee successfully (p. 90, italics author’s). In the current cultural
milieu there is little to no chance that someone can flee successfully from the objects that
threaten them. I contend that we would be better off thinking that we live in the midst of
both an “age of anxiety” and a “culture of fear”. Our inability to escape a constant
barrage of images and looming threats has made fear a problem for the people of this
current age.
The culture of fear in an age of anxiety.
Luvox, Paxil, Prozac, Zoloft, Effexor, Valium, Xanax, BuSpar, Ativan, and
Klonopin are just a few of the anti-anxiety medications listed by the National Institute of
Mental Health. These psychopharmaceutical remedies are intended to help people
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overcome the excessive oppression of anxiety in their lives (National Institute of Mental
Health [NIMH], pp. 20-21). In the context of the United States, anxiety is a barrier to
defeat or at least medicate into oblivion. The deleterious effect of anxiety on human
beings inhibits our desire to function within the parameters of normalcy. At the same
time capitalism and the power of the marketplace determines what is valuable and
anxiety sells. I do not condemn the use of anti-anxiety medications. Many people,
overwhelmed by their lives, have benefited from anxiolytic drugs. However, today’s
marketplace needs us to be anxious. While we can never allow anxiety to be eradicated
through medication or meditation, there is something new to target in the west.
Alongside our age of anxiety a culture of fear has emerged. Instead of nebulous
communists or the anticipation of an atomic holocaust we now have access to the real
faces of terrorists, the immediate reporting of natural disasters and flu pandemics; we
even have 24-hour access to stories about criminals both near and far that feed our
imagination and create real objects for us to fear. This constant auditory and visual
assault has given us “real” threats to fear in our lives. We no longer need apprehensively
to anticipate a threat or misfortune; we “know” that the threat lurks behind every corner
in our neighborhoods, in the eyes of strangers, and in the cultures and religions that are
foreign to us. Many people have become convinced that we need to be afraid of the world
in which we live and move and have our being. As distinct feelings, I have shown anxiety
and fear to differ in their temporal relationship to threats, their antidotes, their behavioral
qualities and in the necessity of a real or imagined tangible threat. My purpose here is to
describe why this age is different from previous ones, as well as the distinct
characteristics leading me to the conclusion that we live in a culture of fear.
39

I would be wrong to contend that the “age of anxiety” Rollo May and W. H.
Auden described had abated. Philosopher and law professor Salecl described multiple
“ages of anxiety” occurring in human history. She stated that “When we talk about the
new age of anxiety we should not forget that in the last century it was always the case
that after some major social crisis there came the age of anxiety” (2004, p. 1). Salecl
points to these ages of anxiety as times of reflection and uncertainty following wars,
economic vulnerability, and unmitigated violence, as well as crises of the mind occurring
due to the proliferation of mental disorders (pp. 1-5). According to my interpretation of
Salecl these ages of anxiety are reactions to reactions; they are reflections upon the events
themselves occurring after the fact; they also signify “apprehensive anticipation” for what
may or may not come next. To talk about the cultural milieu in this manner is to name a
collective memory and imagination that permeates the ways in which we live in reflective
reaction to the events of our times.
However, with the events of September 11th (along with other terrorist attacks in
western countries) some have noticed a change in how significant events are perceived
and discussed. Salecl stated, “After September 11th the American government has been
keeping the fear of possible new attacks alive by continuously reminding the public of the
unpredictable danger that can come from hidden terrorists” (p. 7). She noted that fear
rather than anxiety is being peddled in the marketplace. She believed that “Fear
[concerns] what can be articulated” (p. 18). In this case the danger of terrorism is the
articulated threat that is conveyed to the American public. With a tangible threat, the
cultural response mimics the emotion of fear rather than anxiety. That is not to say there
is no anxiety, the overlap of the two emotions develops in the imaginative possibilities
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derived from the object. That is, when we are reminded of and/or given an object that can
be deemed as a threat, such as the terrorist attacks, it engenders the emotion of fear 5 felt
by many Americans in the moment of the attacks. I contend that as we remember these
moments, we become both anxious about the future, but also more fearful in the present.
Living with constant reminders of our fears establishes a baseline of relationality where
the threat of tangible dangerous objects cannot be easily escaped.
Pastoral theologian Bingaman makes the argument that what we are experiencing
at this moment in cultural history is a “new anxiety”. His understanding is that the current
culture of politics and media creates a hypersensitivity to a pessimistic future which leads
to a different form of anxiety in the present (2007, pp. 57-61). He stated
Fear mongers, in droves, heighten our levels of anxiety by offering us a
pessimistic view of the future. Unless we do what they tell us and return to a set
of values or a system of belief or meaning largely derived from the past, the
future, so they say, does not look very promising. Thus, anxious clients, in this
climate of fear, confusion, disorientation, and apprehensive expectation, will
need, in the context of therapy and counseling, encouragement and permission to
identify, explore, modify, and even change their core sets of beliefs about the
present and future. (p. 57)
While I agree with Bingaman’s suggestion that a unique form anxiety is present in the
current culture, I also wonder how he would discuss the fears that inform this new
anxiety. I sense there something in the current cultural condition that reveals more than
just a particular brand of worry. It seems there is both a “new anxiety” coming from the
worry about future possibilities, and there is also a base level of fear derived from what is
peddled in the marketplace. Fear mongers sell the objects that permeate the pessimistic
dreams of the future. These purveyors of fear not only sell the notion that something
“bad” will happen, but they also sell the object that will make the “bad” dreams come
true (as well as the solutions to said problems). Thus, not only is there a “new anxiety”
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that must be dealt with on an individual and corporate level (p. 58), but there is also a
level of fear based on the real events of the world. This fear is exploited by people in
power, and it affects the ways in which people relate to one another in each present
moment. We are not just worried about the future, but we also live scared in the present.
In the midst of developing this new age of anxiety Bingaman misses out on the culture of
fear that is apparent in the actions and relationships of daily life.
So, what is this culture of fear? Researchers Konty, Duell and Joireman (2004)
described a longer standing “culture of fear” going back further than September 11th.
Their article, based on sociological and social psychology data, described the way fear
plays a major role in peoples’ lives. Looking at the research from Glassner, they put forth
the idea that
Creating and sustaining this fear serves some of the most powerful interests in
American society. The media are interested in cultivating fear because it sells
more ads and publications. The more afraid people are, the more information they
crave. Politicians are interested in cultivating fear because it provides fertile
ground to offer solutions. The more afraid people are, the more they crave
solutions to the problem… Commercial interests also benefit as people seek
goods and services to make them safer. Finally, various governmental institutions
benefit as they receive more funding to take care of the problem. (p. 94)
Our society may well be unable to function without fear. Anxiety may create uncertain
ideas about a possible future, but fear, due to the powerful response it engenders, move
items off of the shelves now. From politicians to the media, corporations to scientists,
fear is necessary in order to provide the appropriate milieu to sell the right solution.
Following the terrorist attacks on September 11th (which I understand as both a credible
threat and a subsequent political marketing opportunity) the authors described how fear is
peddled into the culture to provide a continual state of emergency. They painted a picture
that
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A daily diet of color-coded warnings and announcements that this or that building
is under threat are now de rigueur. Politicians engaged the “politics of fear”
(Altheide, 2004) to push through emergency legislation giving control agents
more authority to investigate and prevent further attacks and giving the executive
branch the authority to use the military as it sees fit. Commercial interests rushed
to market products to keep the public safe. Products not previously in demand—
gas masks and sealable rooms to guard against biological or chemical weapons,
parachutes and inflatable slides to escape from high rises under attack, giant
bomb-detecting machines for airports and important buildings—now found a
hungry market. New governmental institutions were formed and given
tremendous power and oversight. New federal workers in the airports require
babies and old ladies to present their shoes for inspection while stray bags are
destroyed with explosives. (p. 95)
All of this fear mongering occurred despite that fact that if a similar attack occurred on
American soil every year we would still be 15 times more likely to be murdered by
another American or equally likely to die in a car accident each year (p. 95).
Terrorists are the fear du jour; yet, they do not persist alone as the objects our
culture teaches us to fear. The authors continued by looking into the way crime is
discussed and treated in the public sphere. Citing a variety of studies they tease out a few
themes that are helpful to both our understanding of fear and the ways it is at work in
contemporary western culture. Their conclusion is that the more you know about crime
the more likely you are to fear it. Moreover, fear of crime restricts social behavior,
leading people to distrust their neighbors and desire more punitive measures for criminals
(pp. 95-96). To fear crime is to isolate oneself from the greater community, believing and
acting in a manner that sees the possible criminal in every person just waiting to get out.
It is not to anticipate apprehensively that one might become a victim of crime, instead it
is to act in manner where we believe that our victimization is inevitable. Anxiety turns on
the outside lights and locks the doors; fear bolts bars to windows and buys a handgun to
place under the pillow.
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Fear is a relational emotion. To be afraid is to feel threatened by the other/object.
Konty et al. posit that “Fear is a relational product, when a social relation is structured
such that one entity has the power to dictate the outcome of a second party, the second
party will experience fear” (p. 96). When we are fed a constant diet of relationships
which, in their unpredictability, make us feel powerless we will be afraid of those
relationships. On the other hand, when we are anxious, we are anxious about the
possibilities of threats and feel helpless to keep the threat from arising in the first place.
The relational difference between anxiety and fear may be one of helplessness verses
powerlessness. Namely, the relational structures of anxiety may spark a sense of
helplessness, whereas fear engenders powerlessness in relationship to a threat. When a
communal sense of powerlessness arises, or is nurtured through the propagation of
particular objects as immediate threats, a “culture of fear” transpires. In this culture of
fear we behave differently towards the other, believing that evil/threat/danger lies in the
stranger and we are powerless to control it.
Sociologist Bauman (2006) claimed that:
Fear is at its most fearsome when it is diffuse, scattered, unclear, unattached,
unanchored, free floating, with no clear address or cause; when it haunts us with
no visible rhyme or reason, when the menace we should be afraid of can be
glimpsed everywhere but is nowhere to be seen. (p. 2)
Initially, Bauman’s statement seems indicative of the confusion between fear and anxiety.
While Bauman seems to be talking about an apprehensive anticipation of what may
come, a closer reading suggests a state of being where an object is known yet what is
unknown is where the object may strike next or even what it may do. The random
possibility that the object may present itself feeds a constant state of fear which
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permeates life and creates what Bauman termed “derivative fear,” which he described as
the
sentiment of being susceptible to danger; a feeling of insecurity (the world is full
of dangers that may strike at any time with little or no warning) and vulnerability
(in the event of danger striking, there will be little if any chance of escape or
successful defence; the assumption of vulnerability to dangers depends more on a
lack of trust in the defences available than on the volume or nature of actual
threats. (p. 3, italics author’s)
Insecurity and vulnerability are synonyms for helplessness and powerless. The
susceptibility to danger he describes not only feeds the “culture of fear” but it also makes
sure that our “ages of anxiety” will persist indefinitely. Thus, when we dare walk into the
dangerous world, we do so in fear. At a basic level, we operate under the notion that
threats are probable at worst and possible at best. As Bauman points out, “occasions to be
afraid are one of the few things of which our times, badly missing certainty, security and
safety, are not short. Fears are many and varied” (p. 20). Furthermore, our fears feed a
sense of impotence which Bauman calls “that most frightening impact of fear” (p. 20).
Thus we not only walk afraid, but also believe there is nothing we can do, should we
even be able to recognize it, to stop the objects that threaten us.
Bauman used the trial of Adolf Eichmann to express how fear permeates our
relational structures. By all accounts the psychiatrists who interviewed Eichmann attested
to his “normalcy” and even remarked at some of the desirable qualities he exhibited with
his family (p. 66). Eichmann was described as:
an unexceptional, dull, boringly ‘ordinary’ creature: someone you pass on a street
without noticing. As a husband, father or neighbour he would hardly stand out
from the crowd… He just, as we all do, preferred his own comfort to that of
others. It is that common, ordinary malfeasance or lapse that at an extraordinary
time leads to extraordinary results. (p. 67)
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Their conclusion was that Eichmann was not unlike any one of us, outside the
extraordinary circumstances of World War Two Germany. The conclusion Bauman draw
from this is that under the right circumstances we all have the capacity to do evil and
morally reprehensible things. The worst thing for our fears that we could come to
understand about Eichmann was that he was not “the Devil”, not evil incarnate (p. 67).
The worst idea is the realization of the threat within ourselves; this helps us come to the
conclusion, out of that base level of fear, that no one is completely trustworthy. “Trust is
in trouble the moment we know that evil may hide anywhere; that it does not stand out
from the crowd, does not bear distinctive marks and carries no identity card” (2006, p.
67).
Everyone, though capable of evil, does not commit such atrocious acts, even
under the extraordinary circumstances like those of Nazi Germany. The internal object
that sparks the feelings of fear is the projection of our own evil possibilities onto other
unknown human beings. The natural result is to live carefully, trusting few and fearing
most. All the while we listen to the nightly news, the internet, or even just the sirens of
police cars passing by in order to confirm our fears and beliefs that the world is not
predictable. Actually it becomes predictable in the sense that everyone else poses a
tangible threat and we must do what we can to prevent our fears from becoming real. Our
culture of fear will persist as long as we listen; peddlers of fear will continue to operate in
our midst and feed us with threats (real or imagined, almost always vague enough to be
partially known) which prevent us from breaking a cycle of derivative fear. Thus, much
like the ages of anxiety we experience a culture of fear will persist in our midst.
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One final sociologist takes the “culture of fear” from mythical moniker to
mainstream movement. Frank Furedi (2006) opened his book by saying that:
It is not hope but fear that excites and shapes the cultural imagination of the early
twenty-first century. And indeed, fear is fast becoming a caricature itself. It is no
longer simply an emotion, or a response to the perception of threat. It has become
a cultural idiom through which we signal a sense of growing unease about our
place in the world. (p. vii)
Besides the tantalizing juxtaposition between hope and fear, Furedi further supports the
notion that fear is the lens through which many engage the world. When fear, as he
suggests, becomes something that excites and shapes it becomes a part of a collective
imagination. Fear is not only something we live by, but it also encompasses the way in
which interpret the world. Thus, when given an object—be it terrorists, a killer avian flu,
strangers, criminals, SUV’s rolling over, road rage, etc.—we place ourselves in a fearbased relationship with that object. We live as though it were a threat to our personal
well-being and livelihood, regardless of the actuality of that threat impacting us. When
we listen to media reports about a threat, we hear blanket not targeted information. A
threat is broadcast to the entire viewing population which ultimately gives the impression
of a widespread rather than localized phenomenon.
Furedi indicated that popular culture encourages “an expansive alarmist
imagination through providing the public with a steady diet of fearful programmes about
impending calamities – man-made and natural” (p. viii). Certainly, there are threats
happening in the world that deserve the attention and heightened response the emotion of
fear provides. However, Furedi suggests that frequently these fears are not born out of
experience but rather born from television or movies (pp. ix-x). As we are increasingly
subjected to global tragedy, global warming, global pandemics and other global threats
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there is a “tendency to perceive human activity through a narrative that emphasizes its
selfish, destructive and toxic behavior [which] underpins our culture of fear” (p. xiv). In
this context, not only do we think that a stranger might do something threatening, but we
behave as though we know that a stranger is a threat to us.
Together these authors construct a bleak assessment of the current cultural milieu.
Each author points to the rapid rise in information dissemination as one signifier that a
new culture of relationships is developing. These authors see the bombardment of
threatening media reports as changing the culture and communities in which we work,
play, and live. Their analysis points to how people react by fleeing or fighting a perceived
present threat fed to them over the airwaves, internet, and cable channels. We still live in
an “age of anxiety”, however in this current age things shifted. Threats to our safety and
well-being are no longer apparitions we apprehensively anticipate in our imaginations.
Instead, the proliferation of in-the-moment reporting gives us objects (real and imagined,
nonetheless tangible) that focus our eyes on the threats to our lives. If one of the true tests
of the difference between fear and anxiety is that fear has an object attached to it, then it
seems clear we can no longer work with anxiety alone.
As care-givers, counselors, and pastors we must begin to understand fear (and its
antidote) as it impacts the lives of our friends, families, parishioners, communities,
communities of faith, and world. One particular strand of fear-based reactions seems
important to therapeutic settings. In the final chapter of this dissertation, I assert that
trauma is one event/object/threat that triggers the emotion of fear. Traumatic events affect
the lives of millions of people each year (whether directly or vicariously) and we would
be remiss if we did not begin to look at traumatic events through the lens of fear rather
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than anxiety. Traumatic events arise through our relationship with a particular object. The
initial behaviors associated with trauma mimic those of a fear-based response. In the final
chapter of this work I will lay out my understanding of trauma as a fear-based “disorder”.
In addition, I will examine hope as the antidote and undergirding force of the emotion of
fear. Furthermore, by holding these two in relationship I will offer some clinical ideas for
helping those who suffer from the effects of traumatic situations.
My Own Fear of Spiders
I am afraid of spiders. I can’t wholly explain the origins of this fear and it has
never reached a point of complete irrationality. However, I do what I can, all I can, to
avoid contact with spiders. At ten years old I lived in an old house my parents were
renovating in the suburbs of Atlanta, Georgia. Next door to this house was an overgrown
vacant lot with a small pathway that led from back of the lot to the street out front. Often
my friends and I would play games that involved running through the pathway from one
end to the other.
One afternoon a friend and I were chasing each other through the vacant lot. We
were both running as fast as we could down that narrow pathway. I was in front and he
followed a few paces behind. As fast as we were going I have no idea how I saw what
was in front of me. Coming around a bend in the pathway I saw a huge spider web with a
large spider sitting right in the middle of it. I slammed on the brakes and stopped just
short of the spider, its legs splayed across the net and yellow belly staring back at me. My
friend couldn’t stop in time and barreled into my back pushing me ever closer to the web.
Time stopped as I hung precariously with arms raised, stomach sucked in, teetering on
the tips of my toes. I didn’t fall into the web or touch the spider; I didn’t have to, for my
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fear to be realized. My friend, smarting after smacking into my back, wondered what I
was doing. He noticed the spider and took off running in the opposite direction, I
followed closely behind him. My heart raced as the image was seared into my memory. I
lived in that house for close to eight years and that is my main memory of that vacant lot.
Even now I shudder at the ominous visions that lot forces into my consciousness. Even
today I still hike with one eye on the trees and the other on the path in front of me in
order to manage my sense of foreboding and the spiders that haunt my imagination.
I know the spider that day was a (relatively) harmless garden spider. It was not
venomous and probably much smaller than I remember. I continue to this day to read
nature stories about spiders in the hopes of one day overcoming my fear. However, I still
get chills when I think about that story; my heart beats a little harder even as I write these
words. I cannot explain my fear, yet it continues to affect my actions today. The first
thing I do when entering a basement or attic is check the ceiling, walls, and corners to
make sure no spider or web is above me. Even the feeling of a strand of spider web
touching my skin sparks a mental and physical reaction that makes my skin crawl and
long afterwards gives me the feeling that something is crawling on me. If I do encounter
a spider I feel the need to either kill it (depending on its size) or flee the situation and let
my spouse remove it. I have wasted large cans of insect killer attempting to kill spiders in
closets and garages (even though I know spiders aren’t technically insects). I am not
anxious that a spider might bite me; I have convinced myself that any spider, given the
chance, will bite me.
As you can see fear does interesting things to our minds, provided we give it the
opportunity to free associate. My memory of that day on the pathway in the vacant lot
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informed my lasting fear about spiders. Today, that memory (amongst other spider
memories) feeds my present experiences when I enter places where spiders live (or lie in
wait as I sometimes think about it). Thus, my memory, experience, and imagination has
prepared my body to react to the eventuality that I will encounter a spider. I do not do this
kind of preparation for snakes, bugs, or any other creepy crawling reptile, insect, or
animal, only spiders. Is there anxiety involved in this situation? Sure. However, since
there is an object to focus on and that object causes a particular behavioral reaction, I
believe I am afraid.
Through my experiences I formed a conditioned reaction to spiders based on what
seems, to me, to be a traumatic event in my life. The event, as part of the memory
pathways in my brain, connects spiders with threats to my life. When I encounter another
spider I react based on both memory and imagination through particular neural pathways
in the brain. This causes me to either flee the situation calling for my spouse to come deal
with the spider, or if I have rather thick shoes on (and I feel a little brave) I will stomp a
spider. While my fear may be particular and even somewhat irrational, it is fear
nonetheless and is a significant part of the way I live and move and have my being in this
world. While immersion therapies could certainly provide possible relief of this reaction,
it does not provide any sort of meaning for my fear. Removing a conditioned response
does not help us understand the necessity of fear or the hope I believe it ultimately
reveals. For us to begin to understand fear and its benefits for our life, we must find a
therapeutic antidote that can help us make some meaning of the threats that haunt us. As
this work continues I will make the case for hope to be that antidote and how it might be
employed in therapeutic settings.
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Summary
The deconstruction of anxiety helped me destabilize its meanings in order to
shake loose the emotion of fear. While anxiety is important, through the deconstruction
of its conceptual framework we see that there are meaningful differences between fear
and anxiety. These differences include the temporal genesis of the emotional state, the
antidote that alleviates discomfort caused fear or anxiety, the behavioral cues associated
with a particular emotions and the presence of a real or imagined tangible object. While
these emotional concepts are related, it is no longer the case that anxiety is the only
appropriate emotion to examine in therapeutic settings. Even the cultural milieu has
changed revealing a culture of fear that runs concurrently with the present age of anxiety.
Constant access to information about threatening objects abounds in the current
cultural milieu, giving rise to this culture of fear. When people experience these threats,
directly or indirectly, it creates an object or experience of an object which changes their
patterns of behavior. Their fears call forth the expectation that they will (not may) be the
next victims of the same threat. Sociologists Furedi and Bauman understand that the
objects we fear are not only tangible real objects; but that culturally mitigated objects can
also become a part of personal and cultural imaginative structures which lead to fearbased reactions in present moments (or an underlying derivative fear). Our baseline of
fear has a damaging effect on our ability to relate to one another meaningfully. Over the
course of the remaining chapters in this dissertation I want to present an understanding of
fear useful for therapeutic conversation. This discussion will utilize neurological,
narrative and theological perspectives to propose meanings about fear and its relationship
to hope.
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Chapter Three: The Neurophysiology of Fear and
its Conservation in Human History
This chapter addresses the biological/physiological axis of the human emotion of
fear. In this chapter I explore the emotion of fear utilizing neurophysiological and
evolutionary data. Through neurophysiological data I will examine the notion that there is
no such thing as a fearless individual (barring certain brain anomalies). Additionally, I
will examine the emotion of fear through evolutionary sources. This helps contextualize
the emotion of fear as a long-standing reaction to threats conserved throughout our
evolutionary history. Utilizing dual inheritance evolutionary theory allows me to
introduce an understanding of fear that lacks the reductionism of some other approaches
to the emotion of fear. Together these two sources of knowledge provide a wealth of
information concerning the embodiment of fear and the behavioral reactions related to it.
At the end of Chapter Two I described my fear of spiders. They are a threat that
produces typical fear behaviors from me. When I encounter a spider two things happen, I
recall memories and experiences with spiders, and my brain sends a particular set of
reactions to the rest of my body. This dual reaction forms the foundation for these next
two chapters. In this chapter I will mostly explore the emotion of fear. “Fear” or the
“emotion of fear” pertains to the neurological and physiological reactions that occur
when a person encounters a threat. In the next chapter I explore the subjective
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foundations of our “fears”. These are the unique threats we fear as individuals based on
our experiences and subjective interpretations of the world. 6
Human beings are embodied creatures. An examination of the emotion of fear
explores what it means to be a physical actor in a world that has both predictable and
unpredictable threats. This chapter describes the emotion of fear as a physiological and
behavioral reaction beginning in the brain and designed to help us survive and cope with
experiences of threats in an unpredictable world. As subsequent chapters unfold, I will
provide other interpretations of fear through subjective, narrative and theological lenses.
My study of fear will conclude with an interpretation of its meaning utilizing a process
theological framework. This meaning oriented conclusion sees fear as not only basic to
survival, but adaptive and constructive, orienting us towards the things we hold important
in our lives.
Neuropsychologist LeDoux (2002) hypothesized that fear is a physiologically
based emotion “conserved to a large extent across human cultures” (p. 389). As long as
there are stimuli in the environment that threatens our existence we will physiologically
experience the emotion of fear. Try as we might, we cannot escape, rationalize or
completely extinguish the emotion of fear from our lives. The emotion of fear is a
necessary part of our embodied existence regardless of any attempts at resistance. For
theologians to accept this hypothesis as valid, we must also wrestle with how the emotion
of fear, as a physiological and evolutionary reality, can be seen as life-giving in the larger
divine-human relational structure.
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By exploring the physiological axis of the emotion of fear I am making the
statement that part of our unique (yet sometimes similar) personhood is developed
through our embodied selves. In part, to know someone is to understand the ways in
which their bodies act and react to their contexts. By the same token, we are not our
bodies alone. We have unique minds which interpret the world around us. We develop
and devote ourselves to systems of meaning which shape our interpretive processes. Yet,
we can do none of these things without a body, without some physical presence in the
world. Understanding the physiological and evolutionary evidence related to the emotion
of fear is one step in understanding the larger milieu through which fear operates. While
neurophysiology and evolutionary patterns of conservation and behavior supply us with
information about the emotion of fear, this research cannot tell us what it means to be
afraid. It cannot tell us which things will threaten us; it cannot predict traumatic events or
the association of threats with our experiences. It can predict what happens to our bodies
when the emotion of fear is experienced. In order to understand fear, we should
understand its importance in human functioning. We cannot short change this important
aspect of our embodiment. So, this first step is important in providing a grounding
framework through which the meaning of fear can be explored honestly.
This chapter is comprised of three sections. The first section describes a general
understanding of the brain and its functioning. This includes specific structures of the
brain related to the emotion of fear. In the second section, I examine one discipline which
has sought to apply meanings to the evolution of the emotion of fear. I find their
conclusions sorely lacking. Since the emotion of fear is conserved “to a large extent
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across human cultures” (LeDoux, 2002, p. 389), evolutionary data plays an important role
in understanding behaviors and the importance of the emotion itself. Therefore, I utilize
dual inheritance theory to examine the emotion of fear from an evolutionary perspective.
The final section of this chapter brings together neurophysiological, evolutionary and
behavioral research in order to develop a complete understanding of how the emotion of
fear is embodied in our active and reactive lives.
The Brain and our Reactions to Fear
The human brain is the most complex organic structure studied in human history.
It is a mass of bundled cells and neurochemicals hidden behind a protective shell. The
brain is responsible for sending electrochemical impulses through our nervous systems in
order to arouse or inhibit particular functions. In addition to the semi-conscious acts, the
brain also regulates temperature, heart rate and breathing without us ever having to
actually “think” about doing these things. In addition to all of these regulatory functions,
the brain shares a meaningful relationship with the mind, allowing for unique
personalities and interpretive subjectivities to develop.
A study of the brain and its structures can provide us with valuable information
about the common neural life of human beings. Biology professor Mark Dubin (2002)
wrote that the brain is “the basis of our interactions with the world… it is the organ
responsible for realizing there is a ‘me’ and there is a world that is different from me” (p.
1). There are two keys words in this phrase, “organ” and “me”, which I interpret to mean
“brain” and “mind”. While our interpretations and interactions with the world are
complex and multifaceted, these interactions have one thing in common: their genesis in
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the brain. To forgo knowledge concerning the brain for the pleasures of the mind is to
miss a large part of what makes us human. 7 Theologians, pastoral or otherwise, would be
remiss if they do not at least begin to understand what neurophysiological research adds
to our field of study. To know the brain, its organization, its functioning, its complexity
and its design is to begin to know the God within us; as we come to know this complex
structure, we begin to see how the brain experiences and remembers and responds down
to the individual neuron and its purposes; we endeavor to understand how the brain
senses the world and responds, but also how it functions creatively and imaginatively. As
pastors and theologians, basic knowledge about the brain should not be the exception but
the rule.
The Brain
It is easy to think of the brain like another organ, functioning as a single entity or
system. This is true to a point. However, we should also understand that the brain is
comprised of specific areas that perform specialized functions. Neuroscientist Joseph
LeDoux (1996) remarked that “different faculties or functions are localized in different
regions of the brain, and functional localization is now taken as an accepted fact” (p. 76).
Contemporary advances in imaging techniques have allowed neurological researchers to
map how particular parts of the brain respond to stimuli. At the same time we are
learning about these functionally specific (localized) areas of the brain, it is apparent that
these areas function as part of the larger organ that is the brain.
For example, our eyes are highly specialized parts of our bodies charged with
receiving visual stimuli. They are connected via the optic nerve which extends to the
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thalamus. The thalamus then passes the impulses to the back portion (occipital lobe) of
the cerebral cortex. Simply reading this page causes our eyes to move back and forth
(using parts of our brain stem to control their movement). Thankfully, much of the work
between localized functions happens without conscious effort. We do not have to tell our
brains to read and then send the signals along to the appropriate place for analysis.
However, just moving our eyes and sending the stimuli along is not the end of the
journey. Our brains, interpreting the visual stimuli as words, then sends the impulses to
the correct portion of the brain (generally the left hemisphere) and they are placed in the
context of our knowledge and experiences. These impulses might lead to the arousal of
emotions; they may even spark creative thoughts or may cause a physiological sensation.
Each subsequent reaction would involve a different structure and/or area of the brain
which utilizes further corresponding connections to move the body into action.
If this visual pathway was damaged, then we would have severe difficulty with
the initial phase of receiving a visual stimulus. We even might not be able to see the
words on the page. If the damage occurred later in the journey, say in the language
centers of the brain, the words might lose their meaning and/or interpretation. Any
damage to these pathways 8 might render the words we read meaningless. Another factor
in this neural journey is the availability of the right neurotransmitters. The lack of
specific neurotransmitters might inhibit impulses from reaching the appropriate
destination in the brain. While simple, I hope this example underscores the necessity of
localized functions which operate in a larger context to produce the results desired.
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Understanding localization merely scratches the surface into what we know (and
don’t know) about the brain. What follows is three ways people have discussed the
functioning of the brain. While the first two methods do not provide the level depth
needed to fully examine the emotion of fear, they are nonetheless important ways of
understanding the brain. The first method relates to hemispheric specificity. This method
of understanding the brain is helpful, but it lacks an overall completeness by focusing on
tasks related to cognitive functions of the brain. The second method of conceptualizing
the brain is the triune brain theory. This theory organizes the brain around three epochs of
development, attributing certain functions to a layer of the brain. The trouble with this
theory is that it develops discrete areas of specialization where there is little to no
evidence to support the claims. The most appropriate method of examining the brain is
through its anatomy. While accurate, this method of looking at the brain comes across as
piecemeal rather than a cohesive system.
Hemispheric specificity.
Hemispheric specificity examines the brain through its cognitive localizations.
Wehrenberg and Prinz (2007) described the left hemisphere as the region of the brain
where meaning making and verbal work take place, and the right hemisphere as
responsible for emotional memory, creativity and spatial relations (p. 10). Neuroscientist
Michael Gazzaniga noted that, “the left hemisphere is dominant for language, and speech
is generated only from the left hemisphere… [it] is also specialized for processing written
language although the right hemisphere does have a limited capacity for reading” (2005,
p. 654). Moreover, the left hemisphere is generally responsible for organizing

59

information, recording events, and putting them in a sequence that pays attention to time.
It is also responsible for forming verbal and mathematical symbols and giving them
meanings related to experiences (Wehrenberg & Prinz, p. 10).
The right hemisphere reads the environment and interprets emotional content,
helping provide a response to what it recognizes. The right side of the brain not only
creates novel responses to emotional cues but also helps deal with practical situations
using our imaginations (Wehrenberg & Prinz, p. 11). Gazzaniga reported that the right
hemisphere is superior in completing tasks such as “part-whole relationships, spatial
relationships, apparent motion detection, mental rotation, spatial matching, and mirror
image discrimination” (2005, p. 654). As a theory of brain organization, hemispheric
specificity provides helpful information related to the more sophisticated activities of the
brain. As a complete concept it is limited. In fact it barely scratches the surface 9 when it
comes to understanding how the brain functions as a larger system with localized
specialties.
The Triune Brain
The triune brain theory posits three sections to the brain: the reptilian,
paleomammalian, and neomammalian. The reptilian brain forms the core of the triune
brain which includes parts of the brain closest to the spinal column. The reptilian brain is
responsible for basic life support functions and helps facilitate the gathering of sensory
data. It also represents the earliest and oldest portions of the brain corresponding with of
species who have a spine. The reptilian brain is considered highly specialized to maintain
heart rate and breathing (among other things). It contributes little other than some
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individual quirks to distinguishing a person from animal. The second brain, the
paleomammalian brain, is an additional layer of neural matter encompassing the reptilian
brain. This brain is associated with emotions and the interpretation of sensory data. The
paleomammalian brain is similar in position and function across all species of mammals.
This area of the brain is hypothesized to allow for the kind of memories which lead to
some individuation. The final layer in the triune brain is the neomammalian brain, which
consists of an outer layer encompassing the paleomammalian brain. This is the highly
evolved layer of the brain which ultimately allows human beings (and some animals) to
develop higher cognitive functions. The neomammalian brain also exercises control over
some of the impulses of the other brains.
Each layer provide vital functions to carry out life for a specific animal. Thus,
there is no sense that one “brain” is more primitive than another. Paul MacLean, who
developed and researched much of the triune brain theory, believed that the “three
evolutionary formations might be imagined as three interconnected biological computers,
with each having its own special intelligence, its own subjectivity, its own sense of time
and space, and its own memory, motor, and other functions” (1990, p. 9). MacLean’s
work provides a consistent theory concerning the evolution of the brain across time. It
also provides a greater connection between human beings and the animal world.
However, this theory is not without its problems. The first and most important is that the
triune brain theory seems to posit discrete groups of systems where they may not exist.
Moreover, while there are centers of activity in the brain where specific functions occur,
the operations of the brain are more complicated than just saying that a region or sub-
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region is solely dedicated to a particular purpose and that purpose alone. Thus, while
there is a great deal of certainty around the localization of functioning with different parts
of the brain, care should be taken with how far we want to generalize this specialization
across wide swaths of the brain (LeDoux, 1996, pp. 98-103).
Brain Anatomy.
Finally, the best way to understand the localization and system of the brain is by
building a picture of the brain from the brainstem up (and out) to the cerebral cortex.
Three anatomical parts help map the brain, the hindbrain, midbrain and forebrain. A
fourth part, what is often known as the “limbic system” forms a ring around the top of the
brainstem and sits in between it and the cerebral cortex. Neuropsychologist LeDoux
(1996) characterizes the significance of these distinctive parts. He stated “As we ascend
from hindbrain [through midbrain] to forebrain, the functions go from psychologically
primitive to psychologically elaborate” (p. 82). Working our way up from the brain stem
to the cerebral cortex we find that the brain is performing increasingly complex tasks,
assuming that reason is the most complex of the tasks the brain performs.
The Hindbrain. Geographically, the pons, medulla oblongata and midbrain make
up most of the brainstem; with the pons and medulla oblongata considered to be part of
the hindbrain (Hendelman, 2006, p. 54). Additionally, the cerebellum (or little brain) is
often included in discussions about the hindbrain. The pons connects the hind and
midbrain and more importantly “affects physical arousal” (Wehrenberg & Prinz, 2007, p.
15). The pons controls blood pressure and serves an important role in the physical
symptoms of anxiety, as well as playing a role in deep sleep patterns. The medulla
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oblongata is one of the older structures of the brain, responsible for many of the
unconscious activities of the brain, including respiratory functions and making sure the
heart beats.
Little is known about the extent of the role and function of the cerebellum (p. 15).
What is known is that it plays a role related to “balance, posture, walking… in integrating
information… [and finally] it is assumed that the cerebellum plays important roles in
dreaming, memory, and other functions” (2007, p. 15). Some other functions thought to
occur in the cerebellum relate to different emotional states (See Sacchetti, Scelfo, &
Strata, 2005; Turner et al., 2007).
The midbrain. The midbrain forms the top of the brain stem, and it is the smallest
of the three anatomical designations. Neuroscientist Hendelman saw the midbrain as
having a distinct role in motor activity, including a series of fibers associated with eye
and neck movement. Moreover, the midbrain contains pain and temperature fibers as well
as large bundles of axons which connect to several limbic structures along with other
parts of the brain (pp. 176-178). Other than these functions, little else is known about the
extent of functioning related to the midbrain.
The Forebrain. The forebrain is described as “The largest part of the brain, which
includes the cerebral cortex and basal ganglia. The forebrain is credited with the highest
intellectual functions” (Society for Neuroscience, 2006, p. 58). The functions of the
cerebral cortex are often discussed with regard to the specialties of the left and right
hemispheres. Much of the forebrain consists of the gyri and fissures (see note 9 for more
about these terms) which make up the “folds” we see when looking at the outside of the
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brain. In human beings, the cerebral cortex is responsible for advanced cognitive
associations.
The basal ganglia consist of a set of three nuclei 10 whose primary functions seem
to revolve around the initiation and completion of tasks related to fine motor skills.
Hendelman adds that “some of the structures of the basal ganglia are thought to influence
cognitive aspects of motor control, helping to plan the sequence of tasks needed for
purposeful activity” (2006, p. 66). 11 The amygdala is often considered an additional
nucleus in the basal ganglia; however, because it also plays a significant role in the
production of fear it is almost always discussed in the context of the limbic system.
The Limbic “System.”
The term “limbic system” may be a misnomer despite its persistence in
neurological circles. The limbic structures have most commonly been associated with
emotion; however, according to LeDoux (2000b) the concept of a “limbic system” “has
come under attack both as an anatomical concept and as a theory of the emotional brain”
(p. 290) 12. Through research into the limbic structures, it becomes clear that these parts
may not actually function as a discrete “system” (see LeDoux, 1996, pp. 100-101).
Despite the critiques of limbic system theories, the term and its associations persist in
neuropsychological circles. LeDoux attributes the survival of the limbic system theory to
one of two reasons, either (1) the need to give a name to the area between the
hypothalamus and neocortex, or (2) evidence that some emotional functions come from
structures in the limbic area, which is then generalized in order to verify that all of the
structures are involved in the production of emotions (1996, pp.101-102). Much of the
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debate concerning this area of the brain lies with the notion that no one can definitively
state what parts of the brain make up the limbic system.
I choose to think about the limbic area as a set of structures rather than a distinct
or cohesive system. This way of thinking maintains some of the ideas about localized
functioning without over-generalizing. Furthermore, it takes seriously the
interconnectedness of these structures with the rest of the brain. Semantically, I think it is
easy to justify referring to the limbic system as “limbic structures” 13. The term “limbic”
describes the ring shaped geography of the area. Additionally, the term “structures” helps
signify some independence while maintaining their proximity to one another. For our
purposes, “limbic structures” may provide some additional precision, especially since we
will focus on one particular structure in the limbic area.
Overall, I utilize the structures named by Wehrenberg & Prinz in their discussion
concerning the limbic system (2007, p. 14). They named the hippocampus, thalamus,
hypothalamus and amygdala as the primary structures in the limbic area and each of these
structures share connections and function together in certain circumstances. While other
structures might be included in an anatomy text, discussing these four structures fulfills
the purpose of a general introduction on the brain. The thalamus, hypothalamus and
hippocampus will serve as our introduction to the limbic structures, while the amygdala
will receive some special attention due to its role regarding the emotion of fear.
In some descriptions of the limbic area, the thalamus is left off. Much like the
amygdala it both is and isn’t a part of the limbic structures. The thalamus actually sits in
the middle of the limbic area and contains significant connections with the cerebral
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cortex as well as other structures in the limbic area. Sitting on top of the brain stem, the
thalamus acts as a central relay station for most external stimuli gathered by the senses. 14
It then sends along the sensory information to the appropriate part of the brain for action
(Al-Chalabi, Turner, & Delamont, 2006, p. 56). There are two additional features of the
thalamus that are important to mention. First, the connections between it and the cerebral
cortex are reciprocal, meaning the thalamus both sends and receives information from the
cerebral cortex (Hendelman, 2006, p. 36). Reciprocity between the thalamus and cerebral
cortex means that some sensory information becomes laden with higher associations
before being sent on for a response. The thalamus also regulates brain waves and plays a
role in sleep (Wehrenberg & Prinz, 2007, pp. 26-27).
Finally, the thalamus shares a direct connection with the amygdala. This enables
sensory information to proceed quickly to the amygdala for emotional coding and
reaction. Thus, when we are frightened by an unknown threat, the body can react quickly
through this connection. Otherwise the sensory information would have to be processed
by the thalamus, sent to the appropriate region of the cortex and then on to the amygdala
for the appropriate response. This “early warning system” helps prepare the body in order
to respond to stimuli quickly and appropriately (LeDoux, 1996, p. 165)
The second limbic structure is the hypothalamus, which sits towards the front and
bottom of the thalamus. This tightly-packed group of nuclei performs a variety of
autonomic functions including: the regulation of temperature, thirst and eating habits,
heart rate and temperature (Citow & Macdonald, 2001, p. 147). Additionally, the
hypothalamus plays a role in the sympathetic (action) and parasympathetic (rest) nervous
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systems. It also has a direct connection to the amygdala, helping speed flight, fright and
freeze actions when a threatening stimulus is recognized.
Finally, there is the hippocampus. The hippocampus is a complex structure that
wraps around the thalamus, connecting to other limbic structures. 15 It plays a role in the
storage of memories, recording facts and events before they are transferred to other parts
of the brain for long-term storage. It also plays a role in spatial orientation, helping with
the navigation of complex environments (Hendelman, 2006, pp. 210-216). The
hippocampus connects to the amygdala, hypothalamus and the cerebral cortex. Damage
to the hippocampus generally reveals a deficit in the ability to form new episodic
memories (Strange & Dolan, 2006).
The image in Figure 1 captures many of the anatomical structures discussed in
this overview.

Figure 1. A Medial View of the Brain (image retrieved and adapted from Brain Facts, 2006, p. 5)

Beginning at the bottom, the hindbrain connects to the spinal cord and midbrain. This
leads to the limbic area with the thalamus sitting on top of the midbrain. Finally, outside
of the limbic area lies the forebrain. Looking at the image, it is also easy to see how one
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might surmise discrete “systems” based on the geography of the brain. While localization
is a reality, it is also apparent that the connections between structures are vital to the
overall performance of the brain. The brain is a delicate and complex system and our
knowledge of its inner-workings, though vast, does not compare to the mysteries that it
still holds for us. Wehrenberg and Prinz offered this warning about brain research, “new
studies about the brain become available at an astounding rate… Each new piece of
research may cause us to review former assumptions about how the brain operates”
(2007, p. 5). Though my general overview of the brain ends here, one limbic structure
remains to be discussed, the amygdala.
The Amygdala – Structure, Connections and Functions.
The amygdalae are small bilateral structures 16 located between the limbic
structures and basal ganglia. Its name is derived from the Latin word for almond. From
the image above we can see that they sit towards the front of the brain at the tip of the
hippocampus. The amygdalae are made up of a number of nuclei which connect to
different parts of the brain. This allows the amygdala to influence a variety of functions
ranging from respiration and heart rate, to memory and stress responses to behaviors and
thoughts (Hendelman, 2006; Wehrenberg & Prinz, 2007). While the thalamus is
considered to be the central clearinghouse for sensory data (except olfactory senses which
go straight to the amygdala), the amygdala is thought of as playing a central role in the
coding of emotions with stimuli (Hendelman, 2006, p. 218).
More specifically, the amygdala has been shown to be active during the process of
fear conditioning 17 and the subsequent responses to the feeling of fear (Dubin, 2002;
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Knight, Smith, Cheng, Stein & Helmstetter, 2004; LeDoux, 1996; Morrison, Allardyce &
McKane, 2002). The myriad input and output connections implicate the amygdala in the
genesis of defensive behaviors that signal the emotion of fear. What seems to be well
established by current research is that the amygdala plays a significant role with regard to
the emotion of fear as it relates to threats in the environment. Additionally, through its
connections to the hippocampus and other cortical areas, the amygdala has a relationship
to our memories.
The connection between memory and the amygdala is more explicit when the
memory includes stimuli that arouse the emotions (Cahill, 2000; Fenker, Schott,
Richardson-Klavehn, Heinze & Duzel, 2005; McGaugh, Ferry, Vazdarjanova &
Roozendaal, 2000; Morrison, Allardyce & McKane, 2002; Strange & Dolan, 2006). This
means that “the amygdala strengthens memory consolidation during times of strong
emotion” (Miller, Taber, Gabbard & Hurley, 2005, p. 2). Thus, the amygdala aids in the
emotional encoding of memories which are then stored elsewhere in the brain. These
memories are thought to be more vivid, enduring and easily recalled due to the additional
layer of emotional coding present at the time of their making (Cahill, 2000; Strange &
Dolan, 2006). In this case, both positive and negative emotions seem to become
correlated with memories in conjunction with an active amygdala.
Among the variety of neural pathways to and from the amygdala, two help us
understand the ways in which the emotion of fear arises. The first is through a direct
connection with the thalamus. This connection provides nearly instantaneous responses 18
to possible threatening stimuli. We might think of the thalamo-amygdala pathway as the
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interstate; whereas the second pathway, the thalamo-cortico-amygdala is closer to a
highway. The thalamus is responsible for receiving sensory input and sending it along to
the appropriate places in the brain. As an example, take reading this page. Our eyes scan
the words, impulses head down the optic nerve through the thalamus which directs them
on to the visual cortex. There is little emotional content to the words and so the amygdala
is less active and doesn’t need to be a part of the process. All of a sudden, out of the
corner of your eye, you see an unrecognizable black figure creep along the edge of the
table. In an instant that stimuli is recognized as unknown and possibly threatening. The
thalamus sends the sensory data on two journeys.
The first journey is straight to the amygdala, which activates a series of defensive
behaviors in order to act appropriately towards an imminent threat. LeDoux points out
that “the information received from the thalamus is unfiltered and biased toward evoking
responses” (1996, p. 165). This speedy connection enables the brain to prepare the body
for either fight or flight. When this happens, you might feel your body tense (or freeze) as
your muscles prepare for movement or action. Your heart rate might increase a little and
you may feel your skin grow cold as you sweat and your blood flow is diverted.
At the same time the sensory information is sent through cortical pathways in
order to identify the stimulus. The stimulus is checked against the memory of threatening
objects and that information is then sent along to the amygdala as well. This longer
pathway serves to keep the amygdala in check so that we aren’t jumping at every shadow.
So when our body freezes and we tense up our eyes dart to the object to ascertain level of
threat that it poses. If we see that the object is nothing more than a piece of fuzz blowing
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across the table then the body will relax and we can draw our attention back to the tasks
at hand. However, if the object turns out to be a black widow spider and our best recourse
is to run away, then the thalamo-amygdala pathway has already prepared our body for
escape (of course if we didn’t think we could escape we might also pick up a book and
squash the spider).
To conclude, we know that barring a disruption in the normal formation of the
brain everyone has an amygdala. In those people who have experienced lesions or
damage to the nuclei of the amygdala there is a deficit in their ability to recognize threats
and experience the emotion of fear (Tranel, Gullickson, Kock & Adolphs, 2006). The
amygdala also plays a role in the emotional encoding of memories which is thought to
intensify them, enable them to last longer and be more easily recalled. Additionally, this
body of nuclei displays a vast array of interconnections with the rest of brain enabling it
to directly influence behavior among other physiological functions. The amygdala is a
central source for the emotion of and behaviors associated with fear. What we can
surmise from all of this data about the brain in general and the amygdala in particular is
that only in extreme cases do we find a fearless individual. Fear is a normal part of
human functioning, and indeed a necessary part of our humanity. The necessity of the
emotion of fear can be seen through its conservation in our evolutionary history.
Evolution, Psychology and Fear
Evolutionary Psychology and the Evolved Fear Module
Evolutionary psychology is a discipline which provides hypotheses about
emotions and their conservation in human evolution. As a discipline, evolutionary
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psychology describes “human functioning from an adaptationist perspective, examining
the mental mechanisms that evolved to solve problems faced in our ancestral past and
how those mechanisms continue to produce behavior today” (Salmon & Crawford, 2008,
p. 1). Evolutionary psychology is a discipline designed to unravel the mysteries of human
nature and provide some guidance and thought into how our brains and minds adapted to
a changing and often unpredictable environment. According to Salmon and Crawford
most people involved with evolutionary psychology would agree to six assumptions that
guide the field. These assumptions are
1.

Human behavior can (and should) be explained at both a proximate and
ultimate level of analysis;

2.

Domain specificity, that adaptive problems are solved through specific
designated physical and behavioral structures or mental modules;

3.

These mental mechanisms are innate; there is no genetic variation in them
between people (except for those differences between the sexes related to
differences in the ancestral problems they faced);

4.

Human nature is explained best as the product of genes and environment;

5.

The workings of most mental mechanisms are not available to
consciousness; and

6.

There are differences between the current and ancestral environment that
may influence the functioning or outcome of evolved mechanisms (some
Darwinian anthropologists discount this difference). (p. 13)

Briefly, the first assumption gives us the purpose of evolutionary psychology, to explain
human behavior at individual and collective levels. The third assumption proposes that
there is homogeneity of structure and behavior within species, allowing for some evolved
differences between the sexes. The fourth assumption posits that human beings act out of
a combination of our biological heritage and environmental structures. That is, we have
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been preprogrammed to a certain extent to respond to different environmental cues and
those same environmental cues help shape and re-shape our programming. The fifth
assumption reminds us that much of our activity and identity stems from unconscious
mental processes. The sixth assumption makes clear that because our environment is
different than our biological ancestors that the same mental mechanisms they used may
acquire a different shape in this contemporary environment.
Returning to the second assumption, it basically describes designated modules of
the brain that have evolved throughout the eons to deal with specific issues in the
environment. The principle behind this assertion is that “evolutionary processes shape
brain mechanisms and brain mechanisms shape behavior” (Barrett, 2008, p. 173). These
mechanisms can be thought of as specialized units that play “a causal role in guiding
behavior on the basis of neurally coded information” (p. 174). This means that dedicated
portions of the brain guide behaviors based on pre-coded information through specialized
structures or systems developed and passed down in our evolutionary history.
Furthermore, these modules are not expected “to operate in isolation from other systems
because a key value of specialization is that it leads to flexibility and computational
power when modules interact” (p. 174). The thrust of the modular theory seems to be that
the brain has intelligently evolved capacities which enable it to recognize various cues
within the environment and react to those cues without using too much brain power.
Because of these unconscious modules the brain is free to utilize the excess energy for
other tasks as they present themselves.
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Evolutionary psychology, while intriguing, is often characterized as over-stating
what can truly be said about the human brain and the development of the mind. The brief
introduction presented here grounds us in the basics of evolutionary psychology. Even
though I disagree with most of what is proposed in the forthcoming evolved fear module,
it is important engage disciplines that capture the imaginations of psychologists and
researchers. Evolution is important to our understanding of fear. However, the evolved
fear module may not be the best way to characterize that importance. The remainder of
this section presents the evidence for an evolved fear module. I will then develop two
criteria which can be used to critique and test the hypotheses of evolutionary
psychologists. At the conclusion of this section I provide a critique of the evolved fear
module based on the criteria previously developed.
The Evolved Fear Module.
Evolutionary psychologists Mineka and Öhman argued that the evolved fear
module is
a relatively independent mental, behavioral, and neural system that was
specifically tailored by evolutionary pressures to help solve problems of adapting
to dangerous and potentially life-threatening situations frequently encountered in
the ecology of our early mammalian evolutionary ancestors. (p. 928-929)
For the authors, “fear originates in defensive behavior systems that have helped
organisms to cope with different types of survival threats” (p. 927). Rather than devote
conscious brain power to the constant scanning of the environment for threats, a fear
module evolved allowing the brain to relegate the tasks of threat recognition and response
to the unconscious. This module is revealed through four components.
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The first component is selectivity of input, which describes the emotion of fear as
“especially sensitive to stimuli that seem to have been associated with recurring
threatening situations in mammalian evolutionary history” (p. 928). The authors contend
that human brains contain genetically coded instructions concerning particular
evolutionary threats. Activation of these evolutionary threats (such as spiders and snakes)
occurs either innately or through mild conditioning such as being told to fear an object.
To back up this claim the authors point to research which shows that phylogenetic 19
threats tend to have stronger associations and are harder to extinguish once activated (pp.
930-931). This does not mean that ontogenetic threats are irrelevant to the evolved fear
module, but that there is a preference for phylogenetic threat.
The second characteristic, automaticity, describes the evolved fear module’s
“tendency to be preferentially activated automatically by fear-relevant stimuli” (p. 932).
One way we might understand this claim is by highlighting the thalamo-amygdala
pathway, which begins the process of a fear reaction before a cognitive appraisal of a
threat is made. However, the authors are claiming a bit more than just a dedicated
pathway between the thalamus and the amygdala. They claim that the evolved fear
module constantly scans the environment for threats and reacts almost instantly when a
threat appears. Without the burdens of cognitive awareness of a threat, this module
provides us with the opportunity to rapidly escape from threats. To back up this claim the
authors point to the structural evolution of the brain in nonhuman species and their ability
to scan and react to threats in the environment rapidly. They also point to some of their
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own research using subliminal images of feared objects which elicited a conditioned fear
response (p. 932).
The third characteristic of the evolved fear module is encapsulation from higher
cognitive processes. Mineka and Öhman state that “Encapsulation refers more to the
relative independence and resistance of the fear response, once initiated, to conscious
cognitive control” (p. 932). Phobias are a type of fear response where clients self-report
the inability to gain cognitive control of their fears despite the knowledge of their
irrationality. Furthermore, the same research into automaticity provides some support for
the claim that fear responses are relatively independent of the cognitive domain.
The final characteristic that the authors posit for their fear module is distinct
neural circuitry present in other mammals and separate from the sections of the brain that
perform higher cognitive tasks. The authors contend that this dedicated neural circuitry is
found in the amygdala and its connections. Mineka and Öhman’s assertions about an
evolved fear module seem believable. However, as we will come to see, their theory is
not without its problems.
Before delving into critiques of the evolved fear module, I want to make a clear
statement about evolution in general. I take the theory of evolution to be the best
available scientific representation of how human beings came to be a part of this world.
My approval of this theory does not mean that the theory provides a complete
explanation; however it is the best available theory given the scientific data available to
us. Second, believing evolution is the best available theory does not exclude believing in
God, and God’s persuasive power. Theologian Griffin’s work (2000; 2001; 2004) on
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religion and scientific naturalism proposes an alternative to mechanistic science called
theistic naturalism. Theistic naturalism allows for the movement and mystery of God at
the most basic levels of the functioning world 20. Through the belief that God is in all
(panentheism) and that God persuades rather than commands events into being we can
speculate about some of the mystery of how complex objects evolve when science tells us
most objects tend toward simplicity.
Critiquing Evolutionary Psychology.
Evolutionary psychologists Duntley and Buss proposed that “evolutionary
psychology provides a unifying metatheory for the currently disparate and disconnected
branches of psychology” (2008, p. 31). In an age where there is a healthy skepticism
about anything that proposes to unify everything, there will be no shortage of critics.
Evolutionary psychology has been critiqued by philosophers, anthropologists,
behaviorists and psychologists. These critiques range from problems with specific claims
to meta-critiques of the entire discipline. Using the work of philosopher Richardson two
criteria interrogate the claims related to the evolved fear module. His primary concerns
are related to the evidence used to propose specific modules and the manner in which
history is used to support claims.
Richardson declared that “evolutionary psychology as currently practiced is often
speculation disguised as results. We should regard it as such” (2007, p. 12). According to
Richardson, evolutionary psychology claims that “psychological processes are
adaptations, not to present circumstance, but to our ancestral environment. The fact that
they are adaptations, in turn, is supposed to explain and ground our psychological
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capacities” (p. 13). According to evolutionary psychologists, the capacities we exhibit
today have little to do with ontogeny, those things that have happened since birth, save
when those things trigger our phylogenic psychological capacities. When evolutionary
psychology claims we are products of our genes and environment, the environment to
which they often refer is that of the Pleistocene period. Our ancestors of this “epoch
spanning 1.8 million to 10,000 years ago” lived “in small hunter-gatherer groups, but
only the past 10,000 years living as agriculturists and the past couple hundred years
living in industrial societies” (Buller, 2005, p. 9).
Richardson’s major argument with evolutionary psychology is with its status as
an evolutionary discipline. Two of his critiques develop out of methodological concerns.
Richardson expected that through evolutionary research “we should expect sound
evidence; and, for theories that matter more, we should expect better evidence. We
should expect more from theories that matter more” (2007, p. 34). For Richardson there
is no more important theory than the one purporting to explain human beings, something
evolutionary psychology purports to do. Therefore, the theoretical output of evolutionary
psychologists should utilize a higher standard in choosing the evidence that backs up
their claims. This evidence should be solid, taking into account and explaining dissenting
evidence when necessary.
A second methodological critique Richardson suggests is related to the historical
turn. That is, given what we understand about pre-historical human beings, does the
evidence work? The historical turn, according to Richardson, is vital to any evolutionary
argument. Richardson claimed that there was an integral relationship between form,
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function and history. We can see the current form of something and infer some of its
functional components. The historical turn is an attempt to connect this form and its
functions to historical human beings in order to explain how this function has been
selected for through eons of growth and change. As Richardson put it, “The historical
turn is crucial for evolutionary reasoning. Form follows function, but only contingent on
history” (p. 53). Looking at the evolved fear module, the claim is that dedicated circuitry
developed out of the behaviors and associated feelings of fear related to threats. Those
hominids with the behaviors and associated circuitry would be the survivors and produce
enough offspring with similar circuitry that it became a ubiquitous feature of our
evolution. Therefore, data from the historical turn should reveal that some Pleistocene era
hominids did not possess the brain circuitry related to the production of fear. Moreover,
those with fear circuitry had to possess a distinct advantage and thus procreated more
often. This would effectively extinguish any line of hominid without the associated brain
circuitry and behaviors related to fear. The question here is can we effectively validate
any of these claims?
The Evolved Fear Module, Revisited.
Evidence.
The first criterion I will use to revisit the evolved fear module examines the
evidence used to prove its existence. Utilizing the four characteristics that make up the
evolved fear module – selectivity of input, automaticity, encapsulation and distinct neural
circuitry – I will examine evidence which refutes and/or corroborates this module. The
guiding assumption for evidentiary claims is that because we are developing theories
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about human beings, then the evidence supporting these claims should be held to a higher
standard.
Beginning with selectivity of input and automaticity, the authors believe that the
evolved fear module is specifically tuned in to those threats that were most relevant to
our Pleistocene ancestors. Additionally, the module is automatically and unconsciously
scanning the environment for threats. They offer snakes and spiders as two phylogenetic
threats that persist in contemporary human beings and induce automatic reactions.
Current research calls the full veracity of this claim into question.
Blanchette (2006) found that phylogenetic and ontogenetic fears have a similar
response time. Her research revealed that
efficient detection of threat is not restricted to targets that have high evolutionary
significance—which our brains could have been prepared to detect specifically.
Rather, it extends to stimuli that evoke threat but that did not threaten survival at
the time that our brains were shaped by evolution. (2006, p. 1499)
What she found was that ontogenetic threats (guns and syringes in this study) are
identified as quickly as phylogenetic threats (snakes and spiders). Blanchette
hypothesized that the urban location of her research subjects may have conditioned them
to believe that “evolutionary irrelevant” items may be more threatening than
“evolutionary relevant” items. To support this claim, researchers Lipp, Derakshan,
Waters and Logies failed to find “evidence for preferential processing of phylogenetic
fear-relevant stimuli” (p. 248). In their study they utilized visual detection tests in order
to examine responsiveness to particular stimuli. Their results indicated “that among
backgrounds of flowers and mushrooms, pictures of all animals are found faster” (p.
248). They are quick to state that this does not disprove the selectivity of input
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hypothesis, but it does complicate the evidentiary claims. Researchers Fox, Griggs and
Mouchlianitis (2007) also sought to find out whether there was any difference between
the detection of snakes and guns in a neutral environment. Their results were consistent
with Blanchette’s findings that phylogenetic and ontogenetic threats are found without
preference for one or the other. Two helpful conclusions came as a result of this study.
First, related to selectivity of input the authors demonstrated:
that the efficient detection of threat was not restricted to phylogenetic stimuli in a
visual search task… it was not the case that the snake stimuli were detected faster
than guns, as would be expected by the hypothesis that an evolved fear module
can be preferentially accessed by phylogenetic stimuli. (p. 695)
These findings call into question the reality of an evolved fear module as it relates to
selectivity of input. The research on automaticity provides a different result. The same
authors found that “highly relevant stimuli (e.g., stimuli indicating potential danger) are
likely to capture attentional processes and gain priority in terms of speed of processing”
(p. 696). Researchers Dolan and Vuilleumier also found that “Strong empirical evidence
now exists which indicates a high degree of automaticity in the amygdala processing of
sensory stimuli that signal fear” (2003, p. 353). The amygdala plays a role in the
processing of stimuli in the environment and a more specific role in the processing of
threats. The most convincing evidence for the automatic fear responses of the amygdala
related is the direct connection between the thalamus and the amygdala. This pathway
helps us understand the possibilities related to automaticity regardless of the evidence for
an evolved fear module. The question that remains is whether the automaticity relates just
to threats or to relevant stimuli in the environment.
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The final two characteristics proposed by Mineka and Öhman refer to the
encapsulation of the evolved fear module from higher cognitive processes and distinct
neural circuitry for a fear response. While the direct route between the thalamus and
amygdala seems to support evidence of automaticity, the second pathway through the
cortical structures would seem to mitigate some threats. The juxtaposition of these two
neural pathways seems to corroborate and destabilize Mineka and Öhman’s claims. There
is some relatively isolated circuitry used to heighten the body’s awareness of a possible
threat. At the same time, this circuitry is not completely encapsulated from higher
cognitive processes. Instead of always reacting to the impulses through the thalamoamygdala pathway, we often inhibit fear responses through a cognitive interpretation of
the stimulus. The evidence of these two possible interpretive schemas calls into question
the full encapsulation of an evolved fear module from higher cognitive processes.
Furthermore, the amygdala does not just play a role in the production of fear. It
also plays some role in memory and other basic emotional responses. Mineka and
Öhman’s understand the term distinct to mean that the amygdala would be involved with
the production of fear and no other emotions (2001, p. 934). However, what we know
about the amygdala today is that it plays a role in the emotional coding of positive and
negative emotional memories. Moreover, evidence points to the amygdala as playing a
role in positive emotions and reward (Baxter & Murray, 2002; Murray, 2007; Sergerie,
Chochol & Armony, 2008). Thus, new neurological evidence does not fully support the
idea of distinct neural circuitry upon which the evolved fear module is posited. The
amygdala is much more complicated despite its distinct role in the production of fear.
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From an evidentiary perspective, the evolved fear module falls short. The
evidence from neuropsychological research supports only one of the characteristics of
Mineka and Öhman’s evolved fear module, automaticity. There is some partial
corroboration of the concept of encapsulation and distinct neural circuitry. The concept
that phylogenetic threats are activated more quickly than ontogenetic threats seems to
have been refuted. As for meeting the criteria of an attainable standard of proof, the
evolved fear module falls well short of its theoretical promise.
The Historical Turn.
The second criteria relates to the deftness with which the authors of the evolved
fear module make their historical turn. The historical turn is a vital part of evolutionary
theory, revealing the connection between form, function and history. Any appeal to
design, selection or adaptation would need to look back and find the circumstances under
which something was selected for. Not only is this a historical journey, but it is also a
journey that questions the distinct advantage an evolved fear module might give one
hominid over another without it. For a specific design to be proven to exist, evidence of
the historical turn must be “supplemented and augmented in a variety of ways,
considerations of design are inconclusive and likely misleading” (2007, p. 52).
As conceived by Mineka and Öhman, the evolved fear module lacks the support
necessary to prove its existence. Thus, the structure cannot be selected for because given
the current evidence there is no structure to be selected. Despite this knowledge, I want to
continue to examine the historical turn the authors utilize to see if it helps understand
what might have been selected for in the evolution of human beings.
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Mineka and Öhman seem to take history for granted when they set out to describe
the evolved fear module. Their historical turn takes up less than a page and seems to
point to the conservation of fear and fear responses rather than a distinct module. For
them, “Evidence of such shaping by evolutionary contingencies is obvious if we examine
characteristics of fear and fear conditioning in humans” (2001, p. 927). However, they
base much of their historical argument on the notion that phylogenic threats are more
prone to elicit automatic fear responses than ontogenic threats. The authors understand
that fear and fear responses were relevant to our evolutionary ancestors, allowing for an
immediate reaction to threatening stimuli in the environment. These mechanisms and
behaviors associated with fear helped our ancestors to survive and cope with threats. As
the authors stated
Fear motivates organisms to escape and avoid sources of danger and threat with
very fast, sometimes even split-second,… activation of defensive behaviors, as
was necessary for survival in early evolutionary environments in which disasters
could strike fast and without warning. (p. 927)
Our capability of experiencing fear provides us with a greater opportunity to survive in
the face of unexpected threats. For an evolutionary argument to work, supplementation
from other sources is necessary. Additionally, they must show that their module was
selected for during our evolutionary past. In their article, there is no evidence presented
that shows how this module might have been selected for over and against those who had
different or no fear structures or behaviors. To the authors’ credit, I believe this paper
was an initial hypothesis intended to pull research together for further study. However,
the responsibility for supporting the historical turn in their propositions about human
functioning falls well short of proof of its existence and selection.
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In conclusion, I think we can put the evolved fear module to rest. Based on the
evidence, the evolved fear module falls well short of its anticipated promise. There is a
wide range of evidence dismissing three of the four assumptions. Furthermore, there is a
distinct lack of a historical turn which would help show how this module might have
been selected for in our evolutionary past. While I am sure the discipline of evolutionary
psychology can claim a variety of successes, I am also sure that the evolved fear module
is not one of them. Despite the module’s lack of relevance, I do not think we should be
deterred from utilizing evolutionary data to help us fully understand the emotion of fear.
The Emotion of Fear
Fear, like any emotion, can be conceptualized as both a feeling and a certain range
of physiological and behavioral criteria. Neuropsychologists Johnson and LeDoux (2004)
wrote that there are two ways to conceptualize fear, “subjective states (the feeling of fear)
and bodily responses (behavioral, autonomic, and endocrine changes) elicited by
threatening stimuli” (p. 228). This discussion of the emotion of fear relates to the bodily
responses associated with threatening stimuli. 21 The next chapter will examine the feeling
or subjective state of fear.
For the remainder of this chapter my goal is to explore the ways in which fear
manifests through a variety of physiological changes related to the experience of a threat.
An additional goal will be to examine fear as an evolutionarily conserved emotion with
contemporary meanings and purposes. As a result of these explorations, I will propose
two meaning-oriented categories related to the emotion of fear. If, as LeDoux (2002)
reminds us, fear is a physiologically based emotion “conserved to a large extent across
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human cultures” (p. 389), then my assumption as a theologian and clinician is that it
serves an important role in the ways human beings interact with the world. Understanding
these physiological and behavioral reactions provides pastoral counselors and caregivers
with a powerful educational tool which can normalize some of the experiences people
feel following a threatening experience.
The structure of the remainder of this chapter is as follows. First, I will summarize
the role of the amygdala in the production of fear. I then turn to discuss the physiological
sensations associated with the emotion of fear. The physiological changes directly impact
the behavioral expressions of fear. These behaviors are thought to be conserved across a
wide swath of species, including human beings. After examining the defensive behaviors
associated with the emotion of fear, I want to explore the threats that make fear
necessary. This opens the discussion to the evolutionary influences on the emotion of
fear. This discussion will consist of a specific examination concerning how threats arise
and continue. Second, I will look at the rise of our defensive behaviors. Finally, I end this
chapter with a summary definition of fear and brief discussion of the emotion of fear and
its possible theological meanings.
The Amygdala and the Physiology of Fear.
LeDoux (1998) thought, “The key to the fear pathways in the brain is a small
region called the amygdala” (p. 1229). The amygdala is widely connected to other parts
of the brain including higher cognitive functions, sensory input areas and autonomic
functions. Additionally, the amygdala plays a role in emotional memory and the
regulation of positive and negative emotions. Finally, there is evidence of two routes
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through which the amygdala receives its input. What remains to be seen is how the
amygdala utilizes the information it gets in order to produce an appropriate reaction to
stimuli in the environment. Current research and meta-analyses have transformed the
view that the amygdala only performs the function of recognizing threats in the
environment. There is some indication now that the amygdala may perform a broader
function of recognizing general behaviorally relevant stimuli in the environment (Ousdal
et al., 2008; Sergerie, Chochol & Armony, 2008). These findings underscore the
importance of the amygdala in recognizing when relevant stimuli require a response.
Thus, rather than only having implications for fear-relevant stimuli, the amygdala detects
socially and/or behaviorally relevant stimuli (Dolan & Vuilleumier, 2003; Sergerie,
Chochol & Armony, 2008). It seems that the amygdala plays an important role as an
initial interpreter of the emotional substance of a stimulus, and whether that stimulus
requires a particular set of behavioral responses.
Focusing on the emotion of fear, the amygdala is known to play a vital role in
helping us recognize and react swiftly to threats in the environment. As an emotional
encoder, the amygdala is responsible for helping us stamp particular stimuli with the
emotion of fear. Bush, Sotres-Bayon, and LeDoux (2007) stated that “Fear memories
remain potent for long periods, possibly even throughout the lifespan..., but the potency
of fear memory can be reduced through extinction” (p. 414). This means that what we
emotionally code as a threat in our memories can be an enduring phenomenon whose
reactive qualities can be reduced but not completely extinguished. Thinking about the
amygdala we see that it plays a vital role in the acquisition and encoding of fear relevant
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stimuli. The next thing we must understand is how it utilizes this information to
physiologically produce the emotion of fear.
The amygdala is connected to the midbrain and other areas which oversee a
variety of physiological functions. Through these connections the amygdala is capable of
influencing these systems to help produce specific physiological reactions. One of the
first things the amygdala can do when a threat arises is focus our attention. It does so by
way of directing the sensory input through the cortical areas of the brain (LeDoux,
2000a). When we are threatened our brain focuses intently on the threat, allowing us to
prepare for a reaction without distraction. This focus helps us concentrate on retrieving
any memories associated with the stimulus in order to develop an appropriate response.
Additionally, the amygdala may play a role in learning and/or social judgments (Miller,
Taber, Gabbard & Hurley, 2005).
When we encounter a threat the pathway between the thalamus and the amygdala
goes into high gear, while the cortical connections work to catch-up. The automatic
signals focus our attention and senses, helping us prepare for immediate action if needed.
In the moment that we “freeze” for our attentional response, our heart starts pounding,
blood flow increases and our body tenses (Dozier, Jr., 1998; LeDoux, 1996). Our hands
and feet become clammy, and the blood in our face diverts into more defensive muscles
leaving us “pale as a ghost.” The pupils dilate allowing us to take in more of our
surroundings and a variety of hormones are released into the blood stream heightening
our sensitivity. The nerves in our gut shut down the digestive system and our mouths dry
while all available energy is devoted to respond to a threat (Dozier, Jr., 1998). As we
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assess the situation, the amygdala connects with the cerebral cortex to search the memory
for possible previous threats in order to develop a plan of action. By this time though, the
body is completely prepared to act just in case this is a new threat and our survival is at
stake. If the threat abates, then the amygdala tags the experience with the appropriate
emotion and stores it for recall should another similar situation arise. A lot happens when
our defensive system goes into action; almost all of it happens before we can even fully
grasp the scope of a threat. Thus, in the service of survival our brain prepares our bodies
for a particular set of reactions to a threat. These reactions are often termed defensive
behaviors.
Before continuing, I want to continue to develop the notion that the emotion of
fear and anxiety are meaningfully separable emotions. Given how the amygdala works, I
want to put forth a hypothesis that sees our remembered fears as the genesis of some
anxiety in the brain. Basically, I am beginning to think of anxiety as generated by leftover
reverberations of fear associated memories which produce apprehensive anticipations of
possible dire consequences. In essence, the fear-coded memories “bleed out” so that what
might have once been coded with a particular threat now gets associated with diffuse
possibilities in the environment. Some interesting research has posited that interactions
between the amygdala and prefrontal circuits of the brain play a large role in anxiety
production (Bishop, 2007; Davidson, 2002). While this research doesn’t necessarily
prove my hypothesis, it does shed light on the role of the amygdala in anxiety and fear.
To me, this helps the argument that fear and anxiety share similarities and differences
despite their constant use as interchangeable terms. Psychologist Bishop (2007) defined
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the two terms this way: “Fear is viewed as a biologically adaptive physiological and
behavioral response to the actual or anticipated occurrence of an explicit threatening
stimulus. Anxiety crucially involves uncertainty as to the expectancy of threat, is
triggered by less explicit or more generalized cues, and is characterized by a more
diffuse state of distress, with symptoms of hyperarousal and worry” (p. 307, italics mine).
Fear and Defensive Behaviors.
Defensive behaviors are the programmed responses to threats in our
environments. As our bodies prepare to respond to a threat, the number of possible
reactions narrows as we seek to survive. LeDoux described these behaviors as “the
operation of brain systems that have been programmed by evolution to deal with danger
in routine ways” (1996, p. 128). While we may have some conscious control of the depth
and breadth of a reaction, the behaviors themselves seem fairly common. Experimental
psychologist Marks lists four main responses to threats. These four behaviors include:
withdrawal, immobility, aggressive defense and appeasement. In his research, Marks saw
that “Relatively few differences are seen in fear behavior displayed inter- or
intraspecifically” (1987, p. 53). Thus, the specific strategies utilized in the face of danger
tend to follow a similar pattern regardless of species. Again, the depth and breadth of the
response to a threat will differ based on type of threat and the degree to which it is
aversive. LeDoux remarked that,
In spite of the fact that species can have their own special ways of responding to
danger, commonality of functional patterns is the rule… what distinguishes fear
reactions in humans and other animals is not so much the ways in which fear is
expressed as the different kinds of trigger stimuli that activate the appraisal
mechanism of the defense system. (1996, p. 133)
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Human beings will react with one of these predictable patterns of behavior when
encountering a threat. In order to fully understand the emotion of fear, exploring these
behavioral patterns is important.
Withdrawal is synonymous with the terms flight, escape and/or avoidance. To
understand the pervasiveness of this defensive behavior, Marks stated that
Even one-celled organisms show the phenomena of withdrawal from danger,
habituation to repeated stimulation, and simple learning, all of which occur
throughout the animal kingdom and help the organism regulate its relationship to
its environment. (1987, p. 53)
As species developed into more complex multi-cellular organisms withdrawal continued
to be an important evolutionary tool for survival. Moreover, humans, who view their
environments through complex systems of interpretation, memory and meaning have
developed manners of withdrawal that range significantly. Humans are mobile creatures
with the mental tools for creating new pathways which allow us to avoid remembered
places or objects; we also withdraw internally from threats, shielding our selves from
damage when physical escape is not possible. The avoidance of a remembered threat is a
mechanism often used to relieve the discomfort of the emotion of fear. Sometimes, the
best way to survive is not to put oneself in the path of dangerous objects. However,
sometimes dangerous objects can’t be avoided.
Immobility, or freezing, is described by Marks as coming in two flavors, tonic and
attentive. Attentive immobility is when the brain focuses our attention on a threat. This
type of immobility serves the purpose of assessing a threat. Attentive immobility also
limits movement in order to “hide” a fearful animal from a possible threat. This behavior
can last minutes to hours depending upon the threat. The purpose of attentive immobility
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is to provide time for additional defensive behaviors or to escape from a threat by means
of hiding. Tonic immobility is described by Marks as “an extreme fear reaction in which
the animal or person is ‘scared stiff’ and unresponsive to even painful or other intense
stimulation” (1987, pp. 60-61). This form of immobility is an abrupt paralyzing sensation
whereby the person is conscious but unable to move in response to a threat. Marks lists
three experiences where this kind of immobility has been documented: (1) in rape
victims, (2) in shell-shocked soldiers, and (3) in people attacked by wild animals.
Physiologically, those experiencing tonic immobility still remain conscious of
their surroundings, yet they exhibit slowed heart rates which can lead to fainting in
extreme cases (1987, pp. 68-69). Though being “scared to death” has quite the colloquial
meaning today, Marks points to some cases where he believes tonic immobility has led to
heart problems and ultimately death (1987, p. 69). Tonic immobility suggests that some
threats can be overwhelming making active responses difficult. This doesn’t mean that
we don’t respond. Marks remarked that “Recovery often occurs with abrupt explosion
into vigorous activity, commonly with lightning escape or attack” (1987, p. 64). I
understand both forms of immobility as defensive behaviors that provide the time needed
in order to act appropriately in relationship to a threat. As such, immobility takes the
form of attentive examination, hiding or retreating into a shell in order to protect and
ready oneself for action.
A third ubiquitous defensive behavior is aggressive defense or fighting. Often
aggressive defense comes with a variety of display patterns intended to make a predator
think twice before attacking. Generally these display patterns provide an extra moment so
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that the “prey” might escape the situation. The goal of escape separates this behavior
from others associated with pure aggression or fighting. In humans, when a threat
becomes real and escape is not immediately possible, we resort to standing tall. We
increase our physical footprint or stare down an opponent in the hopes they back off; we
may also search our immediate area for a weapon in order to change the dynamic of the
situation. Marks noted that “Bluff has always been a common human strategy to ward off
attack, and disguise to elude capture” (1987, p. 72). The term “fight” takes on a different
meaning when we think of it in the service of escape. It becomes a necessary, if reluctant,
action meant to buy time for a strategic withdrawal. Furthermore, it seems that there has
to be some unknown reality behind any bluff or threat of defensive aggression. That is,
the “bluff” of a threatened human must be believable enough to cause the threat to think
twice before pursuing any further action. 22
The final defensive behavior(s) fall under the rubric of appeasement. Marks
delineated two fairly distinct appeasement behaviors in this category, deflection and
submission. Deflection is an attempt to save what is vital by sacrificing another part of
ourselves. For humans this can range from deflecting blows in a fight to the arms and
legs and away from vital organs; it can take the shape of standing between a threat and a
child; it might even mean deflecting topics that cut to the core of the ego or making a
joke about ourselves in order to deflect critics (1987, p. 78). On the other hand,
submission takes the shape of pre-empting a threatening situation by assuming a
submissive role with other humans. Rather than standing tall, submissive humans
generally stand small reducing the need for the threat to act.
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To summarize this largely mechanical view of the emotion of fear, the thalamus
receives sensory information; it is fed to the amygdala which sorts it for relevance, and
when a threat is recognized the activation of a variety of systems occurs. Our pupils
dilate, allowing us to take in more of our environments; the blood drains from our face,
hands and feet and into our muscles; our brain focuses our senses on the threat for
evaluation and reaction; our muscles tense and non-vital systems are shut down in order
to conserve energy. These physiological changes prepare us to react with a specific set of
behaviors adapted for use in threatening situations. These behaviors are mimicked by a
wide variety of species and serve the purpose of enabling them to survive an impending
threat. Due to the distinct neural structures, the patterned physiological responses and the
similar behavioral strategies, we can say that the emotion of fear, as physiologically and
behaviorally constructed, is largely conserved across human and other populations.
However, human beings are far from mere mechanical entities. While our brains and
behaviors reveal a great deal of similarity in how we respond to threats, the threats
themselves are subjective and unpredictable. Before turning to that discussion in Chapter
Four, I want to develop a hypothesis about the evolutionary development of the emotion
of fear. Evolutionary disciplines add a layer of credibility to the notion that the emotion
of fear is inescapable. Furthermore, by examining evolution and the emotion of fear I am
able to develop two categories concerning the purpose of fear.
Evolution and the Emotion of Fear.
The relationship between evolution, the emotion of fear and defensive behaviors
is vital to understanding its purpose. Without the emotion of fear and its resulting
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behaviors, there is little likelihood that our ancestors would have survived the threats our
world presents. While there is ample debate about the continuity of threats over time
(whether culturally or genetically), specific physiological and behavioral responses show
remarkable consistency throughout the millennia. These responses enabled us to assess
and react to a variety of novel circumstances, including the threats to our individual
existence. In order to understand the evolution of the emotion of fear in human beings I
want to make three arguments. First, I begin by looking at the pervasive physiology of
fear in non-human animals. From there, I turn to examine what makes the emotion of fear
unique in human beings. Finally, I propose a way of thinking about the emotion of fear as
an adaptive tool for surviving and coping with a sometimes hostile world.
No evolutionary exposition of the emotion of fear can begin with humans or even
hominids for that matter. The physiology and defensive behaviors we associate with the
emotion of fear are far older than the Pleistocene period and the development of the
human brain. The origins of the physiological and behavioral characteristics of fear most
likely began the moment an animal adapted and escaped the clutches of a predator. Prey
that can avoid a predator is at a distinct advantage from other prey. Likewise, predators
that have adapted new strategies to capture prey are at a distinct advantage over other
similar predators. Marks (1987) noted that
Defensive responses arose as adaptations against threats from enemies and from
other harsh realities in the environment. Throughout evolution there has been an
arms race between the defensive adaptations of prey and attempts by predators to
overcome them. (p. 14)
Before recorded history we imagine that there has been an intricate series of
physiological adaptations that allowed some prey to develop particular defensive
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behaviors. These behaviors enabled them to survive at a greater rate than others who did
not develop these defensive capacities. As brains developed alongside behaviors, animals
whose neural pathways were molded to react to predators and harsh environmental
realities would have an advantage over those who did not develop these automatic
response systems. The animals that survived lived to procreate and pass along inheritable
defense systems. As the arms race continued and animals adapted under selective
pressures, time and opportunity may have molded the structure and function of the
amygdala. The amazing thing about the amygdala is its conservation of function across a
wide variety of species. Concerning the amygdala, LeDoux stated that it:
seems to do the same thing – take care of fear responses – in all species that have
an amygdala… The function seems to have been established eons ago, probably at
least since dinosaurs ruled the earth, and to have been maintained through diverse
branches of evolutionary development. (1996, p. 174)
It seems that long before humans emerged as a distinct species of hominid the
physiological and behavioral components of fear had been selected for. In all of the
adaptations since the emergence of the amygdala it has continued to provide a similar
role related to the emotion of fear. While our focus is on the human manifestation of the
emotion of fear, I cannot help but be amazed at how little human development has
changed its inherent functioning for survival. While we share this basic similarity with
other non-human species, there are a number of unique conditions which affect human
beings. From research presented earlier in this chapter, the human amygdala seems to do
more than just respond to threats. This, coupled with a number of other unique human
features, helps provide a richer understanding of our reactions to the environment
utilizing evolutionary appropriate responses.
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Our similarity to other species provides one avenue which deepens the history of
fear. However, evolutionary discussions about human beings should also reflect the idea
that humans are quite different from non-humans. Anthropologists Boyd and Silk (2003)
argued that “Evolutionary reasoning suggests that humans should be better at learning
some kinds of tasks, making some kinds of decisions, and solving some kinds of
problems than others” (p. 497). The complexity of the human brain is unmatched by any
other species we have studied, despite our similar neurophysiological structures. The
greatest difference between human and non-human species is the complex ways in which
human brains interact with environmental cues in order to respond to certain stimuli. The
reasons why we “should be better” at some tasks, decisions and problem-solving is that
our brain has evolved to deal creatively with novel situations, to remember them and
learn from them.
Basically, the human brain has “more cortical neurons than other mammals,
although only marginally more than whales and elephants” (Roth & Dicke, 2005, p. 250).
This sounds even more impressive when you factor in the physical size of these creatures
relative to the size of a human being. According to Schoenemann (2006), “The human
cerebellum is 2.9 times as large as expected for a primate of our body size” and “Modern
human brains are 3.1 times larger than predicted on the basis of primate brain/body-size
allometric scaling” (p. 384). In terms of size, which also shows some measure of
intelligence, our brains have more neurons packed in to an organ that is three times larger
than it should be for a body our size. As researchers Sherwood, Subiaul, and Zawidzki
noted, “There appears to be a link between our intelligence and our expanded brain,

97

which increased in size by roughly threefold since the last common ancestor” (2008, p.
427). These authors described the difficulty in fully understanding human cognition as
the tension between “flexibility and efficiency” (p. 447). To understand this phenomenon
in conjunction with our study of fear, one example is the dual pathways between the
thalamus and the amygdala. The thalamo-amygdala pathway is the efficient pathway.
This is the pathway activated when the first sense of a possible threat reaches the visual
field. Greater flexibility is seen in the thalamo-cortico-amygdala pathway which provides
interpretive clues related to a threat. It is also the pathway where memories and cultural
interpretations affect our reactions. Thus, in order to understand the evolution of the
emotion of fear in human beings, efficiency and flexibility provide important clues about
our unique utilization of fear in different contexts. We can also reframe the concepts of
efficiency and flexibility to reflect sources of input into our interpretations. This provides
an entrée into the dual inheritance theory of evolution.
Dual inheritance theory takes both cultural and genetic evolution seriously. The
goal of this theory is to describe how some complex human skills have evolved without
reducing them to a genetic root. I understand the categories of flexibility and efficiency to
fit nicely with the idea that both “hardware” and “software” is passed down in human
evolutionary history. According to philosopher Linquist:
The key idea is that complex psychological traits are transmitted from parent to
offspring via two parallel channels. The computational ‘hardware’ required for
social learning is transmitted genetically and the psychological ‘software’ that
supports a given technology or skill is transmitted culturally. (2007, p. 849)
Dual inheritance theory adds a significant layer of thought to the evolution of human
psychological capacities. It creates a multifaceted approach to evolution which allows
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genetic and cultural material to influence human behavior. Linquist’s goal in engaging
evolutionary theory is to connect it with human emotional behaviors. He seeks to
describe how human emotions become more complex over time without completely
disregarding the role that evolution played in giving humans the capacity to experience
the emotions in the first place.
As an example Linquist stated that “guilt appears to follow a multistage
developmental process that starts out with an ‘innate’ sensitivity to the distress of others
and which becomes increasingly cognitively elaborated as the child matures” (2007, p.
852). Children genetically inherit a disposition towards distress before they can
cognitively reflect and interpret a situation and its meaning. As children develop, parents
operate as the initial primary cultural institution, reacting to particular behaviors which
teach children the meanings of the distress they innately pick up. When children are able
to reflect on the emotion themselves they come to experience the innate distress and add
layers of cultural meaning that they have picked up along the way. Linquist seemed to
think there was a link between biological and cultural developments of guilty feelings,
which “appears to begin even before children acquire an explicit sense of agency or can
draw a conscious link between their actions and their future feelings” (2007, p. 853).
Dual inheritance theory provides a theoretical orientation that reflects the influences of
nature and nurture on our lives. I now want to examine how this theory helps us better
understand fear.
The emotion of fear is hardwired to respond to threats utilizing a variety of
physiological functions and behavioral reactions/strategies. These threats develop
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through ontogenetic conditioning rather than phylogenetic predispositions. 23 Utilizing
dual inheritance theory I want to bring together the hardware and software that inform the
emotion of fear for human beings. On the hardware side, the structure and connections of
the amygdala govern many of the physiological reactions to fear and engages our
defensive behaviors. On the software side, I contend that threats are conditioned and
should be treated as locally and socially conditioned phenomenon. To make full use of
dual inheritance theory it is important to connect the hardware and the software
meaningfully. In order to make this connection I want to develop a hypothesis as to how
the hardware-oriented emotion of fear develops in newborns and infants. From these
early developments we can begin to see software-related connections made in young
children which continue into adulthood.
Evolution, as I understand it, is about the propagation of efficient and effective
means of interacting with the world. Evolution is about survival and, for most species,
procreation. While this is a fairly reductionistic view of human evolution, and one that I
will seek to nuance later, it nonetheless guides the manner in which evolutionary
processes are interpreted. A dual inheritance theory seeks to describe these efficient
means as both a part of our genetic make-up and our cultural milieu. Evolution takes
place in both our hardware and software to root out inefficiencies and prevent their
transmission to the next generation. There are certain actions performed by newborns and
infants which have been theorized as survival mechanisms. These mechanisms help me
understand the emotion of fear as having its genesis in the complex interaction between
our hardware and software.
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In a lecture reviewing the literature on fear recognition and social cognition,
Skuse (2007) noted that “Our ability to meet and to follow another’s gaze is present
during early infancy and is associated with a growing appreciation of salient events in a
socially structured world” (p. 52). We live in an interdependent world where our survival
is not just left up to an individual. Certainly there is much we can do for ourselves; yet, at
the same time, we require social contact in order to survive. A human infant or newborn,
left to their own devices, would have some difficulty acquiring the necessities for life. In
order to survive, an infant or newborn needs to establish social contact with a caregiver
who can provide for their basic needs. Meeting the gaze of another human being is one
way of connecting socially and attempting to find a way to have certain survival needs
met. Skuse continued by stating that “The main function of egocentric gaze relates
primarily to the viewpoint of the perceiver and onlooker, rather than to the spatial
relations of the extrinsic world. Its goal is to engage the viewer and to control interaction”
(2007, p. 52). Whether the need is social or physical or otherwise, infants and newborns
engage in facial gymnastics with caregivers in order to develop rapport and have these
specific needs met. Pontius takes this a step further when she suggested that “In relation
to human babies, who, at a very early age, have the ability to ‘detect and to orient to
faces,’… [which] suggested in part a prewired neural mechanism” (2005, p. 368). It is
hard to tell just what percentage of a newborn’s attention to faces is part of their genetic
makeup. We have no real ways of testing or even asking an infant why they are attentive
to faces. However, the theory that part of the reason for this need to connect being related
to survival would certainly stand up to most scrutiny. The ability to control a caregiver’s
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gaze and attention would almost certainly provide a survival benefit in evolutionary
thought. It is a logical inference that newborns that meet the gaze of and interact socially
with caregivers would have an evolutionary advantage. These gaze meeting newborns
and infants receive information about a variety of emotional states as they meet the gaze
of a caregiver. I surmise that evidence of this transmission of emotional data would be
found in the activation of a newborn or infant’s amygdala. To support this claim I want to
return to Skuse’s review of the literature.
We already know that the amygdala is active when the emotion of fear is
experienced. In conjunction with this understanding of the amygdala and the emotion of
fear Skuse pointed out that “recent evidence suggests that the amygdala responds
specifically to eye contact in adults, and that it is maximally activated by exaggerated
wide-open eyes, such as are associated with a fearful expression” (2007, p. 51). What I
understand from this statement is that a connection is made between hardware and
software which communicates specific emotional capacities. Basically, our affinity for
faces in general and eyes in particular activate specific components of the brain
genetically programmed to deal with facial recognition. Additionally, by paying attention
to faces and eyes an infant begins to receive cultural/familial/social data concerning a
variety of emotional expressions.
These early points of contact are teaching infants about specific emotions and
their environmental cues. Skuse’s reliance on the role that allocentric gaze (the ability to
follow the gaze of another person) plays in the life of infants and toddlers is evidence of a
software connection being made between facial recognition and subsequent object
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detection. Skuse remarked that the development of allocentric gaze “normally occurs
during the first few years of postnatal life, and we become increasingly accurate at
determining where someone else is looking with experience” (2007, p. 52).
The argument for utilizing dual inheritance theory to understand the relationship
between the emotion of fear and evolution is fairly simple. First, the ability to meet the
gaze of another conceivably provides an evolutionary advantage for a newborn or infant.
Meeting the gaze of another is a social act, but it also helps the newborn or infant
communicate and connect with caregivers. A large part of this connection through gaze is
centered on eye contact which activates the amygdala; wide-open ocular expressions,
associated with fear and surprise, activate the amygdala. As infants develop, interactions
become more complex, and infants follow the gaze of others and correlate emotive
responses with particular objects. These objects can sometimes include the correlation of
a fear response with a particular threat.
The emotion of fear, seen through an evolutionary lens, is directly related to our
ability to survive threats. The behaviors and physiological reactions provide us with the
ability to cope with threats and take appropriate action related to our survival. We are
born with the hardware to experience fear, as well as pre-programmed evolutionary skills
which help us apply this emotion to our environment. Even before we can enact the
behaviors associated with fear, there is evidence that we are attuned to recognize fearful
gazes. Skuse pointed to research which found that “Infants are selectively interested in
faces that show fear, even within the first year of life” (2007, p. 54). Selective
attentiveness to particular expressions reveals a burgeoning complexity related to the
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ability to recognize and refer to the social world for clues about threats. Our ability to
survive in the world depends on the increasingly complex ways in which we can harness
the emotion of fear in order to negotiate these threats. The programming of these survival
instincts has its genesis in early social interactions. These interactions prime the
activation of the amygdala, focus our attention on particular emotional cues and
ultimately direct our gaze towards threatening objects.
As we develop, two forms of learning impact the recognition of threats:
experiential learning and social learning. Experiential learning is defined as direct self to
stimuli interaction. We learn about a threat by coming in contact with it and surviving.
Social learning encompasses all of the other ways in which we learn about a threat. This
could be through direct or indirect observation of another person’s fear; or we could learn
about a threat through cultural storytellers like the news, family members, friends or the
internet. In both cases a form of conditioning takes place whereby we come to associate a
stimulus as a threat and thereby induce a particular set of behavioral responses.
Right now, it is enough to note that almost all neuropsychological research related
to the emotion of fear involves some kind of Pavlovian conditioning. This involves
pairing an adverse stimulus with a neutral stimulus in order to condition the subject to
fear the neutral stimulus. After enough pairings, the subject comes to see the neutral
stimulus as a threat. It would be as if you saw your favorite dessert sitting on the counter.
However, every time you reach out and touch the plate you receive an uncomfortable
shock. After reaching out several times and getting shocked, you begin to associate the
dessert with the shock and thus quit trying to grab it. What happens is the amygdala
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encodes the memory of that dessert as a threat and categorizes it as something to fear.
The next time the dessert is sitting out on the counter, you will recall that memory and
your body will begin to process the interaction as threatening and react accordingly.
Through your experience, you have developed a new fear of your favorite dessert. While
we all may react to this kind of conditioning similarly, we do not all fear the same
dessert.
On the social learning side, research from Olssen and Phelps (2007) revealed that
fear can be learned through either watching someone else react to a threat or by merely
telling someone they should feel threatened by an object. According to the authors, the
“ability to detect and respond appropriately to signs of fear and pain in a conspecific
probably has conferred a significant selective advantage during evolution” (p. 1096).
Basically, it is to our advantage that we can recognize fear and/or pain in another human
being. Learning vicariously through the experience of others provides an additional
advantage when trying to navigate world that includes threats.
Moreover, our capacity for language helps transmit emotional feelings. As such,
we can tell one another about the dangers a threat poses through the stories we tell.
Olssen and Phelps remarked that, “Language forces the receiver to rely on similar past
experiences and internally generated imagery to establish an emotional memory” (p.
1099). The authors found significant similarities between reactions to experientially and
socially learned fears. As cultural evolves so do the ways in which we can transmit the
possibility of threats. Whereas early in our history this might happen around a campfire
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or in small groups, today our social learning takes place on a global scale through a
variety of media outlets.
What I hope to have shown in this discourse is an alternative formulation for the
development of fear in our evolutionary history. Our genetic topographies reveal
embodied structures which enable us to react to and cope with threats in the environment.
Evolutionary hardware, including the amygdala and a “pre-programmed” desire to
connect with the social world, provides the initial introduction of a new human being to
the emotion of fear. Evolutionary software uploaded through interactions with caregivers
direct our gaze and defines particular objects as threats; our unique software develops
during the post-natal period and activates the hardware in place to deal with a threat. My
contention is that this explanation provides a more plausible analysis of the emotion of
fear than the one offered by the evolved fear module. In the end, the emotion of fear
serves an evolutionarily advantageous purpose for human beings. That purpose is to
survive and cope with an unpredictable world. These two thematic purposes arise out of a
basic understanding of the mechanics of fear. However, as complex beings, humans make
additional connections to fear around its meaning.
The most basic understanding of our evolutionary purpose is that we are built to
survive and procreate. For human beings, I think this can be subtly twisted to state that
we act and react to the world in a manner that helps us survive, cope and thrive. Given
the cognitive complexity that separates us from our closest genetic cousins, I think a
basic understanding of our evolutionary purpose is helpful; yet, we also deserve a more
nuanced understanding of our purpose. Survival and coping with a threat are easy enough
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to interpret as part of the meaning and purpose of the emotion of fear. When we think of
procreation I want to propose that we understand it through the lens of thriving. Thus, the
instinct to create progeny in humans is more akin to a nuanced human instinct to create,
recreate and procreate. We are nothing if not imaginative creatures. To say that we have
evolved to be “for creation” reveals a purpose centering on the ways we choose to thrive
in the world.
As we look to defining the meaning of fear for contemporary human beings we
will return to this idea of surviving and thriving again. However, we should not be so
quick as to forget how the emotion of fear helps us cope with a threat. Defensive
behaviors provide the necessary means by which we cope with a threat lives. They
provide a meaningful action with regard to a threat which enables us to relate to it
appropriately. When we put these three meanings together, we find that the emotion of
fear reveals a human need to survive, cope and thrive in a sometimes unpredictable
world. In this same vein of interpretation, human beings might be well-served by
beginning to look not only at the threat they wish to escape, but also the reasons which
make their escape necessary. That is, when threatened and afraid, we may not always be
running away from something. We may also have something in mind that we feel is
worthy of running towards.
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Chapter Four: The Experiential and Social Underpinnings of our Fears
In this fourth chapter I want to turn from examining the physiological
understanding of fear to the ways in which we construct our unique fears.
Neuropsychologists Johnson and LeDoux (2004) wrote that there are two ways to
conceptualize fear, “subjective states (the feeling of fear) and bodily responses
(behavioral, autonomic, and endocrine changes) elicited by threatening stimuli” (p. 228).
Neurophysiology, dual inheritance evolutionary theory and behavioral reactions all
comprise ways to examine the bodily responses to the emotion of fear. Each discipline
points to fear as a necessary tool for survival. This chapter examines fear as a subjective
state, constructed through a variety of interactions with our social environments.
Psychologists Jarymowicz and Bar-Tal (2006) characterize the concept of fear by
separating it into primary affective and social qualities.
On the level of primary affect, fear is related to homeostasis. On the level of
social emotions… fear is a component of more complex reactions and feelings,
such as panic, dread, anxiety, despair, caution, submission, guilt, shame, prudery,
or cowardliness. (p. 371)
At the physiological level, fear balances the recognition of threats in the environment
with our need for survival. At a secondary level, the social component to fear
encompasses the depth and breadth of subjective reactions to the emotion of fear. While
we all have the capacity to experience the physiological emotion of fear, the feeling of
fear will differ from person to person. Thus, while you and I might jump at the sight of a
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spider crawling across the floor, one of us might jump higher or farther away depending
on our interpretation of that spider as a threat. The same threat triggers reactions that vary
in intensity based upon the meanings and interpretations that we have internalized related
to that threat.
This chapter explores subjective components of fear. For me, to understand the
meaning of subjectivity is to understand how we remember experiences (memory), what
we believe as a result (beliefs) of experience and what we imagine happening in future
interactions or the subsequent moments of a present interaction (imagination). These
three components form my understanding of subjectivity. Two additional sources impact
our subjectivity, emotions and society. Our memories, beliefs and imaginings occur in a
social milieu and they are impacted by emotional content. We learn what to fear through
our interactions with the world, and through the world’s interactions with us. Subjectivity
is affected by individual and social phenomena. Moreover, our emotional response
impacts our memories, which has further implications for our beliefs and imagination.
Psychology provides a framework through which our subjectivity can be
understood. Most studies of the psyche intend to provide useful theoretical and clinical
knowledge. I utilize the postmodern approach offered by narrative theorists as the best
avenue for a theory of the psyche. Utilizing narrative theory and practices helps weave a
tapestry that can incorporate neuropsychological theories, philosophical positions and
good clinical practices. Through the telling of stories our memories are activated, our
beliefs about an experience are revealed and we engage our imaginations. Narratives
reveal what we have learned, how we remember our lives, what we believe about
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ourselves and the world, and what comes next. They are the means by which our
perspective on an experience comes to life. The social interaction based around narratives
is a two-way street; we both give knowledge, beliefs and dreams and receive these same
messages from others. Much like the human brain, our stories are dynamic and flexible.
We never share the same story twice; we are always interpreting and re-interpreting the
world and our roles within it.
This chapter begins with the roots of subjectivity. Memories, beliefs and our
imaginations are the lenses which inform the content and structure of our stories. I
intentionally develop these three categories using data from neuropsychology as well as
theories of emotion. My discussion of subjectivity continues by examining the social
qualities of interpretation. The lenses of constructivism and social constructionism
explore how we come to interpret the world around us, including our unique fears.
Finally, this chapter ends by exploring how the self is constructed utilizing narrative
philosophy. This view of our constructed identities is used to introduce narrative
therapeutic theory and practice.
Subjectivity: Memory, Beliefs, and Imagination
When we interpret an experience we do much more than take in the facts of our
surroundings. When we interpret, we remember. Two types of memories flood our minds
when we are confronted with an experience in the present. Sometimes, we are able to
search for similar experiences in order to gauge the necessity for a specific reaction.
Other times, memories are recalled without conscious effort, almost forcing themselves
upon a situation. When we interpret, we impose beliefs. The meaning we ascribe to a
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memory or a present experience through a memory adds to the interpretive mix of the
moment. When we interpret, we imagine. Our imagination works on two levels. If we
believe an experience to be novel our imagination works to provide possibilities for what
might happen. If an experience bears a resemblance to previous experiences our
imagination provides a picture of what it believes is going to happen. Neuroscientist
Berthoz (2006) pointed to the fact that
Making a decision requires associating events, sensations, memories, and so on.
This work of association is carried out in part in the amygdala. But making a
decision also requires deliberating over it, changing one’s point of view, mentally
altering the relations between associated elements, and simulating different
possible realities. So it has to be somewhat flexible. (p. 203)
Berthoz is describing is the building blocks of interpretation. Memories, beliefs and
imagination engage an experience at multiple levels in order to inform our reaction to that
experience. As we move from fear to hope, the notion of flexible interpretive frames is
important. A person who is believed to be dynamic, operating out of multiple identities,
carries the building blocks through which change and re-interpretation of experience can
occur.
While these three categories are relatively straightforward, we should remember
that they operate in the context of emotional, behavioral, social and reasoned responses to
a current experience. Thus, while we remember, believe and imagine, we are also feeling,
acting and reasoning. When we interpret, all of these things happen together to read and
respond to our experiences. Furthermore, each category of subjectivity is impacted by our
emotional state. We already know that fear impacts our memories, making them stronger,
longer lasting and easier to recall. As this examination of memory, beliefs and
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imagination continues, we will also discover how emotions impact our beliefs and
imagination as well.
Memory
Have you ever had a past experience intrude on the present without your
conscious consent? Have you ever had the lyrics of a song repeat over and over again
until you thought it would drive you mad? Have you ever remembered a story yet in
sharing it find out that others who experienced the same event remember things
differently? Memory is at same time a complex and simple phenomenon. If you look at
the above questions, a number of themes emerge surrounding the concept of memory.
First, memory has to do with past experiences, we remember something. Second,
memory requires an act, that is “remembering” must occur in order for the memory to be
realized. Third, memories can be intrusive. That is, sometimes our remembering occurs
outside our conscious control. Moreover, the facts of memories can be elusive, subject to
interpretative and emotional frames that have been added to an experience.
The term memory is a multifaceted concept. At first glance memory might refer to
a stored event or knowledge. Yet, we also use the term memory to describe the retrieval
process, such as when we say that our memory fails us. Looking deep into the brain we
might think of memory as the neurophysiological structures that aid us in encoding and
remembering stored knowledge. Developing a singular concept of memory can be
difficult. While neurophysiological structures are important, I think a concept of memory
requires looking more broadly at its functional components. Our primary task is to
understand memory as a key element to our interpretive process. To do this I will
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provide: (1) a concept of memory, (2) an understanding of voluntary and involuntary
memory, and (3) a sense of the impact emotion has on our memory.
Given the variety of disciplines which attempt to utilize the concept of memory, a
singular definition is difficult to ascertain. Cutting across these disciplinary contexts is
not easy. Dudai, Roediger, III and Tulving noted that while “There does exist some
commonality in the languages spoken by memory science’s parental disciplines
already… However, this accord often fails to extend to the level where it could matter
most, the level of concepts” (2007, p. 1). As it stands, there is some agreement on the
basic language of memory; however, the definitions used to describe these terms differs
from discipline to discipline. Agreement on basic understandings of concepts is vital to
cross disciplinary conversation. In a recent attempt to expose memory to conceptual level
thinking psychologist Schacter (2007) worked to “seek what is common to the concept of
memory across the various forms, i.e. to try and delineate the core of memory itself” (p.
23). Schacter’s method examined four of the six definitions of memory delineated in an
article by Tulving, a psychologist who has been studying memory for decades. The result
of Schacter’s analysis led him to confirm that memory is “the neurocognitive capacity to
encode, store and retrieve information” (2007, p. 26). This basic concept incorporates
much of the overall process and function of memory. It provides an emphasis on the role
of the brain in memory processes; it understands memory as encompassing the functions
of encoding and retrieval; and it includes the storage of knowledge as a function of
memory. One of the key functions of any concept of memory deals with retrieval of
stored knowledge.
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The terms voluntary and involuntary memory refer to two processes of retrieval
which occur daily. Mace (2007) proposed that voluntary memory refers to “instances
when memories come to mind because they are either willed, intended, thought about,
searched for, and so forth… In short, voluntary memory appears to be our ability to call
up our personal past on demand” (p. 1). Writing this chapter is an exercise in voluntary
memory. I am intentionally willing stored knowledge into a linguistic format appropriate
for the context of this chapter. However, there are times when an intrusive association
process interrupts my writing. This intrusion is one instance of our involuntary memory.
Mace understands involuntary memory as “instances in which memories come to mind
spontaneously, unintentionally, automatically, without effort, and so forth” (p. 2). He
further elaborates on involuntary memory by delineating three instances where
involuntary memories invade our lives: precious fragments, by-products of other
memories, and not so precious fragments.
Precious fragments refer to a familiar form of involuntary memory. These
memories are the associations brought to the forefront of our awareness through common
everyday experiences and mental functioning. The feature most associated with these
memories is the surprising nature of their content related to the experience being
perceived. A second form of involuntary memory discussed by Mace is involuntary
memory as by-products of other memories. This form of involuntary memory refers to
the process whereby a memory is retrieved which sometimes “will trigger another related
memory, which in turn might trigger another” (2007, p. 3). It is as if the first willed
memory produces a cascade of subsequent unbidden memories. Mace alludes to this type
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of involuntary memory as “resulting from deliberate attempts to construct the past” (p. 3).
The final type of involuntary memory named by Mace is the not so precious fragment.
These generally stem from traumatic experiences and are considered to be repetitive but
rare occurrences in everyday life. However, these fragments are so intrusive that they are
part of the diagnostic criteria for post-traumatic stress disorder, and their troubling nature
“caused it to be of interest to clinicians and clinical researchers, dating back as far as
Freud” (Mace, 2007, p. 4).
Mace reports that, on average, humans have 3 to 5 involuntary memories per day
(p. 5). These memories can be primed “by cognitive activities which involve recalling the
past” (2007, p. 6). This assertion provides an interesting clinical note. Namely, that
rumination about the past may cause involuntary memories to surface. This could be a
dual-edged sword. On the one hand, priming the mental pump helps create a wide variety
of clinically important associations that might otherwise be unknown. On the other hand,
rumination about past trauma may provide a situation where involuntary memories would
become more intrusive, hindering the ability of a person to interact meaningfully. I
believe the involuntary and intrusive recall of traumatic memories can be closely
associated with an intense sense of fear related to an experience or object.
To this point memory has been stated to be a neurocognitive process related to
how we encode, store and retrieve knowledge. Furthermore, I have divided memory
retrieval processes into voluntary and involuntary forms of memory. Both of these forms
of memory are important for our understanding of subjectivity due to the ways in which
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they shape our interpretations of a present experience. However, I associate involuntary
memories with the emotion and feeling of fear.
First, involuntary memories have associations which surprise us in the present. As
we have seen, fear is an emotion that is temporally aligned with the present due to the
necessity of a threat for its arousal. Second, involuntary memories can be intrusive and in
the case of a relived trauma or threat, frightening. Mace points out that traumatic
involuntary memories often encompass the “worst moment of a traumatic experience. As
such, then, traumatic involuntary memories tend to cause the individual stress, whereas
this is generally not the case for ordinary involuntary memories” (2007, p. 9). Content
alone does not produce stress; therefore something else must be produced alongside these
traumatic involuntary memories. I contend that these memories produce emotional
reactions and many times this reaction is fear. From Chapter Three, we know that the
physiological reaction to the emotion of fear produces a variety of tensions throughout
the body which can be construed as stress reactions. Furthermore, it seems as though
these strong emotional reactions affect our memories as well.
From a neurophysiological perspective, the amygdala plays a role in stamping
memories with emotional content. In Chapter Three I mentioned that emotional memories
tend to be more vivid, last longer and are easier to recall. It is important to note that the
correlation between emotions and memories works for both positive and negative
emotions. That is, our memories are easier to recall, last longer and are more vivid for
happy occasions as well as fearful ones. Psychologist Reisberg stated that “The study of
emotional memories also is crucial if we are going to understand autobiographical
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memory in general… the events that make us who we are, usually are emotional in one
fashion or another” (2006, p. 15). Autobiographical memory refers to the memories we
use to describe our personal experiences. These are the memories that remind us of who
we are based on how we interact with the life that unfolds around us. It is not a stretch to
say that the most vivid, longest lasting and easiest to recall memories are also the
memories that have a greater impact on how we define our sense of self.
To this end, psychologists Buchanan and Adolphs (2004) described four ways that
emotions influence memory. The authors stated that:
We can think of the ways in which emotion influences memory as changes in
memory for (1) the emotion-inducing sensory properties of stimuli themselves…,
(2) the intrinsically neutral sensory properties of stimuli associated with a related
emotional state…, (3) the emotional state itself in the perceiver…, or (4) higherorder information about the emotion and the stimuli… None of these is mutually
exclusive, and there is evidence to suggest that the amygdala may contribute to all
of them. (pp. 65-66)
All four of these relationships hinge on associations and how we remember an experience
and its associated emotion. The first relationship reflects the ways in which memories
change because of the direct emotional impact of a stimulus. That is, the stimulus itself
holds the greatest emotional valence upon recall. The content of the memory, the
experience itself, is remembered differently once emotional content is sensed. Think
about it as the difference between writing a liturgy for a funeral and sitting through the
funeral of a loved one. The funeral itself comes to mean something vastly different when
the emotional layer of losing a loved one is added to the memory. How we remember
funerals from that point forward changes. Thus, the way we remember a stimulus is
transformed by the emotional content, and the emotional content transforms the meaning
of the stimulus as well. The second relationship pairs something thought to be neutral
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with an emotionally significant event. Going back to the funeral analogy, we might
remember that a particular hymn was sung during the service. The hymn is essentially a
neutral component of the service. However, because of the emotional situation, a
relationship forms between the sadness felt at losing a loved one and the hymn.
Remembering the hymn then brings back the sadness felt at the time. The third way
emotion affects memory is through the ways in which we remember feeling an emotion.
In this relationship, we merely remember that at some point we were sad or frightened or
happy, etc. There is less of a clear stimulus for the emotion and the conditions of the
emotion itself are the memory. The final relationship deals more with the cognitive
awareness of an emotion or of a particular stimulus which produced an emotion.
Returning to our funeral analogy, we might think of a pastor who has been through the
funeral of a loved one, but also continues to perform funerals for others’ loved ones. The
pastor might remember her own emotional experience and that a funeral can produce
sadness for those involved. This can be helpful reframing of a memory and its emotional
content allowing the pastor to be more available to those who are experiencing a similar
circumstance in the present moment.
These four relationships between memory and emotion provide a basic
understanding of the ways in which emotion impacts and changes our memories. From a
physiological perspective, fear is a fairly homogenous set of embodied reactions and
behaviors related to the sense of threat we correlate with a particular object. From a
subjective point of view, emotional memories provide one avenue through which the
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interpretation of particular fears develops. Understanding memory requires three
components: encoding, retrieval and storage.
During the encoding process, I noted that the emotion of fear narrows our field of
vision so that we can focus on a threat. This ensures that our memories store specific
knowledge related to the central themes of a fearful experience. We become so focused
that peripheral stimuli fade into the background. Our memories of an event become vivid
for the threatening object and fuzzy for any other details. Our focused attention on central
details or themes changes what we might otherwise remember about a similar experience
without a threat involved (See Reisberg, 2006). Thus the emotion of fear adds an initial
layer of subjectivity which focuses a particular memory on a threat within the context of
an experience.
Interpretation is most noticeable during the retrieval process. A layer of
subjectivity is added whenever a memory is recalled to inform us about a current
situation. In any given moment an association can be drawn between our current situation
and a past situation. This is the point that Buchanan and Adolphs (2004) make by
positing the different relationships between emotion and memory. That is not to say that
there are no novel situations; however, every novel situation is interpreted through
remembered themes or associations. Involuntary memories are one way in which these
associations develop in novel situations. These memories come unbidden and place
demands upon our attention. Their retrieval shapes our interpretation of the current event,
especially when these memories fall into the “not so precious fragment” category. When
it comes to fearful memories, I have purported that they are especially vivid in narrow
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ways. During the retrieval process fearful memories can provide a vivid set of
associations which can affect our behavioral and physiological responses.
My interpretation of a spider’s sudden presence is shaped by my previous
experiences with spiders in a variety of locations. While there is great novelty in
situations (location, actors, experience, novel threat specifics), my reactions are similar to
other reactions related to my memory of spiders. I attribute my fear reactions to the
retrieval of involuntary memories which intrude into the present moments.
Finally, the stored knowledge I possess is unique to my person. While the
retrieval process itself may be similar in human brains, what gets retrieved in any given
circumstance is unique. Memory forms the grounding knowledge of our subjectivity;
however, there is more to our interpretive frames than just stored knowledge and
encoding and retrieval processes. My memory of spiders develops out of the culmination
of all of my experiences and interpretations of the threat I believe spiders pose to my
well-being. My memories have been shaped into beliefs about spiders that I utilize as
additional lenses of interpretation.
Beliefs
In a perfect world memories record an experience exactly as it occurs. We live in
a world that is far from perfect. Emotions affect our memories, changing their focus
based on previous perceptions and interpretations. What we remember is, generally
speaking, often far from what actually happened. Furthermore, when we retrieve and
retell a stored narrative that narrative is rife with our beliefs related to what has happened.
Thus, beliefs form another core part of how we subjectively interpret the world. In this
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section, I explore the understanding of what the term belief means, ending by examining
how emotions and beliefs affect our interpretive frames.
According to psychologists Frijda, Manstead and Bem (2000) “Beliefs can be
defined as states that link a person or group or object or concept with one or more
attributes, and this is held by the believer to be true” (p. 5). In the same edited volume,
psychologists Fiedler and Bless (2000) stated that “Believing presupposes not having
perfect knowledge but taking some risk and adding some internally generated inference
in adopting an idea, goal or argument” (p. 144). Together these concepts of belief have
more power than they do separately. Namely, that beliefs are mental states linking an
attribute with an object; this interpretive link does not presume that knowledge
concerning the relationship is perfect, requiring the interpreter to risk something in order
to fully adopt a belief as having some truth.
I sense this definition tests well in the context of religious beliefs. As an example,
most of my memories pertaining to religion were formed through experiences in
Christian churches. In my memories, I have come to associate particular attributes with
Christianity. My list of attributes is a series of mental constructs based on memories
which have been thematically organized around stored knowledge and experiences. My
memories include times of worship, mission, fellowship and study experiences. These
experiences have been interpreted in light of one another with the result being an
internally constructed framework of beliefs that I find necessary for the practice of
authentic Christianity. As constructs they do not provide a perfect description of
Christianity. However, they provide a personal truth that leads me to take particular
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interpretive risks when speaking about the things I believe. The first thing that most
Christians might notice about these statements is their cognitive origins. Christianity,
they might state, has much more to do with carefully developed sets of constructs that
guide behavior. For the most part they would be right. Even the psychologists we have
quoted in this brief exposition notice that there is a difference between belief and
action 24.
Frijda, Manstead and Bem noted that
Although beliefs may guide our actions…, they are not sufficient to initiate
action. No matter how rational your thoughts about helping the needy may be,
you need an emotional impulse before you actually volunteer to help. Emotions
are prime candidates for turning a thinking being into an actor. (2000, p. 3)
What we need to realize is that emotions also impact the beliefs that arise from an
interpretive process. Though many might read my statements above and say that “faith”
is the missing item, a closer reading might be that passion is what is missing from an
understanding of beliefs as mental constructs. One source of passion is our emotions;
they drive us to act on our beliefs.
Psychologists Frijda, Manstead and Bem argued that “emotions can awaken,
intrude into, and shape beliefs, by creating them, by amplifying or altering them, and by
making them resistant to change” (2000, p. 5). Emotions have a deep impact on what we
believe. Through the impact of emotions our beliefs about the world and our experiences
are practically irrevocably altered. Frijda, Manstead and Bem saw the impact of emotions
on beliefs as varying quite a bit. Whatever the relationship between emotions and
experience happens to be, the results seem to strengthen, embolden, create or even tear
apart beliefs.
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Psychologists Frijda and Mesquita (2000) proposed a more generalized version of
the relationship between emotion and beliefs by stating that “Emotions influence beliefs
in basically two ways. They may give rise to beliefs where none existed, or change
existing beliefs; and they may enhance or decrease the strength with which a belief is
held” (p. 45). Frijda and Mesquita thought that conversion experiences offered a window
into how emotion shapes beliefs. They stated that, “The intertwining of belief and
emotion is most evident in the conversion experience, in which an emotionally
overwhelming experience vouches for the truth of acquired belief and constitutes it as a
conviction” (2000, pp. 50-51). In this way, emotions not only give rise to a new set of
beliefs but also change what we believe to be true about the world. Furthermore, a
conversion experience, though often referenced in religious settings, could also be
applied to experiences of fear. In the presence of a threat which gives rise to the emotion
of fear, we become converts who construct beliefs about that object through the vivid
memories we retain from our experiences with the threat.
Frijda and Mesquita also proposed that emotions might enhance or decrease a
certain belief. They develop three clues relating emotions to strength of beliefs: concern
relevance, emotional intensity and the intervention of virtual emotions (p. 61). In order
for an emotion to impact the strength of a belief it must be relevant to a person’s
“motives, major goals, personal sensitivities, attachments, and supra-personal goals”
(Frijda & Mesquita, 2000, p. 61). For example, dogs bite people. Spiders bite people. I
have overwhelmingly positive interactions with dogs and enjoy playing with them. The
opposite is true for spiders. My fear of spiders provides emotional support for my beliefs
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concerning their danger. Even though I know that dogs also bite people, I am more apt to
feel joy upon seeing a dog than fear. The emotional content of my memories with dogs
and spiders strengthen the beliefs I hold about the relative safety in interacting with each
animal.
Emotional intensity is the second way emotions affect beliefs. Clore and Gasper
(2000) proposed that “An increase in emotional intensity may further narrow attentional
focus, making relevant events seem even more important, leading to still greater
intensity, and so on in an ever-narrowing circle” (p. 11). With the emotion of fear,
physiological reactions occur which induce narrow threat-focused behavior. This intense
reaction would feed back onto the beliefs which give a threat its meaning. Depending on
the situation, specific intense emotions related to threats could strengthen or weaken an
already held belief. The emotional intensity of an experience can work to provide new
interpretive material in which to re-evaluate and act upon modified beliefs appropriately.
Emotional anticipations are another way emotions affect the strength of our
beliefs. The authors proposed that, “It probably is the anticipation of emotional situations
and corresponding emotions that can give beliefs their enormous power when
challenged” (p. 63). Challenges to the meanings we hold dear are often met with
powerful reactions led by emotional responses. When we anticipate entering a situation
which requires us to defend our beliefs, we respond with physiological changes to the
body which is related to the rise of emotional output. By anticipating the emotions of a
defensive position we are on guard so that we can protect our beliefs. This, in turn,
strengthens our hold upon particular beliefs through their emotional connections.
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Emotional beliefs play a significant role in the ways we interpret and interact with
the world. When relevant, emotions can intrude into our deeply held beliefs, imposing
new guidelines for interpreting the world in which we live. The sociological data from
Chapter Two pointed to the ways the emotion of fear creates and/or transforms our
beliefs about crime, terrorism and our neighbors. When an object or experience is
interpreted in light of the emotion of fear, there is a distinct possibility that a strong and
enduring belief will form. Furthermore, emotional beliefs centered on fear may intrude on
other arenas of life when themes of the original experience overlap with new experiences.
Fear-tinged beliefs, formed from the memories of experiences, inform the manners in
which we can respond to novel situations. Thus, the final component of human
subjectivity relates to the ways in which our imagination informs the possibilities of our
lives.
Imagination
Psychiatrist Reading (2004) proposed that imagination
involves conjuring up stored visual and auditory images, and stringing them
together into scenarios that can be played out in our theater of the mind… Fantasy
and imagination allows us to experience life vicariously and experiment by trying
things out in our mind’s eye… We can only imagine the future in ways that are
related to how we have experienced and understood the past, for we are unable to
conceive of things that do not fit with our preconceived models of the world. (p.
68, italics author’s)
There is a connection between memories, beliefs and imagination. To imagine is to
utilize our creativity to construct novel ideas, concepts or stories from fragments of our
memory and influenced by our beliefs about the world. Thus the greatest limitations of
our imagination are twofold. The first limitation pertains to our knowledge about the
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world. These limits could stem from the breadth of our educational practices and
experiences, or even from the stories we have experienced throughout our lives. The
second limitation of our imaginations relates to the creative capacities we use to put
fragments together in novel ways. Imagination may begin with what we know or believe,
but it also depends on the creative combination of this knowledge to construct new
stories. Psychologist Reading concluded that “Ideas and images concocted out of the
figments of imagination have… motivated people to cross oceans, build pyramids, and
create civilizations” (2004, p. 69). Yet, while imagination can create new and meaningful
worlds, it is not always related to positive constructive practices. As pastoral theologian
Hogue (2003) stated “Imagination is not merely a source of pleasure. The creations of our
minds can frighten as well as inspire and comfort us” (p. 15). Any memory fragment or
belief is fair game for imaginative interpretation and reconstruction. Thus, there is
nothing that limits negative experiences from being a part of this process as well.
I want to return to my fear of spiders as an example of the ways in which our
imagination and emotions impact one another. When I was younger I found a large
brown spider in the corner of a basement closet. I was alone in the house and the surprise
from finding such a large threat got my adrenaline pumping. I forgot what I was looking
for in the closet and immediately ran upstairs to try and find a method of removing the
spider. What I found was a can of wasp and hornet spray. I returned to the closet and
immediately began dousing the spider with the spray not knowing if it would work to kill
the spider. The rest of the night I experienced the force of my imagination. I couldn’t be
sure that the wasp and hornet spray worked and I was too scared to return to the basement
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to find out. Instead, I found myself visualizing the staircase and a mangled spider slowly
crawling up the stairs to exact revenge on me. At various points in the evening I would
peer over the back of the couch down the staircase to check and make sure that nothing
was heading my way. I sat on the couch – hyper-vigilant, with my feet off the ground –
afraid that this threat would return. Imagination provides us with a myriad of interpretive
possibilities, some of these hopeful and some paralyzing. Social worker Smith (2007),
while studying the impact of threats on helping professionals, reported that “Threats work
by fuelling the fires of the imagination that threaten to burn down defences erected by
workers” (p. 327). The person imagining a threat projects calamity and turmoil into the
future freezing them from taking the appropriate kinds of action to relieve the distress.
Reading corroborated much of what I am saying by stating that “Our ability to
predict the future is a two-edged sword… if what we see is dark and foreboding, we
become weighed down with inaction and despair” (2004, p. 172). Negatively imagined
futures impact depressed individuals who believe it holds no promise for them; fearful
individuals may imagine the worst in everyone or every new experience and live life in a
constantly hyper-vigilant state. Utilizing the thoughts of horror fiction writer Stephen
King, Smith (2007) explained that fears are “fed by the imagination to the extent that they
evolve into something worse than the reality” (p. 327). There are times when our
imagination gets the best of us, making possible future realities much worse than the
reality of any given moment. What becomes evident in imaging both positive and
negative futures is that they are connected to our memories, beliefs and emotions in
intimate ways.
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I want to say a little more about the manner in which our imagination utilizes
emotions and their behavioral reactions to our benefit and detriment. Reading (2004)
proposed that
The advantage that imagination has over pure thought is that it can elicit
associated emotional information that can be used in decision making. We can
thus evaluate alternative scenarios in our mind by experiencing whether they elicit
favorable or unfavorable emotional reactions. (p. 68)
Emotions are generally coupled with a variety of physiological sensations and behavioral
cues alongside subjective feelings. This leads us to develop possible and/or probable
future courses of action based on imagined reconstructions. As stated before, our
imaginings are limited to the knowledge and nurtured creativity we possess (or that
continues to develop). Thus, what is created through imagination is purely the result of
our own memories, beliefs, emotions and creative constructions. These reconstructions
are wholly our own creative interpretation from beginning to end, at least until it is
proffered to a public audience. 25 Future courses of action depend on our ability to
stomach the emotional possibilities they bring with them. If all we can imagine is the
feeling of fear in an imagined experience, then chances are we will avoid that kind of
experience or react negatively should the experience find us. Imagination plays an
important role by directing the attention of the human mind in present and future
moments based on the knowledge contained in the memories of our past. Imagination is
the result of previous learning rearranged through a novel reconstructive process and
providing a subjective interpretive frame for present and future experiences.

128

Summary
Memories, beliefs and imagination provide the basic building blocks for our
interpretive lenses. Our acts in the world cannot be reduced to a mere physiological
presence. We are human beings who interact with a dynamic world and change as a result
of that interaction. These interactions involve a wide range of interpretive possibilities
given the memories, beliefs and imagination of an individual. Furthermore, it is obvious
that emotions play a deep role in memory recall, belief formation and imagined
possibilities. Emotions can create, strengthen, diminish or change a set of interpretation
or possibilities we have adopted.
When it comes to fear each one of these interpretive blocks plays a role in the
process of developing and maintaining particular objects as threats. Our memory provides
the knowledge of experienced threats, giving emotional weight to particular
circumstances or objects. Through our emotional memories, we develop meanings
concerning particular threats. These mental constructs provide for general attributions to
a particular object. Our beliefs can intensify the meanings we associate with threatening
objects. Finally, our imaginations provide for the possibility that we would project fearful
reactions onto future interactions with a particular threat. Taken together, these three
building blocks provide the impetus for the continued associate of fear with a particular
threat. Furthermore, due to the interaction between memory, beliefs and imagination I
surmise that there are times when feared threats are generalized or the emotion is
projected onto non-feared objects with similar themes. This might mean that when a
person who is afraid of guns hears a car backfire their imaginations, utilizing previous
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knowledge about the sound a gun makes, imagines that the backfire is a gunshot and they
react by diving under their desk. In this case, the imagination utilizes the best information
it has from memory which then informs the beliefs about a particular sound and enables
that person to react accordingly. While all of these processes are described as individually
maintained, what is also evident from these sources is the role of experience in their
activity. Subjectivity does not arise in a vacuum; it requires interaction with outside
influences. For me, the best way to talk about external influences is through the lenses of
constructivism and social constructionism.
Subjectivity: The Construction of Fears
Two types of learning influence the construction of fear in our lives. Experiential
learning occurs when we directly experience a threat which elicits the emotion of fear.
Second-hand learning happens when we are exposed to another’s interpretation of an
experience. Both of these types of learning require a person to interpret and incorporate
an object as a threat into their meaning structure. Yet, sources for the initial interpretation
are vastly different. In the first instance, the impetus for associating an object as a threat
comes from an internal source of meaning. Through second-hand learning an
interpretation of an object is “forced” upon another person eliciting a reaction of fear.
For example, someone present when the World Trade Center fell might easily
become afraid of a number of objects – terrorists, tall buildings, big cities. Their fears
would be related to their experience with one of these objects and the personally
constructed meaning related to those moments living with the threat. On the other hand,
threats arise differently for someone who witnessed the World Trade Center fall on

130

television. There is an additional layer of interpretation offered by the commentators of
the event. While the same objects might be interpreted as threats, the means by which the
fear is acquired is different. In the first instance, we are responsible for the interpretation
of the object (though some might easily contend that the meanings we construct develop
socially). In the second instance, another person’s meanings accompany a situation, preinterpreting an object before (or simultaneously as) we experience the object ourselves.
I relate these two forms of learning to the philosophical and psychological
theories of constructivism (experiential learning) and social constructionism (secondhand learning). There are strict proponents of each of these theories, yet I find that this
project will be better helped by utilizing both of them. Just as one theory of learning
cannot fully explain how we learn to fear particular objects, one psychological/
philosophical paradigm doesn’t fully explain the way we construct reality. In short, I see
constructivism as helping us understand the ways in which we personally encode
meaning into our experiences. In addition, social constructionism allows us to see how
relationships and culture impact the sources of knowledge we utilize in interpreting the
world. Ultimately, I will develop what I call “constructionism” which endeavors to see
persons in context as a theory of how we interact with the world and our experiences of
it. The remainder of this section will elaborate my understanding of these two theories of
construction, relating them to the two forms of learning proposed earlier. I will conclude
by developing a synthesis of these theories in order to understand how we learn to fear
particular threats.
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Constructivism
Crotty (as cited in Patton, 2002) described constructivism as:
the epistemological considerations focusing exclusively on ‘the meaning-making
activity of the individual mind’… Constructivism taken in this sense points out
the unique experience of each of us. It suggests that each one’s way of making
sense of the world is as valid and worthy of respect as any other. (p. 97)
Constructivism is a singular task whereby an individual constructs unique meanings
related to their individual experiences. The theory of constructivism helps us understand
the unique qualities related to the ways in which we interpret and incorporate experience
into the narratives of our lives. Lester (2003) described constructivist narratives as
reflecting “our unique interpretations of the world and [they] are not to be confused with
the real world. In this sense, persons must be responsible for their thoughts, feelings, and
actions in response to the world as they perceive it” (p. 92). I understand constructivism
as describing the unique methods we utilize in order to derive meaning from novel
experiences. These unique meanings are constructed from our own subset of memories,
beliefs and imaginings. It is these meanings that enable us to construct what we believe to
be reality; we are responsible for their content and the ways in which we act as a result of
how we interpret the world.
Additionally, constructivism can help us see how two people who witness the
same event come away with completely different interpretations and memories of what
happened. Constructivism, in part, explains my reaction to spiders and how it is different
from your reaction to spiders. It prioritizes the individual interpretive impact of an
experience and the reality constructed in its aftermath. This enables us to consider a
reality valid regardless of its grounding in the real world.
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I find the connection between a direct experience and constructivism helpful.
Both concepts center on the person as the initiator and locus of interpretation, experience
and meaning-making. In first-hand learning the subject experiences an object/threat and
reacts using a series of judgments. The subject is the sole interpreter of that event/threat,
putting together the information they gather and formulating a response. The resulting
reaction is unique to the subject due to the individual manner with which memories,
beliefs and imagination are creatively intertwined to make sense of an event/threat.
A constructivist would look at our September 11th example and see that each
person internalized the event and created a reality based on that internalization. This
internalization of the event initiates a meaning-making process. Unique points of view
enable unique constructions of meaning. These constructed meanings provide equally
unique interpretations which lead to a reaction based on the reality constructed by that
person in that moment. From a singular event, multiple realities are created because we
each bring uniquely interpreted ideas and concepts to that event. A strict constructivist
looks at this internal meaning-making process and believes it sufficiently describes the
interpretive capacities of an individual. On the other hand, a social constructionist will
begin and end in a different place.
Social Constructionism
Social constructionism “emphasizes the hold our culture has on us: it shapes the
way in which we see things (even in the way in which we feel things!) and gives us a
quite definite view of the world” (Crotty, as cited in Patton, 2002, p. 97). Social
constructionism understands that our cultural interactions inform, and even form, our
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interpretive processes. Where a constructivist would seek to understand how someone is
constructing reality around an event, a social constructionist would examine the same
event and ask how we came to know the knowledge we utilized to interpret the event.
From the perspective of social constructionists, culture deposits the knowledge we utilize
in our meaning-making processes. This shapes our understanding of reality and affects
our constructive processes.
Neimeyer pointed out that social constructionists assume that we “do not have
direct access to a singular, stable, and fully knowable external reality. All of our
understandings are contextually embedded, interpersonally forged, and necessarily
limited” (as cited in Patton, 2002, p. 96). Neimeyer is pointing out that what we know
about reality is dynamic. Meanings constantly change and adapt as reality is constructed
and reconstructed. Furthermore, what we know is based on the knowledge of what others
know. To bring the theory to the level of individuals, Gergen (1985) stated that social
constructionism is concerned with “explicating the processes by which people come to
describe, explain, or otherwise account for the world (including themselves) in which
they live” (p. 266). Knowledge is inherently relational. The terms we utilize in describing
and defining the world are socially constructed and linguistically shared. Their meanings
and their impact may vary some on a local level, but these are in constant negotiation as
people continue a dynamic process of growth and understanding.
As a budding social constructionist, I would often question whether the sky was
actually blue. I know the scientific reasons for the color of the sky (refraction of light,
atmospheric conditions, etc.). Instead my question was always “who was the first person
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to decide that the color we look up and see is blue?” Needless to say, this was a line of
questioning that disturbed some people. It can be unsettling to some people to challenge
the basic constructs of reality and what we generally accept as “fact” or “truth.” My
question wasn’t about the sky so much as it was about the construct “blue.” If we could
visit the first instance of the usage of this term and argue that blue is actually red and vice
versa, then we could change the color of the sky. At least we could change the construct
that we utilize to describe the hue we see when we look up at the sky. Blue is the socially
negotiated and agreed upon label for a particular color and this color is associated with
the sky and a particular wavelength in the color spectrum.
A more serious example of the social construction of knowledge is provided by
Boydell, Stasiulis, Greenberg, Greenberg & Spiegler (2008) who examined the dialectics
that developed in children who survived brain tumors. The authors found that the
messages these survivors received from doctors and others impacted their lives in a
variety of ways. The authors use the dialectic of competence/incompetence to describe
how they navigated their world as they aged. Many of the messages the survivors
received while younger were couched around the possible limitations of their success
(such as not being able to graduate from high school, etc.). As the survivors completed
grade after grade they were able to contradict the socially constructed limitations placed
on their lives. One participant stated that they “had the doctors tell me I would never
graduate high school… it made me feel like I was stupid” (p. 167). This is a prime
example of some of the messages we receive that come through our relationships which
then become catalysts for interpretation of both the self and the world. The dialectic arose
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as this person went on to graduate from high school and they were forced to reckon their
sense of competence with the continued limitations of memory, concentration and
physical participation due to the earlier treatments they received (p. 167). Thus, the social
message of incompetence bred a sense of limitation, which drove the person to act in a
manner that contrary to the doctor’s opinion. While they may have initially felt “stupid”,
they utilized the counter-narratives of their high school graduation to combat these
socially oppressive statements. This leads me to state that social construction is a
relational process whereby one person imparts knowledge (or opinion) to another person
which is then incorporated into the way the receiver processes the world.
That we look up at the sky and see a color is reality for the complex visual
systems of human beings. That a person who undergoes treatment for a brain tumor will
quite possibly have physical differences is reality. The meaning of the sky (and/or its
color) itself will be different for different people depending upon their experiences
related to it. Furthermore, the reality is that the sky is not always blue, but can range in
color in the evenings and mornings, providing multiple opportunities for interpreting the
meaning of the sky and its colors. However, the meaning of the label we use to describe
the sky is socially constructed and imparted to each of us at an early age. Some socially
constructed meanings become ubiquitous and are no longer challenged. For the person
who undergoes a treatment that will limit future physical activity, there are multiple ways
in which social contact constructs meanings about their treatment. It has a present and
future impact that shapes the ways in which a person views themselves in relationship to
the rest of the world. Social constructionists understand that all of our knowledge about
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the world is constructed and negotiated. Furthermore, these negotiations often happen at
local levels to construct a variety of meanings related to the world. While some
constructs may transcend localization, others find their meaning in the local community
based on the values of that community and the force with which they assert their
meanings over others.
In the case of fear, faces that express the emotion of fear can often pass that
emotional state to another person. If I walk into a room and see a huge spider and my
face twists to reveal the emotion of fear, then a companion might be predisposed to react
with the emotion of fear until they are able to construct their own reality of the room and
the meaning of the spider for themselves. In essence, I have socially conveyed my
construction of the room and communicated this in a way that “prejudices” a person
entering the same room.
Constructionism: Person in context/community
Grand philosophical questions arise when we talk about the role constructionism
plays in our lives. We can wonder which came first, our ability to construct reality or the
socially conveyed language we utilize to construct it. We might think about the subjective
aims of constructivism and social constructionism and speculate about whether there is an
objective reality or whether everything is a result of perspective. Theories of construction
can cast doubt on the basic truths we have come to depend on to make our lives secure
and stable. The rub is that we can construct any number of questions or thoughts that cast
doubt onto the pervasiveness of construct theory. That is not the point of exploring these
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theories though. The point is to begin to think about how things come into being in
different ways by different people regardless of the similarity of their experiences.
For me, both theories provide methods that are helpful for understanding how we
learn, process and construct the world in dynamic ways. Thus, as the remainder of this
chapter shifts from theories of subjectivity to theories of the mind I want to utilize the
term constructionism to describe a hybrid understanding of these two helpful theories. To
me, constructionism means seeing a person in context. It means realizing the impact
relationships have on our interpretations of events, as well as understanding a person’s
unique and creative way of putting together these messages into impactful action and
thought. As Lester (2003) stated “Though each person brings individuality to the creation
of personal stories, these stories are not created in isolation. The mind never works
completely free of existing perspectives, but is constantly influenced by our social
context and personal history” (p. 93). We should consider that it is the mind that
constructs meaning through the experiences we have in life. At the same time, the content
of our mind, the language we use to develop and share these meanings is filtered through
our interactions with others. Language is an external source of knowledge, the ability to
utilize language is an internal capacity of the evolved human brain. We cannot help but
interpret experiences through social and relational lenses of meaning; yet, we cannot
ignore the fact that an individual, influenced by these social constructions, is creatively
manipulating them to derive unique meanings. To better understand the generic meaning
of constructionism, we cannot ignore constructivism or social constructionism.
Constructivism basically means the creative construction of reality; social
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constructionism signifies the derivation of meaning through language passed down by
means of relationship and community. Grafted together these two construct theories help
us fully understand what it means to be a person (who constructs reality) in context
(where knowledge and meaning are previously constructed and shared).
Subjectivity: Final Remarks
The feeling of fear is a constructed phenomenon. The threats that affect us
develop through personal experiences and meanings constructed in community. In the
second chapter, I discussed the growth of a culture of fear which utilized meanings
passed down through the media and other communal traumas. This is a perfect example
of how the feeling of fear has become uniquely constructed in a multitude of contexts.
Whether it is a fear of crime, natural disaster or terrorism, people have utilized their
imaginations to construct threats where they may have previously ignored them. This has
the effect of creating new threats which are passed on through community interactions.
Additionally, memories of the catalysts for these feelings of fear reinforce or create new
beliefs systems which perpetuate fearful reactions to perceived threats.
When it comes to subjectivity and the feeling of fear, memories, beliefs and
imagination form the basic building blocks of constructionism. In turn, constructionism
provides a theory as to how particular threats come to have meaning in our lives and the
life of a community. To feel afraid is to construct an object as a threat. This constructed
threat then permeates our memories, beliefs and imagination (even as it is derived from
them) creating a new reality through which we interpret the world. This new reality is
formed through the language and stories of our context, but it also informs the
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community perpetuating the threat as a part of the relational fabric. As we wrap up this
section on subjectivity one question remains. How do human beings organize their
constructions of reality as well as the constructions shared with them by others? I believe
the answer to this question is found in narrative theories and therapeutic paradigms.
Psychology: Storied Lives
Philosopher Atkins 26 (2008) proposed that “to the extent that a life is coherent, it
is so because it deploys narrative strategies, and for this reason, narrative coherence is
crucial to agency, moral identity, and, ultimately, a good life” (p. 7). The last half of this
chapter is devoted to understanding how narrative theories impact our lives. When I use
the term narrative, I am most often talking about the therapeutic paradigm developed by
White and Epston in the late 1980s to early 1990s.
While I will use the term narrative to denote particular stances and theoretical
orientations, narratives are by no means unique to narrative theory or therapy. Every
psychological theory utilizes narratives. We describe behaviors by telling stories
concerning our reactions to particular events in our lives. We share with others what we
think by verbalizing our experiences into novel systems of beliefs. We tell others about
our contexts or families through stories about our experiences. Every psychological
theory depends upon narratives in order to function effectively. However, in this context
narrative theory and therapy are understood to be unique methods of utilizing stories in
order to understand human identities and provide a method of care. Narratives are
essential to our ability to relate effectively to the world. 27 They enable us to organize the
meaning of our experiences as we construct our realities in each moment.
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Narrative theory and narrative therapy provide two frameworks through which we
can understand the impact of narrative methods on our view of human beings. I use the
term narrative theory to signify philosophical and anthropological claims of narrative
theories of selfhood. These two disciplines are front in center in helping define the
postmodern self. Following this exposition of human selfhood, I turn to examine
narrative therapy. This final section examines the theoretical work that grounds a
narrative therapist’s practice. Additionally, I propose four narrative therapeutic practices
which guide the case study at the end of this dissertation.
Storied Lives: Narrative Theory and Selfhood.
How do you know who you are? When you think about terms such as selfconcept, self-awareness, self-reflection and self-esteem what is the subject, the “self,”
that concept, awareness, reflection and esteem refers to? Every psychological system has
some way of conceptualizing a “self” so that methods of practice can be derived to help
that “self” when needed. Narrative therapy is no different. As pastoral theologian Lester
purported, “Human beings do not simply tell stories, or illustrate their lives with
storytelling. We construct our sense of identity out of stories, both conscious stories and
those we suppress” (1995, p. 29). The capacity to story our lives is directly related to the
capacity to develop a self in relationship to the world. We become, in a sense, the stories
we tell.
Using narrative theory, I want to establish a theory of the “self” grounded in
philosophy and theoretical psychology. The term “self” is often associated with “an entity
existing apart from the acting and suffering human being” (Atkins, 2008, p. 1). Therefore,

141

I will depend on the terms selfhood or identity. The concept of selfhood, which I will
define shortly, is important to narrative theories of identity. Moreover, by understanding
narrative theories of selfhood, we gain an understanding of how narrative therapeutic
practice may be useful to those burdened by fear-based memories.
Selfhood, according to Atkins, begins with two questions that are inextricably tied
together: “who am I?” and “how should I live?” (2008, p. 1). These questions are
grounded in a desire to discover the characteristics and stories that pervade our
humanness, as well as the drives and purposes that form the basis of our actions. How we
live arises from who we think/feel/imagine we are and vice versa. As we answer one
question, it changes our response to the other; what I do answers who I am, and who I am
guides what I do. Atkins defined selfhood as “an activity of self-constitution and selfunderstanding articulated narratively” (2008, p. 7, italics author’s). As characterized
here, narrative selfhood has to do with the active and dynamic articulation of the stories
we believe best represent our lives. Furthermore, our articulation of these stories enables
us to create a role which further defines our selfhood. Diverse situations require different
skills in order navigate them appropriately. Psychologist Bruner (2003) exclaimed that
there is no such thing as an intuitively obvious and essential self to know, one that
just sits there to be portrayed in words. Rather, we constantly construct and
reconstruct a self to meet the needs of situations we encounter, and do so with the
guidance of our memories of the past and our hopes and fears for the future. (p.
210)
Atkins and Bruner’s concepts reveal a dynamic sense of selfhood as an activity of
continual construction and reconstruction. This feels obvious considering the varieties of
experiences a person has and the numerous contexts in which we live.
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Even as I write this I am reminded that I also live out stories of being a husband,
father, stay-at-home-dad, son, brother, friend, doctoral student, teacher, minister and
therapist. As I experienced fatherhood and needed to develop the skills necessary to take
care of our daughter, I had to adjust my answer to the questions of “who am I?” as well as
“how should I live?” This active reconstruction of my selfhood in the moment takes place
each time I switch from writing this chapter to caring for my daughter or even talking to
my spouse on the phone. My skills as a diaper changer are not quite as useful when my
context calls for me to perform as a therapist. That is not to say there isn’t some overlap,
but these are distinct roles I play and require me to shift my perspective on who I am
about how I should act in a moment. A dynamic selfhood is not the same as a completely
transient idenitity.
Something from each story is recorded in our memories and provides source
material for its retelling. Bruner goes on to say that
It is not that we have to make up these stories from scratch each time. We develop
habits. Our self-making stories cumulate over time, even begin to fall into genres.
They get out of date, and not just because we grow older or wiser, but because our
self-making stories need to fit new circumstances, new friends, new enterprises.
(2003, p. 210)
Lester (1995) described this same phenomenon as “core narratives” which serve as the
“central interpretive theme[s] that provides an individual or system with an overarching
structure… that organizes and makes sense out of a particular aspect of the human
condition” (p. 30). Lester also thought these core narratives “set the parameters of that
individual’s sense of self” (p. 30). While new contexts require new stories, something of
our previous stories remains. It may be a theme we tell ourselves or others; it may be that
we try and tell the same story in another context because we think it fits the situation; it
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could be as Bruner believes that our core narratives are nothing more than habits that
have developed over time.
For example, if we are rejected by a group of peers, we would probably develop a
narrative about that emotional situation that gets lodged into our memories. If it happens
again and another rejection story is lodged into our memories we might begin to connect
the stories. This could engender a belief through a new story about how we are friendless
or not worthy of new friendships. This story might come to the forefront in a novel
context and lead us to dismiss our importance to others. Our reticence to engage may
reaffirm our story, possibly turning it into a core narrative or narrative habit.
If we say that our identity is constructed narratively, then where do these
narratives come from? Language and experience are two obvious places where narrative
material originates. However, these sources must be incorporated into the life of an
individual in order to provide meaning or motive. Atkins identified three perspectives
that shape how we construct our narratives and their interwoven meanings. She posited
that
Narrative identity is not simply a first-person report but a complex structure that
interweaves first-, second-, and third-person perspectives into a semantic and
temporal unity with a subject who attests to that identity and in doing so
constitutes it as her own; one whose claims concerning identity are subject to
certain constraints and can be tested by processes of validation. (2008, p. 57)
The first-person perspective relates to the ability of a person to have “temporally
extended self-awareness such that one can recognize and respond appropriately to the
question ‘Who are you?’—even if who you are is in question for you” (p. 6). Related to
self-awareness, this first-person perspective positions us as actors in our own stories.
Through it we see that we hold a unique perspective on the world. We experience things
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and reflect upon those experiences, incorporating pieces of them into our memories and
forming narratives based on our reconstructions of those memories. The self-awareness
of a first-person perspective reveals us as actors in the world.
Thus, Atkins continued by stating that “My first-personal perspective implies my
existence as a third-personal object in the physical world” (2008, p. 8). There is no “me”
without a physical presence in the world. Atkins goes on to state “Our concerns about
who we are and how we should live would be meaningless to an essentially disembodied,
immaterial ego untouched by the constraints and catastrophes of the material world” (p.
32). We are aware of ourselves in part through the world we can sense. We are beings
whose awareness of their place in the world is generally constituted through the ways in
which we physically interact with it. The question of “how should I live?” is not just a
metaphysical quandary, but a daily reminder of our humanity and our activity as beings
in the world. The first- and third-person perspectives are tied together much like our
questions of selfhood. To this we must add the second-person perspective which reveals
its relational qualities.
Atkins believed that “We develop selfhood and acquire our practical identities
only through relations with other people beginning with specific second persons who care
for us in our juvenile dependency and extending to our later mature relationships” (2008,
p. 45). Thus, the final component of selfhood relates to the ways we interact with others.
When my embodied self interacts with your embodied self information and knowledge is
exchanged. A full sense of self-awareness may be only achievable through the ways we
perceive and are perceived by another. Without a mirror I would not really know what I
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look like. Without the information and feedback of another “self” our narratives would
lose their context and meaning. Bruner stated that “much of self-making is based on
outside sources as well—on the apparent esteem of others, and on the myriad
expectations that we early, even mindlessly, pick up from the culture in which we are
immersed” (2003, p. 210).
Together these three perspectives provide the basic sources for the construction
and reconstruction of selfhood. Through narrative theory we see that the “self” is not a
disembodied immutable core. Instead it is a fluid representation based on the needs of a
specific context. Selfhood is informed by core narratives, themes and even narrative
habits through a variety of internal and external interactions. To be a “self” is to act,
interact and reflect in the context in which we live and move and become. Bruner
reminded us that
Self-making through self-narrating is restless and endless. It is probably more so
now than ever before. It is a dialectical process, a balancing act. And despite our
self-assuring homilies about people never changing, they do. They rebalance their
autonomy and their commitments, most usually in a form that honors what they
were before. (2003, p. 221-222)
If the making of a “self” is a restless and endless process, then the possibility for hope is
present. If the “self” we attest to is made from the stories we tell, then stories can be reauthored. If the activity of our “self” is not amenable to the context in which we act then
we can make new stories which allow us to act differently. We can be both author and
editor of the selves we project into the world. I see a narrative theory of selfhood as
providing room for possibility. This is not just a dissertation about fear; it is also a
dissertation about hope.
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Bruner believed that the stories we tell develop out of a constant construction and
reconstruction of “a self to meet the needs of situations we encounter, and do so with the
guidance of our memories of the past and our hopes and fears for the future” (p. 210,
italics mine). This constant reconstruction of a self to meet the needs of the moment
includes those moments when threats become overwhelming. As stated earlier, these
emotional moments have a greater impact on our memories and thus greatly figure into
the stories we tell ourselves and others. If stories are dynamic and can be re-authored,
then this includes stories which reveal our fears. Narrative theories of selfhood give us
permission to believe that people do not have to be or to live in ways that steal their hope.
Through narrative theories we understand that people live in the middle of the books they
are writing about their lives. While they may have read a good many pages and written a
great deal, they are by no means finished. By the same token, while a threat or a trauma
may have them reading the same page again and again, narrative theories of selfhood
remind us that it is possible to turn the page and begin writing once more; indeed, it is
impossible not to turn the page and keep on writing. To that end, narrative therapeutic
practices provide a method for helping people re-write these traumatic and terrifying
stories.
Storied Lives: A Narrative Process for Re-authoring Lives
Narrative therapy adds a practice-laden theoretical lens through which specific
techniques can be applied to therapeutic situations in order to affect change. If selfhood is
organized around the construction of stories that we tell to ourselves and/or others, then it
would be important to utilize a psychological theory which takes into account this
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dynamic view of the self and orients practices towards narrative re-construction and the
re-authoring of identity. The remainder of this section seeks to introduce the theory and
practices that have been developed under the auspices of narrative therapy.
What will follow is by no means exhaustive. Beginning with the theory of
narrative therapy28 I want to highlight two phenomena: power/knowledge and resistance.
These two theoretical guides provide an understanding of how narrative therapists view
clients 29 and the stories they bring with them. While there are a number of practices
utilized by narrative therapists, I choose to highlight four of them. I see externalization,
counternarratives, taking a position and re-authoring identities as particularly helpful
narrative therapeutic strategies for people who suffer extensively because of the impact of
threats and fear. These two theoretical perspectives and four practices develop a basic
understanding of the narrative therapeutic paradigm as it applies to helping people deal
with threats and fears.
Power and Knowledge.
Power and knowledge play distinct roles in narrative therapeutic conversations.
Narrative therapists White and Epston (1990) utilized the work of Foucault in order to
draw attention to the use of power and knowledge in therapeutic processes. According to
them, “a domain of knowledge is a domain of power, and a domain of power is a domain
of knowledge” (p. 22). This is not to say that knowledge and power are one and same.
Instead, knowledge and power are bound together through our discursive practices. A
narrative cannot be presented as devoid of knowledge, all narratives reveal something.
Furthermore, narratives reveal the ways in which we understand our power in the world,
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as well as the power of others over us. Power, in this regard, is seen as constraining
(when the power of cultures, communities and others impact us) or constitutive (when we
act with power to speak our stories into the world). As a result, each person becomes a
center of power/knowledge, but is also impacted by the power/knowledge of their context
as well. White and Epston stated that “we are all caught up in a net or web of
power/knowledge, it is not possible to act apart from this domain, and we are
simultaneously undergoing effects of power and exercising this power in relations to
others” (p. 22).
Understanding power in this constitutive and constraining manner is vital to
therapeutic practice. Social worker Brown (2007) argued that when it comes to power, a
narrative therapist should acknowledge “both the social constraints on subjective life and
the individual agency and power within these constraints” (p. 4). When the therapist
acknowledges the dual role power plays, they begin to see that the person/client possesses
certain abilities and agency as well as how their ability or agency has been stifled by their
social contexts. However, in as much as we might see a person/client as powerful in their
contexts, White and Epston were careful to state that not all persons “are equal in the
exercise of power, nor that some do not suffer its subjugating effects very much more
than others” (1990, p. 22). Whether constraining or constitutive, power is nonetheless
unequal. Regardless of how much we are in control of our meaning making capacities,
there are other forms of power which exert control over our ability to fully exercise our
agential capacities.
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Being situated between constitutive and constraining power has an effect on
knowledge. If we cannot escape the effect of power, then all of our knowledge is
somehow incomplete. Brown reminded us that “From a postmodern perspective, there are
always competing stories of truth” (2007, p. 5). This reveals some of the implications of
constructionism.
In this case, the person in context reveals that we each have a unique perspective
on the world. We have the power to create stories and ascribe meaning to them. These
stories divulge the truth of our constructed realities. Likewise, powerful narratives are
imparted to us and they also shape our worlds. Those with the power to label objects and
disseminate their findings throughout the world change how we view ourselves and our
contexts. Lock, Epston, Maisel and de Faria (2005) proposed this simple example
concerning the social construction of the self
If, for example, we take Mead’s (1934) view that the development of a self
involves ‘taking on the attitude of the other’, and if that other’s attitude to us tells
us we are ‘bad’, then we come to regard ourselves as ‘bad’. The twist that
Foucault (above) adds to the Meadean view is that the other’s perceptions of what
constitutes ‘being bad’ is, in large part, the result of the sedimentation of regimes
of power into the construction of somewhat historically-arbitrary standards of
judgment, so as to make them appear as somehow essential truths and timeless,
universal moral standards. (p. 318)
There is a relationship between power and knowledge in which they work together to
shape not only the world we live in but the self we see and narrate to the world.
Furthermore, it proposes that many of the constructions we live by are “historicallyarbitrary standards of judgment.” This seems to propose that our knowledge, our sense of
“truth,” is relative. In a postmodern context which challenges the depth of knowledge we
have about any one “truth” we live by, this makes sense.
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However, what do we do with those things that seem more real or fixed? In
psychological circles, the limits of historically-arbitrary standards of judgment might
pertain to neurochemically-based “disorders” like schizophrenia or bipolar. In these
instances we seem to have evidence that there are distinct neurochemical components that
alter the perception of reality of people who live with schizophrenia or bipolar. Does the
postmodern challenge of knowledge and power mean that these “disorders” are relative
rather than real? Simply put, no. However, the manner in which we construct selfhood
and meaning related to persons with schizophrenia or bipolar should be considered
relative.
When thinking about power and knowledge, Brown and Augusta-Scott stated that
Systems of classifying and labeling individuals rely upon the nexus of truth and
power, legitimized by ‘experts’ such as therapists, and are often dividing
strategies of power that determine which people are normal or abnormal, good or
bad, strong or weak, moral or immoral. (2007, p. xvii)
In the second chapter the DSM-IV was portrayed as a negotiated document, manipulated
by those in power, as well as those seeking power. By creating a specific manual related
to mental health disorders, knowledge about these conditions has been constructed and/or
co-opted in ways that often pathologize people rather than problems. The DSM-IV, as a
widely disseminated manual of knowledge, has defined mental disorder for more than a
generation. To label a person living with bipolar disorder is to present them with a set of
standard criteria that informs new narratives of selfhood. It is also a means by which
judgment is passed. These new narratives have multiple effects on how that person then
operates in the world.
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To say that bipolar disorder is socially constructed is not to deny its existence or
its impact on persons and their relationships. Instead, the questions for narrative
therapists are: how does the impact of a bipolar diagnosis change the ways in which a
person lives and acts in the world? How does the diagnosis of bipolar impact the ways in
which we represent our selfhood as both subjects and objects in the world? Thus, what
becomes relative about the diagnosis of bipolar is its meaning to the individual. Lock et
al. proposed that the theory of narrative therapists requires them to challenge the
assumptions about diagnosis and disorder. They stated
The issue is not ‘What is mental illness really ’, but how does a person make
sense of their situation? The issue is not ‘Is there really a problem’. The issue is
‘What sense does a person make of ‘‘their problem’’?’; ‘what relation do they
have to this problem?’; and thus ‘how might their relation with the problem be
changed so as to make it less troublesome?’ (2005, p. 320, italics authors’)
The challenge related to knowledge and power is one of meaning and construction. It is
about how we situate ourselves with regard to the narratives we have experienced which
hold power over our lives. To say that knowledge is relative is not to deny the existence
of something.
We should understand that we all have some power, but that we are all affected by
the power of others, of culture and of dominant discourses which garner our attention and
seek to define us. Knowledge becomes relative through the varieties of narratives that we
accept or reject. We situate ourselves with regard to the messages we take in from our
contexts. However, we can never take in the fullness of each narrative or experience and
thus our knowledge about any one thing is incomplete and partial. The same can be said
for knowledge that characterizes our selfhood. That is, any story that is told about us is
incomplete at best. No global or universalized story can be said to encapsulate the
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experience of all people. Thus, while our selfhood is constructed by the stories we tell,
the stories we tell never reveal the completeness of an experience, event or even
ourselves as characters within it. White and Epston remarked that
The structure of narrative requires recourse to a selective process in which we
prune, from our experience, those events that do not fit with the dominant
evolving stories that we and others have about us… much of our stock of lived
experience goes unstoried and is never “told” or expressed. (1990, pp. 11-12)
In many ways we forget or push aside more than we can reveal in a narrative. This leads
narrative therapists to theorize that we often live by thinly-described narratives. As
Brown and Augusta-Scott (2007) noted, narrative therapists co-opted the idea of “seeking
‘thick description’ in therapeutic conversations in place of the often unhelpful thin
descriptions that suppressed alternative story possibilities” (p. xii). By seeking out these
“thick” descriptions narrative therapists look for pockets of resistance to
power/knowledge through alternative narratives (or even alternatives within narratives)
that may have been previously overlooked.
Resistance.
Psychologist Guilfoyle (2005) defined narrative therapy as a “therapy of
resistance” (p. 101). This means that narrative therapists often advocate that a person,
through the course of a therapeutic conversation, find some way to resist the socially
dominating stories that trouble them. Guilfoyle’s focus is on the limits of one person’s
abilities to resist macro-level social forces. While the term “therapy of resistance” is used
specifically, I think it has some value as a broad moniker. I see two ways in which this
resistance occurs. The first is through the resistance of dominant and political
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psychological cultures. The second is through resisting traditional psychological models
of viewing the person/client.
White and Epston stated that “we become wary of situating our practices in those
‘truth’ discourses of the professional disciplines, those discourses that propose and assert
objective reality accounts of the human condition” (1990, p. 28). Narrative therapists
resist the larger landscape of diagnosis and the “disordering” of people. This isn’t about
the denial of the dis-ease that some people experience; instead it is a proactive stance
against one-size fits all labeling that is a large part of psychological culture. Utilizing a
diagnostic structure, such as the DSM-IV, provides a level of comfort for some people.
The trouble begins when the DSM-IV is treated as though it contains objective knowledge
about the world suitable for describing and defining the full scope of an individual’s
problem. White and Epston’s position is that we should treat with suspicion that which
purports to explain a person/client’s reactions without actually knowing the person/client.
Through the influence of social constructionism and post-structuralism 30,
narrative therapy (like narrative theories of selfhood) denies the presence of a core or
essential self. Psychologist Payne remarked that “The humanist philosophical tradition in
Western thought has put the individual, perceived as an independent functioning entity
with a core self at the centre both of study and of values” (2005, p. 160). Many
psychotherapeutic theories revolve around the reclamation of our “selves,” as if
something stable had been lost. Narrative therapeutic theory resists this notion of an
essential self by offering something different. Through the utilization of poststructuralism and social constructionism, narrative therapeutic theory gives “more weight
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to social and cultural influences on persons’ perceptions, identities and behaviour, and
emphasize the social results of human interaction” (Payne, 2005, p. 160). Instead of being
born with an essential self we lost along the way, we were born with the capacity to
interpret the world, with particular brain structures that enable sensory input and control
activity. Through these capacities we constantly experience the world and interpret a
myriad of relationships from human to cultural to environmental. Through our local
knowledge, our interpretations of experiences, our co-opting of cultural narratives and
our memory and imaginations we actively construct and re-construct our selfhood in each
circumstance to meet our best estimation of the needs of that relationship.
Narrative therapists also resist the metaphors of depth and surface that proliferate
in structuralist thought. As we noted before, one site of resistance for narrative therapists
was in helping people “thicken” their narratives. Instead of looking “under the hood” to
fix a presenting problem, a narrative therapist would involve themselves in “a process of
deconstructing unhelpful problem-saturated stories, reconstructing alternative stories, and
re-authoring preferred identities” (Brown & Augusta-Scott, 2007, p. xxx). If narratives
form the basis of interpretation and identity-making, then the focus of therapy is to
provide adequate space for people to explore a problem-saturated narrative. By
constructing and re-constructing a problem-saturated narrative a person/client is offered
the opportunity to thicken their stories and develop ideas about how they have resisted
living out a particular narrative. Payne (2005) made this remark about the difference
between thin and thick descriptions, “thin descriptions of life… derive from a person’s
unexamined socially and culturally influenced beliefs, and rich or thick descriptions…
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more nearly correspond to the actuality and complexity of life as experienced by that
person” (p. 30). Not only is the therapist resisting a long-held psychological belief about
what helps persons, they are also providing a milieu where the person can become their
own source of resistance. What happens when someone re-authors an experience utilizing
thick descriptions is that a new identity is formed. This is in contrast to the idea of reclaiming an identity through careful analysis which probes the depths of people.
One final form of resistance takes place through the language of the therapeutic
relationship. Narrative therapy requires us to examine the language we utilize to create
the world in which conversation occurs. One example of this is developed by narrative
therapists Combs and Freedman (2002) in an article concerning the use of the terms
boundaries and relationships. They stated,
We do recognize that in some contexts safety is more important than interest or
enrichment. However, we do not believe that a focus on safety necessitates a
focus on boundaries. We find it more useful to pay attention to relationships than
to boundaries. (p. 204)
For the authors, implicit in the term boundaries is the notion that a person is a selfcontained actuality with a fixed identity or content. Use of this term as an organizing
principle in therapeutic conversation mandates a certain view of the interaction between
therapist and person/client. The authors went on to state that “Boundaries are about
separation. They invite us to relate to people on the other side as ‘other,’ as foreign” (p.
205). While they acknowledge that relationships can be harmful or inappropriate, the use
of the term “boundary” can be equally harmful to the ability of a therapist to work
effectively. If selfhood is socially constructed, then what does the setting of boundaries
contribute to the narratives a person/client creates about therapeutic conversations? From
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a linguistic standpoint what is the most important part of therapeutic conversation, the
manner in which we separate ourselves from the “other” or the manner in which we relate
to them?
We might opine that without boundaries, anything goes. This is certainly a valid
concern to a discipline (psychology) that is “bound” to operate by a certain set of rules
and ethical responsibilities. Combs and Freedman acknowledged this quandary and
replied by stating
Eschewing the use of boundary metaphors does not imply that “anything goes” in
therapeutic relationships. It does not mean throwing away care, respect, or
reverence for one another. We believe that professional helpers should not use
their power to abuse, harass, or exploit the people who seek their help.
Professional helpers, when practicing their professions, should put the safety,
security, and desires of the people who consult with them far ahead of their own
desires, safety, and security. However, none of this requires the use of metaphors
or language concerning boundaries. If we may quote Greenspan (p. 132) one more
time, “…There can be connection without harm, love without power abuse,
touching without sexual abuse in psychotherapy-but the language of boundaries
doesn’t help us see our way clearly into this arena.” (2002, p. 207)
The shift in language may seem subtle, but the effects can be large. By focusing on the
term “relationship” we understand therapeutic conversations taking place through the lens
of what we should be doing as professional helpers. This is in juxtaposition to the
interpretation of boundaries which requires us to think first about the liabilities of the
therapeutic relationship rather than its possibilities. The language we use as therapists to
define therapeutic interactions shapes our view of the person/client as well as our
intentions about the type of relationship we wish to build. Narrative therapists use
language to resist conventional cultural definitions in order to thicken and add layers of
complexity to the therapeutic milieu. Additionally, the careful construction and
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deconstruction of psychological metaphors has the power to resist and re-story the
political landscape of psychological culture.
Methods.
Narrative therapy adopts a stance of theoretical resistance to dominant
psychological and cultural discourses. It resists the universalizing of a person’s problemsaturated narratives; resists metaphors designed to probe the depths of the self; and it
resists the use of psychological terminology that might impede therapeutic conversation.
The remainder of this chapter focuses on four tools utilized by narrative therapists:
externalization, counternarratives, taking a position and re-authoring identities. These
methods of practice arise from the theoretical ground of narrative therapy and open
possibilities for helping a person/client resist and re-author problem-saturated narratives.
This final section introduces each method and provides a brief rationale related to how it
helps people with fear-saturated narratives.
According to White and Epston (1990), externalization is “an approach to therapy
that encourages persons to objectify and, at times, personify the problems that they
experience as oppressive” (p. 38). Externalizing problem-saturated narratives give people
the opportunity to see their problems as outside of themselves, rather than feeling as
though they are the problem. White and Epston concluded that externalization (1)
decreases unproductive conflict, (2) undermines a sense of failure, (3) provides for a
cooperative milieu, (4) opens new possibilities, (5) decreases stress around the problem
and (6) opens pathways for dialogue (pp. 39-40). A person who comes to therapy to get a
handle on depression might transform their problem from being depressed to being
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affected by depression. The subtle difference is that “being depressed” equates the person
with the depression while “being affected by depression” places the source of the
problem as external to the person. By externalizing the problem, the therapist encourages
the person to name it with some measure of certainty and frankness. In the case of
depression, “being affected by depression” might transform into “being pushed around by
the fog” or something to that effect. The push is to get the person to name the
externalized problem in such a way that they can deal with it outside of themselves.
For those whose narratives are saturated with fear the threat is already an external
source of discomfort. Therefore, externalization 31 will not only name the threat but also
how the threat impacts the narrative quality of a person’s life. While the threat may take
center stage in a problem-saturated narrative, the therapist should also ask the
person/client to explain how the threat impacts their lives. The narrative describing the
impact of a threat can shape and give more definition to the already externalized threat.
Payne added that “Narrative therapy’s emphasis is always on the real effects on people’s
lives of the problems they are grappling with – it is not a ‘feel-good’ therapy” (2005, p.
45). By focusing on the threat and its impact, a person names the object which threatens
them using their own interpretation of the threat; they quantify the qualities of that threat
and reveal how it shapes their problem-saturated narrative; finally, externalization allows
the person to describe the impact of a threat on their life. 32
Once a person has externalized the problem narrative therapists encourage them
to thicken its description and create a full description of the narrative. This is usually
done with the help of deconstructing questions offered by the therapist. Within this full
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picture, the therapist and person begin to look for sub-plots and “minor” stories that
reveal resistance to the problem-saturated narrative. The purpose of this exploration is to
find at least one “unique outcome.” A unique outcome, according to White and Epston
can be found in past, present or future accounts of how a person understands a problemsaturated narrative (pp. 56-61). Essentially, a unique outcome is the moment when a
person gained the upper hand over a problem-saturated narrative. Payne stated that these
moments are sometimes found in the “kind of swiftly passed-over aspects of the person’s
story which might indicate that he has demonstrated strengths, resourcefulness, tenacity,
courage or other qualities which he himself is not acknowledging in the overwhelming
tenor of his account” (2005, p. 68). Unique outcomes, or counternarratives, are often
forgotten alternative stories that run against the problem-saturated narrative.
In fear-saturated stories, counternarratives provide the initial clues of resistance to
a threat. It helps the therapist see some of the strategies people have utilized in order to
negate an overwhelming reaction to a feared object. As a therapist, I see three ways in
which counternarratives could be developed. We can explore previous times when a
person/client was able to mitigate the effects of a threat. We can explore times in between
sessions when the threat was present but the person re-storied the event to develop a new
outcome. Finally, we can present the opportunity to create a future story whereby the
person develops a fictional narrative in the hope of living into it when the threat
reappears. In each situation, the person is enriching the fear-saturated narrative with
alternative outcomes and possibilities. Seeing the problem-saturated narrative alongside
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these counternarratives offers the person an opportunity to figure out their relationship
with and contribution to this narrative.
Having developed a thicker problem-saturated narrative, by describing the
problem, its impact and seeking out counternarratives, the person is asked where they
wish to position themselves in relationship to the narrative. That is, do they wish to
remain in the same relationship with the narratives they have described or do they wish to
enact some form of change to this relationship? The reason this step is important is that it
secures a verbal commitment to the person’s relationship to the narrative going forward.
Furthermore, it enables people to “take up chosen positions of their own” (Payne, 2005,
p. 76) rather than the chosen position of a therapist or other self-defined experts. Once a
person takes a position on their narratives the therapist encourages them to thicken this
new position by elaborating on their reasoning for taking this new position.
How a person positions themselves in relationship to a fear-saturated narrative is
an empowering step meant to further enhance their relationship to the narrative. By
taking a stand relative to a threat, the person makes a statement concerning the
continuance of that relationship. Payne remarked that the
process of telling and re-telling in response to the therapist’s questions frees
persons to re-position themselves in relation to their problems and to identify and
take up modified or different ways of living and relating which correspond more
closely to their wishes for themselves and for others who matter to them. (p. 79)
Just as we have constructed particular objects we fear, we too can construct alternate
ways of relating to these objects. Regardless of whether a person chooses to continue to
act in compliance or counter to the fear-saturated narrative, their relationship to that
narrative is altered through the process of its re-construction.
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Assuming a person vocalizes the desire to change their relationship to a problemsaturated narrative, the final tool I want to examine is the re-authoring of identities.
Brown and Augusta-Scott (2007) saw narrative therapeutic practices as involving “a
process of deconstructing unhelpful problem-saturated stories, reconstructing alternative
stories, and re-authoring preferred identities” (p. xxiv). Utilizing a variety of questioning
platforms 33, narrative therapists provide the space for a person to begin constructing a
narrative which envisions their preferred identities. Re-authoring identities relies on the
understanding that our selfhood is dynamic, fluid and changeable. Moreover, this process
focuses on “people’s agency, preferences, and values in relationships” (Augusta-Scott,
2007, p. 252) in order to empower them to see and develop alternatives to the narratives
that brought them for help in the first place. Re-authoring one’s identity is not about
forgiving and forgetting. It is precisely in the remembering of our narratives that we are
called into a new relationship with them so that we can face our lives and take a new
position with regard to our problem-saturated narratives.
With fear-saturated narratives, re-authoring identities will not negate a threat, nor
will it help us forget or make us fearless. There is no such thing as a fearless person
(barring specific brain injury). However, we can place fear dominated narratives within
their context in order to develop new methods of relating to the objects that threaten us.
While the emotion of fear will always be with us, our ability to re-author our identity
with regard to a subjective threat shows great possibility. Implicit in the re-authoring of a
fear-saturated narrative is the performance of the new position with regard to the threat.
Because our worlds are built at the social level, the enactment of our new narratives
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becomes the pinnacle of re-authoring our identities. It is through the performance of this
new narrative that we not only announce our new selves to others, but we also stake a
claim to a realistic hope concerning our futures and the selves we will continue to create
and relate to others.
To summarize this section on the methods of narrative therapy, I want to quote
White and Epston who stated that, “It is never the size of the step that a person takes that
counts, but its direction” (1990, p. 61). Any movement in any direction shifts the ways in
which we tell a narrative to ourselves and others. With fear-saturated narratives the
object/threat is already externalized but its impact may remain closeted. By thickening
the story related to a threat, we invite people to describe its impact on their lives and see
the ways in which they may have successfully interrupted its power over them. As the
story thickens, perspectives change and we can invite people to begin to wonder how
they want to relate to this threat in the present and the future. Any position taken with
regard to this thick narrative is a small step. However, I think it is when people begin to
see how a fear-saturated narrative impacts their relationships that they really begin to
question whether their identity related to this particular story is valid enough to
perpetuate. Re-authoring our identities is a significant step made up of many small
shuffles. To re-author and perform a new identity requires strength, fortitude, resistance,
resilience, imagination and hope. Most of all it requires developing and performing a new
position related to a tired, problematized narrative. To wit, Brown and Augusta-Scott
believed that “the most important contribution of narrative therapy is its belief that new
or different stories, accounts, or representations are always possible” (2007, p. xxiv).
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Summary
This chapter has asserted that memories, beliefs and imagination provided the
basic building blocks of our subjective life and interpretive frames. Each person
remembers particular things about experiences or events based on past experiences and
proffered social and cultural narratives. Our memories change in a given situation, and
we never tell the same story twice. Thus, while our memory provides a historical
timeline, the stories that make-up that timeline will differ with each telling. Because our
memories of experiences change we often fill in gaps with mental constructs called
beliefs. Beliefs generally equate an attribute with an object and they occur when a person
takes an interpretive risk to associate these two constructs with one another. Together
memories and beliefs provide an interpretive frame through which we subjectively
interpret the world. Finally, imagination provides the penultimate component of basic
subjectivity. Through our imaginations we are capable of projecting possibilities into the
future as well as seeing alternatives in a present moment. A particular fear may develop
through a past experience (memory); an interpretive risk is taken which associates fear
with a particular object (belief) whether or not that object poses an actual threat in the
moment; a belief about an object may also be projected into future interactions
(imagination) leading a person to act in the moment as though a fear will come to
fruition.
From the building blocks of subjectivity, I moved to examine constructionism as
the theory through which fears become a part of our lives. I saw key insights provided by
both constructivism and social constructionism, and together they form an adequate
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understanding of persons in context. We are individuals situated socially. Our contexts
provide numerous narratives through which we can interpret the world. In addition, it is
our acceptance of certain narratives as self-defining that make us unique beings in these
contexts. As Lester (2003) stated “Though each person brings individuality to the
creation of personal stories, these stories are not created in isolation. The mind never
works completely free of existing perspectives, but is constantly influenced by our social
context and personal history” (p. 93). Thus, as I creatively construct my reality I must
also remember that the tools I use to create were passed down to me from others. As we
saw in Chapter Two of this work, fears live in society, in the mind and in the contexts of
individuals. As objects are interpreted for us and we accept the stories we are told, we
then creatively construct meaning about an object/threat/person which directs our actions.
Narrative theories and therapy provided the best theories of selfhood and
therapeutic practice for understanding persons in context. Following in the footsteps of
narrative theorists I saw selfhood as fluid and dynamic. Through first-, second- and thirdperson perspectives we constantly construct and re-construct our selfhood in a variety of
contexts. The first-person perspective provides us with self-awareness, while the thirdperson perspective relates to our embodied presence in the world. The second-person
perspective reveals the influence of the outside world on our creative constructions of
selfhood. While we are constantly re-constructing our selfhood in relationship to our
contexts, we develop habits or core narratives (which may be seen as beliefs as well) that
guide our lives and interpretations. At times, these narratives become saturated with
problems and/or fears.
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Narrative therapy provides a theory and method of helping people look into
problem/fear-saturated narratives to find a different way of relating to them. Narrative
therapeutic theories pay attention to the use of power and knowledge in order to find
ways of resisting socially constructed and problematized narratives. In the praxis of
narrative therapy, the theory of helping people thicken their stories as a practice of
resistance to dominant and universalizing narratives provides a starting point for change.
Through the externalization of the problem a person is challenged to see themselves as
capable actors in their lives. As counternarratives are developed persons begin to
understand their own power of resilience and resistance. As they take a position on the
newly thickened narrative a person begins to re-author their identity as it relates to the
problem at hand. Finally, as they perform envisioned identities a person begins to live
into new narratives which make novel claims about their identity to the world.
I want to conclude this chapter by looking backward and forward. To this point I
have made social, physiological and psychological claims about human beings and the
world they inhabit. Each claim revolves around one subject, fear, and its meaning for
human beings living in our contemporary context. I have claimed that we live in a culture
of fear. I have claimed that the emotion of fear is inescapable given the structure of our
brains and evolutionary history. I have claimed that we are dynamic beings with
changeable identities who construct particular narratives around objects that give rise to
the emotion of fear. While I have claimed much about our collective humanity and
unique subjectivity, I feel compelled to look forward at another claim about human
beings.
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This forthcoming claim is theological and reveals the ways in which I see God
interacting with human beings and the world. Through the use of process theology I will
make claims about hope and its place in human lives. At the end of Chapter Three I
mentioned that the emotion of fear reveals a human tendency for surviving, coping and
thriving in a sometimes hostile and often unpredictable world. Not only are these
tendencies revealed through the emotion of fear, but I also see them as directly related to
our ability to imagine a hopeful future. That is, the emotion of fear reveals our hope for
survival, coping and thriving in an unpredictable and sometimes hostile world. 34
As we transition from talking about fear to talking about hope I feel the need to
make something clear. I do not place these two constructs together lightly. Fear and hope
are very real emotions which provide the impetus for passionate action in the world. I
have sought to develop the construct of fear as thoroughly as possible so that its impact is
taken seriously. Fear is not something that should be brushed aside as a lack of faith or
inability to trust. Physiologically speaking fear is necessary for our survival;
psychologically speaking fear is essential to our ability to cope; theologically speaking
fear is necessary for us to thrive. I do not see our reactions to fear as just defensive and
seeking escape. For me, to run away from something is to run towards something else. In
order to begin developing this relationship between fear and hope I will now turn to
process theology as a meaningful grounding for a hopeful relationship between God and
humanity in a sometimes hostile and often unpredictable world.
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Chapter Five: Fear and Hope Theologically Interpreted
This chapter concludes our theoretical ascent by looking at human beings and the
emotion of fear through a theological lens. So far, I have examined the emotion of fear
through physiological, psychological and social lenses. Together, these lenses allowed us
to see fear as an inescapable neurophysiological emotion which is individually activated
by threats constructed through first-hand and vicarious experiences and expressed
physically and narratively. Furthermore, given the evolutionary basis for the retention of
the emotion of fear and the unique human capacity for creativity and imagination, I
posited that fear enables us survive, cope and thrive in a sometimes hostile and often
unpredictable world. Furthermore, implied in my understanding of fear is its relationship
to an undercurrent of hope which is revealed in the divine-human relationship. A hope
which gives rise to fear, helps mitigate its impact and provides the impetus to thrive. This
chapter examines how the dynamics of fear and hope participate in the God-human
relationship, as interpreted through the lens of process theology. Process theology is wellknown for its reconstruction of God’s power and its maintenance of human freedom. The
manner in which these concepts are laid out in process theology form the basis of my
understanding of the meaning of fear as well as its relationship to hope.
The main thrust of this dissertation is to understand what it means to be afraid and
how our fears relate to our hopes. As a result of this focus, threats and trauma provide the
backdrop of our discussions. They are catalysts for the emotion of fear and their memory
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perpetuates a physical and psychical readiness which can permeate our lives. Any
theology which attempts to deal with fear (both on subjective and physiological terms)
must also deal with how humans interpret their natural, systemic and subjective worlds.
Process theology provides a theological framework through which I can see the threats
and traumas that affect us and still hold out hope for the world. I will speak more about
process theology’s contributions to our thinking about trauma and threats in Chapters Six
and Seven.
This chapter introduces some of the major concepts of process theology as they
pertain to this dissertation. I begin with a brief history of process theology in order to
provide a context for this discussion. I have chosen process theology as the theological
framework for this dissertation for a number of reasons. They include: how process
theology relates to science, its commitment to human freedom, its realism about
destructiveness and loss, its redefinition of God’s power and the resulting refinement of
the God-human relationship. I also see each of these reasons impacting my understanding
of fear as it is interpreted theologically. Furthermore, each of these reasons provides a
meaningful connection to the ways in which fear has been constructed for this
dissertation. Following this discussion of process theology and its relationship to fear I
will conclude the chapter with some ideas about hope. I will make a more explicit
connection between fear and hope in Chapter Six; however, it is important to include a
basic understanding of hope in order to guide further discussion.
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Process Thought and Theology
History
The North American 35 version of process theology is a system of thought based
on the work of Alfred North Whitehead, a mathematician and philosopher. As a professor
of philosophy at Harvard, Whitehead worked to develop what he thought was a
“comprehensive vision of reality” (Mesle, 2008, p. 4). This new philosophical work,
often described as speculative philosophy, was an effort “to generalize our knowledge, to
seek a way of understanding the world as comprehensively as we can” (Mesle, 2008, p.
12). Accordingly, process philosophy gathered the broad range of scientific knowledge of
the day, brought it together into a framework of thought and then imaginatively
generalized this knowledge in order to provide a meaningful way of organizing the world
interactively.
The result of Whitehead’s ruminations was a philosophy which primarily
described the world as composed of an infinite series of interrelated experiences.
According to Whitehead (1929/1985) “The elucidation of immediate experience is the
sole justification for any thought; and the starting point for thought is the analytic
observation of components of experience” (p. 4). That is, we think about what we
experience; we interpret what we experience; and, our lives are a series of observations
originating in the elements of experience which provide the beginning point for our
interpretations of the world and all that is in it. Mesle (2008) believed process philosophy
rejected “philosophies and theologies that give primacy to Being over Becoming, to
independence over relatedness, to things over processes, to the idea that the human spirit
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is fundamentally isolated from the social and natural web in which we clearly live and
move and are becoming” (p. 9). Simply put, process thinkers tend to emphasize the
dynamic processes of life, experience and relationships. These processes, informed by
imperfect interpretations of experiences, enable us to know ourselves as actual entities in
a real world who, along with the world and God, are in the process of becoming.
The introduction of the phrase “actual entity” leads to one of the great struggles
with process thought, language. Cobb, Jr. (2008) remarked that “No deeply original
thinking can be expressed adequately in existing language” (p. 7). This is certainly true of
Whitehead’s work, which ran counter to the prevailing philosophies of being in his time.
To set his work apart from other philosophical traditions Whitehead developed new terms
to describe his intentions, while at other times he would stretch the meaning of familiar
terms in order to expand on its possible interpretations. There are numerous definitional
resources available 36 which can provide a variety of interpretations of Whitehead’s
terminology that can be utilized by readers unfamiliar with this philosophy.
Process Theology and God
Generally speaking, process theology follows the conceptual framework put forth
in process philosophy, but most often views God from a specifically Christian point of
view. To be sure, other religious traditions have found some value in process thought for
their own theological formulations. I will follow in the footsteps of Cobb, Jr. and Griffin
(1976) along with other process thinkers who see process theology as operating “on the
one side from the perspective of Christian faith and on the other side in the metaphysical
context provided by process philosophy and its doctrine of God” (p. 41). My use of
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process theology stands in contrast to more traditional (often called orthodox) theological
formulations of the God-human relationship. These traditional theologies often posit God
as unchangeable and controlling; some perpetuate the ideas from our early Greek heritage
that God is omnipotent (all-powerful) and independent; while others continue to
understand God as only male (Cobb, Jr. & Griffin, 1976, p 8-10). As I will explain,
process theology sees God and God’s activity differently.
This introduction to process theology is divided into three parts. First, process
thought is inextricably tied to the scientific understandings of the world and the way it
works. Process theology continues this relationship by organizing itself around three
principles—panentheism, panexperientialism, and prehension—which guide its
relationship to scientific thought. Understanding the relationship between science and
process theology is important. It is through this relationship that we not only understand
the interconnectedness of all things, but we also discover some of the possible ways God
works at the smallest levels to affect larger happenings. By utilizing process theology, I
am able to reconcile the scientific methods and approaches to knowledge found in
neuropsychological and evolutionary data used earlier and the exercise in constructive
and contextual thought engaged through pastoral theological methodologies. Next, I want
to look at how process theology explains human freedom. Narrative theories of
experience and the self posit a human being who is free to change given the experiences
of their lives. If I am going to posit that human beings are malleable and their selves are
made up of reinforced habits based on narratives they experience, it is important to have a
theological system which allows for human freedom and human possibility. Directly
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related to this exploration of human freedom is how process theologians understand
God’s power. Understanding the ways in which God’s power works in this world
provides the grounds through which I can interpret fear as an adaptive and even loving
response to a sometimes hostile and often unpredictable world. Finally, the redefinition of
power and human freedom refines the God-human relationship. In this final portion of the
introduction I want to introduce the process concepts of God’s initial aim and a human’s
subjective aim. Through the elucidation of these process theological concepts I will draw
some links to the emotion of fear and begin to introduce how I see hope relating to it. In
Chapter Six a more definite link will be established which further explains how all of
these concepts come to bear on the relationship between hope and fear and provide new
methods of thinking and working with those who are afraid.
Process Theology and Science.
Science is an important conversation partner to the understanding of the emotion
of fear presented in this dissertation. Without scientific knowledge and research, any
claims I make about the emotion of fear would be incomplete at best. However, I
consider much of the hard scientific data used in this dissertation to be composed of
descriptive anthropological claims about the emotion of fear which establish its
embodiment. Neuroscientific and evolutionary data are indispensible when it comes to
understanding the emotion of fear and how it manifests in human lives. At the same time,
some questions arise from this research. Namely, is the descriptive data presented in
scientific data enough to understand what it means to be afraid? Can we accurately
surmise what it means for a human being to be afraid by understanding physiological

173

data? As a pastoral theologian, my response to this question is no. For me, a more
complete discussion of the emotion of fear necessarily entails a theological contribution.
Moreover, by adding a theological point of view to any discussion regarding the emotion
of fear enables us to draw out its connection to hope which thickens the anthropological
claims we can make. Yet, given the often contentious relationship between science and
theology, it is sometimes difficult to see how these two disciplines could converse to
build better anthropological claims than either can make alone.
Despite the scientific gains we have made in this current era there are still a
number of things that go unexplained. For all that we know about neurophysiology, we
cannot explain through science alone the rise of the mind from seemingly simple neurons.
Aesthetics and moral judgments are nonsensory perceptions which give rise to novel
ways of interpreting the world. Despite their sometimes sensory origins, aesthetics and
morality provide knowledge of the world that is not immediately testable through
scientific methodologies. They are uniquely expressive due to their subjectivity, but
provide meaningful ways of interpreting phenomena outside of normal sensory data. All
of the things explained to us through scientific research do not give us all of the things we
need to know to understand human beings. Something must give for complex
anthropological claims to be made and valued. Process thinker Griffin (2000) believed
we cannot think of “theology or science as an autonomous discipline with truths to be
protected from the encroachment of the other” (p. 10). Any theological work (such as this
one) which seeks to incorporate scientific data into its derivative meanings should
endeavor to establish a relationship between these two disciplines. Griffin sees potential
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in characterizing the relationship between science and theology as “going both ways, so
that the resulting harmony results from a mutual modification” (2000, p. 8, italics
author’s). Descriptive data is not the same as providing an interpretive framework for the
meaning of a particular object. Instead, mutual modification allows for the conversation
between description and interpretation to occur in a cross disciplinary fashion. This
allows for the possibility that novel meanings can be derived which can help further
interpret the data from diverse disciplines.
Three concepts utilized by Griffin characterize the ways in which process thought
can modify science in meaningful ways. Griffin assumes that a minimal definition of
science, described as “simply a rejection of supernatural interventions in the world,
meaning interventions that interrupt the world’s most fundamental pattern of causal
relations” (2000, p. 11) would enable the flexibility for the mutual modification sought
between science and theology. A normal understanding of science sees the world as a
place of cause and effect, where there are basic laws in operation that govern the behavior
of particular objects. Panentheism, panexperientialism and prehension offer alternatives
to the scientific dependence on sensationalism, materialism and mechanism. Prehension
addresses the doctrine of sensationalism, that there is nothing beyond what we can sense,
by allowing for the fact that people can sense things beyond just their physical senses.
Panexperientialism addresses the materialism of modern science which reduces the rise
of the human mind to a series of accidents occurring in vacuous actualities over time.
Panentheism further addresses materialism by allowing for the reality of nonsensory
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possibilities which interact with actual entities in order to affect their behavior and
interpretations of the world (Griffin, 2000, pp. 7-14).
At the same time, these three concepts add a layer of theological interpretation to
how I understand the emotion of fear. Before we can adequately explore any of these
concepts it should be understood that for mutual modification to occur, both disciplines
need to change. Griffin believes that theistic religions need to give up something. That is
clinging to a strict and exaggerated form of supernaturalism that posits a God outside of
time and the world. This understanding of a supernatural force, one that can manipulate
the world at a whim to bring about specific aims, keeps any sense of relationship with
even a minimal form of scientific naturalism from developing. Rather, Griffin advocates
a form of theistic naturalism proposed through the writings of Alfred North Whitehead
where God “in one sense transcends our particular world, [but] it is also the case that God
is actually within our world” (2000, p. 96, italics author’s). By embracing a vision of
God that is both immanent and transcendent we allow for the possibility that God works
within the structures of the world to impact people relationally.
The concept that God is within the world coincides with the meaning of
panentheism. Griffin defines panentheism as “God [being] in all things and all things are
in God” (2000, p. 97). Here, the “in” in panentheism takes on significant relational
qualities that speak of the immanence of God in the workings of the world. Furthermore,
the “all” signifies the transcendent reality that God interacts on a grand scale which
transcends human understanding. That is, if God ultimately relates to “all”, God in some
ways must also transcend our normal understanding of what “in” and/or “with” might
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mean. Thus, God becomes relationally responsive to the workings of the entirety of the
world. This enables God to become an integral party to our fearful moments rather than a
remote observer.
Through panentheism I surmise that God is present and fully relating to us in the
midst of fearful moments. God is there when we recognize a threat. God is present when
our amygdala fires, sending impulses through our bodies in order to react to a threat; God
is present in the moments influencing choices about whether to fight, freeze, flee or
appease a threat. In each occasion, a process view of fear would posit that God is present
at the moment of relational inception to the abatement of a threat. Just as we cannot
escape the emotion of fear, panentheism and process theologians would explain that we
cannot escape God. This would mean that the emotion of fear is responded to by God in
particular circumstances in order to influence the best result for a particular human being
facing a threat. Through the emotion of fear, as it manifests itself from neural awakening
to physiological manifestation, I would contend that we interpret God as present with us
offering possibilities to aid us in that experience. I would also posit we infer God’s
presence among us when our fear abates, allowing us to reflect and take stock of a new
situation.
The second concept which can help us bridge the gap between theology and
science is the notion of panexperientialism. Panexperientialism signifies the idea that all
things have some measure of unique experience. Through this concept all things are seen
as both subject and object, they are experiencing and experienced. Utilizing
panexperientialism, theology takes science beyond materialism and into a realm where
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“the ultimate units of nature have both experience and spontaneity” (Griffin, 2001, p.
103). This experience and spontaneity come together in human beings through the rise of
the mind from the neural capacities of the brain. The mind and the brain are one
substance, but functions as both subject (mind) and object (brain). As Griffin stated, “We
can understand that the mind and brain cells can interact, because rather than being
completely different in kind, they are different only in degree, with both having feelings”
(p. 79).
Panexperientialism is important for a few reasons. First, it supports the idea that
God works immanently in the world to offer conditions for change at the most basic
levels. Second, by allowing for the possibility of ultimate units to be both subject and
object, it creates a situation where those units can experience the world and react with a
capacity of freedom not understood in other conceptualizations of the world. Thus,
because I am subject and object, mind and brain, human and animal I can react to
experiences in unique ways that are not just determined by biological forces or causality.
For human beings, who experience the pinnacle of the subject-object relationship, this
freedom to interpret experiences allows us to choose our reactions rather than having
choices determined biologically. Panexperientialism helps us understand the complex
reactions we have to particular threats which give rise to the emotion of fear. It helps
account for the differences in interpretation of an object and our reaction to it. Through
individual histories and abilities to remember, panexperientialism can help us understand
how some threats linger in the recesses of our minds while for other people a fearful
event is experienced and forgotten. In summary, panexperientialism gives us ample pause
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to consider the freedom of human beings to interpret the same object as either threat or
treat. As stated before, the emotion of fear is inescapable; on the other hand, the objects
we fear are unique to the history, culture and circumstance of the subject experiencing it.
This gives rise to the notion that while at times we may interpret that God [uses] the
emotion of fear as a loving response to the world, there are other times when we may
understand the emotion of fear as unnecessarily applied to a threat hindering our ability to
relate to the world in meaningful, novel and creative ways.
The final concept Griffin gives us for the establishment of a meaningful
relationship between science and theology is prehension. Griffin thought that prehension
emphasized “the fact that something more fundamental than conscious sensory
perception is intended” and that “the perceiver actually incorporates aspects of the
perceived thing into its own constitution” (2004, p. 79). Prehension has to do with our
ability to sense something beyond the senses. It is a feeling that something outside the
realm of our physiological sensations occurs when a relationship is instigated. It might be
the sense of something beautiful when seeing a landscape or a loved one’s face again.
Griffin used the synonym, feeling, as a descriptor of prehension. Our experiences are
many layered and go well beyond the physical sensations of a particular moment. Griffin
surmised that when we prehend, “something is felt and that it is felt with emotion” (2004,
p. 80, italics author’s). Prehension impacts our understanding of the emotion of fear.
That is, when the emotion of fear is elicited by a perceived tangible threat something
about the object is prehended which steps beyond the normal bounds of physical
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sensation. Furthermore, the subject which prehends an object becomes aware of their
interpretation of the object’s relational intent.
When a threat is recognized a relationship is established. The subject and its threat
share a connection, cued through sensory data, but which imparts an almost nonsensory
feeling about the impending encounter. That is, a subject might pick up on cues of
aggression or interpret something dangerous about the way a threat moves which incites
the emotion of fear or increases their vigilance towards a situation or object. Some
animate objects may also seek to capitalize their interpretation or sense of a subject’s
fear-based emotional arousal and some form of power over an object. In the case of
inanimate objects, such as someone who fears heights, a relationship is still established
whereby a subject prehends the inanimate object as a threat. We should still consider the
object/threat in these cases as relationally involved with the subject. That is, we prehend
these threats just as we might prehend the beauty of a sunset even though the sunset has
no particular emotional content or aesthetic sense to relate to us. Thus, while tall
buildings or hurricanes or guns might spark the emotion of fear, the prehension of these
objects can be seen to be ultimately related to the past experiences we bring with us in to
a present interpretative moment.
In summary, Griffin not only gives us three concepts which help connect science
and theology, he also gives us three concepts which are integral to understanding a
process view of the world and God. Through panentheism we understand how God is
present with us and we are present with God in each moment. Through this universal
immanence we understand how God is transcendent at the same time, as God is present to
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all things in all moments. With panexperientialism we understand the entire world as
experiencing, though some beings experience it in more complex ways than others.
Through this view we come to see how human beings are both subject and object in each
relational moment, giving them the freedom to interpret and act. In the process concept of
prehension we begin to see human beings as able to interpret a world beyond physical
sensations, a world which includes emotions. Prehension is concerned with the
instigation, negotiation and declination of the subject-object relationship in each passing
moment. To prehend is to recognize that something larger than the relationship occurs in
a particular event. Moreover, both subject and object carry a bit of each other away when
the relational moment subsides.
All three of these concepts help place fear into a meaningful theological
framework. Through panentheism, I surmise God to be present in our fearful moments,
and even makes it possible for us to use our fear to relate meaningfully to our lives. With
panexperientialism we see how human freedom impacts the particular objects we fear as
well as our complex reactions to them. A panexperientialistic theology accounts for both
the moments when we interpret fear as warranted and used in life-giving ways and also
those moments when we interpret fear as part of a life struggle which hinders a person
from living into the novelty and creativity hoped for in the initial aims of God. Finally,
the emotion of fear is something that can be prehended in a relationship between subject
and object. Prehension describes the moments before, during and after a relational event
in which something of a subject or object is felt by the other. These feelings form part of
the basis for our actions to a circumstance. Through prehension the world opens up
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beyond physical sensations and becomes an even more complex arena where subject
becomes subject/object and object becomes object/subject. In some ways the emotions of
a prehended moment are shared and acted upon and fear is not an exception. Thus,
through these process concepts the emotion of fear begins to thicken with meaning and
develop under a theological framework which can take the science of fear seriously.
Human Freedom and God’s Power.
The conception of God’s power and its impact on human freedom is one of the
hallmark differences between process and orthodox theology. Bowman (2006) opined
that:
If God is all-powerful, then it follows that human beings are none-powerful. Even
if we might be allowed some limited causal efficacy in our immediate
environment, we are certainly bereft of true power: the power to determine one’s
own fate or to effect real good or progress in the world. (p. 14)
Most traditional and/or orthodox theologies utilize the position that one of God’s
enduring characteristics is that God is all-powerful. As Bowman points out, to attribute
this characteristic to God is to relegate human beings to a state of powerlessness. When
one entity holds all the cards, then there is nothing left to share with anyone else. Thus,
any semblance of human freedom is nothing more than an illusion. If God is all-powerful
as it is traditionally conceived, then there is nothing we can do to truly impact our lives as
God already controls the situations and outcomes. Any sense of power we have would
ultimately dwindle in the face of God’s control.
Mesle (2008) pointed out that “people work toward the idea that power is the
ability to affect others without being affected by them” (p. 65). This type of power
becomes a solitary condition whereby the relationship flows in one direction, generally
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downward towards those with the least amount of power. Mesle calls this “unilateral”
power (p. 66). It is the power to rule without being affected by those one rules over.
When speaking about current societal constructions of power Sia (1985) remarked that
“There is nothing ideal about longing to possess total control and to reduce others to
powerlessness” (p. 80). If we understand power as only the ability to bend one party to
the will of another, then God’s power is coercive and ultimately lacks compassion and
ideal relationality. Instead God becomes tyrant and dictator, eschewing any form of
freedom and creativity for control. Mesle argued that “To be fully unilaterally powerful, I
must not be affected by people, and that means I must not care about them. Healthy
caring love is just the opposite: the more we love, the more we open ourselves up to
being affected by the other” (2008, pp. 70-71). Even if someone argues that God limits
God’s power in the interest of some semblance of human freedom the argument
ultimately fails if we cannot give up traditional notions of God’s omnipotence. Some may
simply pose the question of “why bother” or see God’s power as a mystery we aren’t
intended to understand.
As I have shown in previous chapters, human life is varied and rich even when we
only look at the emotion of fear. Our experiences, and the cognitive and emotional
capacities to interpret and creatively react to them, are relatively unique amongst the
universe we understand. We should acknowledge, at some point, the mystery that is
beyond our knowing. We should also reach and stretch our capacity for knowing to its
human limits before acquiescing and giving up knowing the qualities of God we can
surmise from the world and its interrelatedness. That said, as we continue to better
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understand the world and the God who moves within and outside it, this God should
exhibit some logical coherence without overestimating the impact of mystery as a
fallback position. In that vein, to believe in an omnipotent God calls into question the
quality of God’s love.
Ascribing omnipotence to God, especially as currently constructed in traditional
theology, comes with its share of problems, especially when dealing with situations of
suffering and tragedy. Farley (1990) claimed that “Omnipotent sovereignty is not the
power of a love that values creatures; it is the benevolence of a slave owner, who is
‘kind’ to slaves but still deprives them of dignity and responsibility” (p. 93). The logical
conclusion of this particular understanding of God is that if God is in control, God
actively has a hand in both loving and tragic circumstances and micro and macro level
suffering. Furthermore, behind this statement is the understanding that God knows about
the coming of these circumstances and does little or nothing to stop them. This means
that hurricanes, tornadoes, tsunamis and typhoons develop by the hand of God and those
who die, die at God’s behest. The same could be said for terrorist attacks, oppression and
other social ills that impact lives on a daily basis. By carrying out the impact of
omnipotence to its logical conclusion, the quality of the love of God is simply called into
question.
Process theologians take a different stance towards God’s power. Utilizing the
terms coercive and persuasive, process theology redefines God’s power to allow for
human freedom. Another way of characterizing these forms of power is unilateral
(coercive) and relational (persuasive). Process theologians see the omnipotence of
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traditional theologies as a form of coercive power. Through the concept of an omnipotent
God, human power and freedom is non-existent. Human beings become actors in a divine
drama with the script already written and the parts clearly laid out. For process
theologians faced with the realities of suffering and unpredictable tragedy, a loving God
whose power is coercive does not exist, and if such a God existed that God would not be
worthy of worship. Therefore, something has to give; either God is described as no longer
loving or the way in which we conceive of God’s power needs to change. Process
theologians, myself among them, contend that the best recourse for developing a coherent
concept of God is to hold on to God’s relationality and love while redefining God’s
power.
Like most terms, persuasive or relational power requires definition and structure.
The same can be said for the term freedom, which I have applied to the human condition
as it relates to God and the world. Together, these two concepts form a basic
understanding of the ways in which God and human beings interact. Furthermore, they
provide a more coherent framework through which we can understand God’s love
alongside human vulnerability and responsibility.
To understand God’s power through a process-relational lens it is necessary to
remember that God is both immanent and transcendent. In process theology these two
qualities fall under the rubric of God’s dipolar nature. The concept of dipolarity basically
means that God is thought of around two poles, a Primordial (abstract) nature and a
Consequent (concrete) nature. Cobb and Griffin (1976) stated that the abstract essence of
God is “eternal, absolute, independent, unchangeable. It includes those abstract attributes
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of deity which characterize divine existence at every moment” (p. 47). God’s omnirelationality speaks of God’s ability to relate to all things in existence as they come into
and pass out of being. God’s relationality in this circumstance is independent of the
objects relationship with God. Mesle (2008) contended that “In some respects, the
primordial nature of God has no moral character; it just is” (p. 85). At this pole, God is
transcendent, still connected to the world, but connected to the entire world including its
historical and present moments of existence. These are the attributes of God which speak
to God’s ability to know and be present to what is happening everywhere in each
moment.
Speaking to the other pole, Cobb and Griffin looked at God’s concrete attributes
as “temporal, relative, dependent, and constantly changing. In each moment of God’s life
there are new, unforeseen happenings in the world which only then have become
knowable” (1976, p. 47). This concerns God’s immanence, or the close relationship God
shares with the world. God’s concrete attributes move God beyond an immutable
passionless deity into direct relationship with the creation God loves so dearly. According
to Mesle (2008),
God is good because God shares the experience of every creature—every pain,
joy, hope, despair, failure, and triumph. God is not an impartial, disinterested
observer of the world but the uniquely “omni-partial” and totally interested
participant in every relationship there is. God knows what it is like to be you and
me and “them” and the animals and plants we all eat. In the fullest sense possible,
then, God is love: God is perfect relational power. (pp. 86-87, italics author’s)
For God to share our experiences reveals the intimate ways in which God passionately
relates to all of creation. God knows and is responsive to our sufferings and joys; as we
weep, God is moved to be present to our sorrow, fully understanding its impact on our
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lives and share the experience with us. The same might be said for our struggles and our
fears, that God is fully present to the moments of our lives, receiving in to God’s self the
impact of our experiences and what it means to be us in each moment. Through the
Consequent and Primordial natures of God we come to see God as ultimately relational in
God’s own becoming, eternal yet changeable as the world continues to become. In the
midst of the attributes comes the need to understand how God ultimately relates to the
world using God’s power in meaningfully persuasive as well as receptive ways.
What does it mean to persuade? Persuasion is a respectful negotiation of power,
possibility and perspective. It assumes that both parties in a relationship have the power
to decide a forthcoming action. As the moments become, one party puts forth an idea
intended to help another party make the best choice available to them. To persuade is to
provide possibilities while ultimately realizing that the party you are attempting to
persuade has the capacity for self-determination, making their own decision by utilizing
what they know and determining how they will act in accordance with that knowledge.
When an attempt to persuade is made, the assumption is that we have enough information
about a particular circumstance or experience in order to provide a helpful perspective to
another party. Finally, persuasion assumes relationality. It assumes that I have a
relationship with you that is sufficient enough for my possibilities to have meaning for
your life. To want to persuade someone of something means that one person cares
enough about another person to attempt to help them see alternative possibilities for their
lives and experiences. All of these things are part of the persuasive process in human
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relationships. For process theologians, persuasion forms the crux of the power inherent in
the God-human relationship.
When process theologians talk about persuasive power, they are ultimately
discussing the manner in which God relates to humanity in order to bring about the best
possible outcomes in particular moments of experience (or occasions). Mesle (2008) used
the term relational power in order to describe this same phenomenon. According to him
relational power incorporated “(1) the ability to be actively open to and affected by the
world around us; (2) the ability to create ourselves out of what we have taken in; and (3)
the ability to influence those around us by having first been affected by them” (p. 73).
This is a radical alteration concerning the use of power in relationship. To be in
relationship is to exercise and negotiate the power between two or more parties. Rather
than assume the pinnacle of power comes through our ability to command others to bend
to our will, process theologians see the most effective form of power arising through our
ability to be present to the moment and relationship before us. By being present, our
influence develops out of the ability to incorporate meaningfully the experience of others;
subsequently, being affected by this incorporation offers the best scenario for subsequent
moments. In human terms, this relationship is always limited because human beings have
limited knowledge of the interactions of the world and the interpretation of an experience
by another party. Despite our limitations, we continue to act by engaging the world
through what we discern to be the best possible activity for a given situation, including
the manners in which we utilize fear to navigate the world.
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Applying this form of power to God yields a special manner in which relational
power is utilized. According to process theology, God’s knowledge of all moments up to
that point in history allows God to develop influential (persuasive) possibilities which
seek the best possible outcomes for a particular situation. God’s perfection in relational
power stems from God’s encompassing knowledge of the entirety of experience at all
given moments in the present, as well as the previous moments which brought about a
particular circumstance. Process theologians surmise that through God’s exercise of
relational power interacting with human a human being has the option of choosing God’s
initial aim as one possibility among many.
One way to think about fear is to understand it as a relational possibility offered
by God in threatening moments. Thus, at times, to be afraid and/or act out of that fear is
to live out God’s best relational possibility for a particular situation. When we experience
a threat, a cascade of interrelational possibilities arises; in the moment we recognize a
threat, God is present with us. Utilizing God’s knowledge of the history, emotional
capabilities and desire for additional relational possibilities, God persuades us that fear is
the appropriate recourse in that moment. Thus, God offers, through the emotion of fear,
the best possible scenario to maintain relational integrity while increasing the intensity of
life for all involved. Fear becomes the catalyst for recognizing God’s care and concern
when human life becomes threatened. When I see a spider and react with the emotion of
fear a number of options may be open to me. At times, the most effective relational
possibility might be just to leave it alone and escape. However, another perspective
would be to stomp the spider out of existence. I have the freedom, within reason, to co-
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create with God the next moment of my life. The initial aim in that moment may be to
provide the spider with enough room to go about its business. God’s activity through my
reaction of fear and the desire to escape could provide an equally satisfying response to
that moment. Given my imperfect knowledge of the past and the stories I tell myself
about spiders I may or may not choose the ideal relational response.
This leads me to examine what it means to say that human beings have freedom.
Freedom is not anything goes. I do not have the freedom to decide to be a bird, nor do I
have the freedom to completely escape the interrelationality of the world. Human beings
live in a world that constrains us. We are coerced into particular experiences by political
and social systems. Cultural understandings and experiences constrain our ability to act
with complete freedom. Have you ever tried to walk down the sidewalk nude? Those that
have were probably met by the odd and possibly disgusted (or enthralled) stares of other
people. They might have been picked up by the police for breaking a particular law, or
sent to a psychologist or psychiatrist to check on their mental health. We are constrained
by political and cultural systems of meaning which define certain levels of expected
behavior. 37 Bowman (2006) stated that “Although forces beyond our control determine
much about our situation and destination in life, even in the most constricted situation
there is always something over which the human being, and the human being alone, has
power” (p. 14).
For process theologians that power is the power of novelty. It is the power to
create out of a situation the self that responds and acts in a given moment. Bowman
continued talking about human freedom by stating that human power
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itself is singular. It is the power to respond to one’s unique situation and to
become that response. It is the power of self-determination. God’s selfdetermination uniquely affects all creatures directly. My self-determination, in
itself, has a far more limited effectual range. That does not make it any less
worthy of being called with the same name and given its due respect. (pp. 14-15)
Thus, within constraints we have some freedom to respond to our experiences in a
manner which defines ourselves and our relationship to the world in unique and novel
ways. While we have the freedom to construct ourselves in relationship to a particular
moment in time, we also have freedom to choose particular paths given the constraints of
the past that brought a moment in time. Sia (1985) opined that
God makes it possible for someone to do or not to do something. But the fact that
one did something rather than something else or omitted to do it was that person’s
own choice. It was made by him or her and definitely not by God. God merely
decided to make a number of alternatives open for that person. (p. 79, italics
author’s)
By understanding that there are possible possibilities reveals the nature of human
freedom. We will always have choices related to action, construction and interpretation.
Among the possible acts related to an experience, our act is but one of many; among the
many persons or habits of the self we might utilize in a given moment, the construction
we utilize is but one among many; and finally, among the many interpretations both
during and after an experience we might develop, we choose one interpretation to
primarily help us understand what is happening or what has happened.
While I cannot overestimate the reality of human novelty and freedom; I cannot,
as well, underestimate the impact of divine relational power. Bowman (2006) described
God’s power as extending “to the knowledge and perfect assessment of all possibilities
for human beings, their communities, and their surroundings”, and therefore “[Human
beings] cannot act in our own best interests, let alone in the best interests of those we love
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and those yet unknown, without connecting ourselves to divine power” (p. 15). In order
to realize the pinnacle of human novelty and freedom a connection to God’s relational
power is a must. Thus, returning to the spider example without a connection to God’s
aims in a particular experience of fear there is little possibility that I will choose the best
relational choice among the options available. The connection to God’s aims is often
understood through our awareness of how God has acted in the past. Our present
interpretive milieu is influenced by the memories of divine-human activity we interpret as
important.
Hearing and acting upon the persuasive option proposed by God in a particular
fearful circumstance requires recognizing the vitality and life in a relationship with God.
While we may never have the kind of direct access to the mind of God in the moment, we
can act upon the previous aims we are aware of and hope that they provide a close
approximation of God’s aims for the present. The key, it seems, is acting responsibly to
what we understand our options to be given the memories of the divine-human
relationship we carry with us. Thus, instead of stomping a spider the best relational
option might be to capture it and release it outdoors or ignore it and let it return to where
it came. Alternatively, there may be times when the best relational option might be to
stomp a spider, especially if I am threatened by a poisonous variety from which there
seems to be no escape. Using process theology we can interpret the emotion of fear as
one possibility through which God can interact with human beings in meaningful ways to
possibly bring about novel relational interactions. Through this interpretation, fear
becomes an emotional alternative which increases the beauty present in the world,
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orienting us towards novelty in the midst of a threat. As we reflect upon our encounters
with threats, the use of fear as an initial aim may become more apparent. The struggle
around the emotion of fear is when it becomes a maladaptive emotional response to the
world a person inhabits.
Initial and Subjective Aims.
The question of freedom, relational power and novelty come to together through
the understanding of how the relationship between God and humanity is operationalized
through the aims of every interaction. Thus, the final component from process theology
which can aid our understanding of what it means to be afraid stems from understanding
the concepts of initial and subjective aims. To be afraid is to orient ourselves related to
particular threats in the environment in order to bring about some form of relief from the
fear we are experiencing. It is to aim our activity for a specific purpose and goal. In
process thought initial and subjective aims reveal part of the possible forms of activity
humans can undertake at a given moment. The aims we undertake are related to the
possibilities which might occur relative to an experience and our interpretation of it. The
remainder of this section on process theology will seek to define each of these aims and
open a discussion concerning their relationship to adaptive and maladaptive fearful states
of being.
The easiest way of conceiving of initial and subjective aims is through the genesis
of their creation. An initial aim can be considered to be the best possible action offered
by God at a particular moment in time given the circumstances a person finds themselves
dealing with. McDaniel and Bowman described an initial aim as “The way that God is

193

continuously active in the world by providing potentialities for becoming, which add
value to the world and enjoyment to the experiencing subject… [it is] the infusion of
value into the initial stage of an occasion’s becoming” (2006, p. 7). I have already
proposed that the emotion of fear can sometimes be offered as the best possible action
and reaction to a particular experience. The concept of an initial aim takes this one step
further by claiming that God’s initial aim is intended to add value and enjoyment to the
world and the person experiencing a particular moment. Cobb thought the notion of value
pertained to something specific to the situation rather than a general term. Value is
related to the perception of contrast in a particular experience. Through contrast our
intensity of feeling related to a particular experience is heightened to the point resulting
in novelty and creative expressions related to our interpretation of that experience (2008,
p. 58).
It may be hard to think about the emotion of fear as something that adds value or
increases our ability to enjoy life. However, this can clearly be the message of our fear in
the face of something that threatens our very existence. Our initial aim in threatening
situations is towards survival, towards the continuation of life in the face of something
that may threaten it. There is enjoyment to be found in the possibility that life can
continue despite the objects that persist in threatening that life. There is value in believing
that the God who loves and cares with and for us also attempts, through the emotion of
fear, to share with us that message of care and beauty enhancing activity. Hope is found
in the midst of these initial aims, as they attempt to aid us in gathering the courage to act
responsibly and lovingly in the face of threats.
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However, initial aims are just one part of the equation related to how we act and
react to the experiences of our lives. The lure of God’s aims, if recognized and followed,
should overwhelm any possibility we could think or imagine in a given experience.
However, these initial aims are not the only possibilities available to us. There are always
competing aims open to us in particular circumstances. The aim we ultimately end up
choosing is the subjective aim. McDaniel and Bowman (2006) termed our subjective
aims as “The individual entity’s own decision about what is to become. It springs both
from the initial aim provided by God and from the standards of value inherited from other
occasions in the concrescing entity’s past” (p. 8). First, the concept of concrescence
relates to an “actual entity’s process of becoming concrete. It means sorting out the many
things that might be and settling on what will be” (Mesle, 2008, p. 101). Basically, a
subjective aim is the possibility we choose to actualize given the possibilities presented to
us in an initial aim coupled with the habits of the self we have cultivated and the
moments of experience that bring about a particular situation. Thus, my decision to stomp
a spider rather than capture and release it is my subjective aim for relieving myself of the
threat that is causing the emotion of fear to stir within me. This aim stems from the
fearful habit I have developed related to all spiders; it relates to the options I see that are
immediately available to me to alleviate the threat; and, it does have some form of value
to me in that it relieves me of the stress and physiological reaction I experience upon
coming into contact with a spider. I will also admit to moments of guilt for ending a life
and for cultivating habits which include the death of some object in order to maintain my
own sense of security. As Bowman pointed out,

195

Creatures with significant freedom, creativity, and power can destroy as rapidly
and as thoroughly as they can create. Such creatures can also suffer in conscious,
lasting, and perhaps inescapable ways; their pain detracts from the intensity of
feeling God aims to achieve. (2006, p. 18)
The freedom to choose a subjective aim in the midst of an experience is terribly liberating
but also fraught with the consequences of our choices. At times, the habits we have
cultivated through the multitude of subjective aims we have enacted create more pain
than enjoyment or value. We become caught in patterns which create destructive cycles
of becoming. With the emotion of fear, we can create habits which attempt to remove us
from live-giving relationships. We might fear large groups of people and thus cultivate
habits which aim us towards isolation; we might fear crime or terrorism and develop new
habits which prematurely develop suspicion towards an unknown other or a particular
group; we might fear hurricanes and move ourselves away from family and friends in
order to maintain safety and security no matter the cost. In the wake of trauma, we
cultivate habits out of our memory of that fear to protect ourselves from further injury.
When a new situation with a threat arises, these subjective habits detract from the
enjoyment and value God intends to add through the initial aims of a given concrescing
moment. Our past experiences overcome the possibilities of a moment (even a
threatening moment) and we become stuck in the necessity of survival without being able
to access the coping mechanisms related to the emotion of fear and the intent of an
imaginative thriving life following a threatening encounter. To be sure, in threatening
situations our survival will almost always be paramount in relationship to these other
meaningful categories. However, to be stuck in “survival mode” alone is to forsake the
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possibility evident through an initial aim for the increased enjoyment of one’s life and
value of the contrast in intensity afforded one by these fearful situations.
Process theology provides an invaluable theological framework through which we
can interpret the emotion of fear as an adaptive, even hopeful, response to a threat in our
lives. Up to this point, this dissertation has been concerned with developing a full sense
of what it means to be afraid. I have shown how the emotion of fear has crept into our
lives, creating a culture that goes beyond anxiety alone. In our culture of fear, objects are
shared through information systems which have been incorporated into the structure of
our lives. The traumas of faraway places have come to rest in our homes creating a level
of fear which at times guides our activity and relationships. These traumas activate
particular parts of our brains, preparing us to respond at the slightest hint of provocation
and threat. Furthermore, these traumas and threats invade our memories, creating beliefs
where there may have been none before and coloring our imaginations, which affects our
ability to develop possibilities for action and interpretation in the face of threats. These
memories, beliefs and imaginative possibilities shape the habits of our lives, which in
turn reinforce some of the fears we narrate into our experiences. As we move from
experience to experience, these subjective aims point us in particular directions giving
rise to the emotion of fear even when it is unnecessary. At the same time, there are
moments in our lives when we are truly threatened and it is in these moments that God’s
initial aims are found in the elicitation of the emotion of fear and its concurrent
behaviors. Here, the emotion of fear not only enables us to survive in the face of a threat
and cope with its aftermath, but it also reveals a measure of hope. That is, if God’s initial
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aims are for increased enjoyment and added value to our lives and world, then the
emotion of fear reveals an adaptive orientation towards future moments of life. The
emotion of fear is not just a fight for survival; it is also a mechanism by which the value
of our lives is revealed through the possibility of continued existence. Thus, when we are
afraid we do not just run from a threat, but we run towards something else. In that
positive movement towards something else, I believe a profound sense of hope can be
realized. Thus, I want to close this chapter by introducing what I construe to be the
meaning of hope that will guide the rest of this dissertation.
Understanding Hope
Hope presupposes a positive orientation towards the future and what might be.
While it is often thought to be the stuff of dreams and possibilities, it is in reality so much
more. Popular uses of the word hope pertain to things like winning the lottery. New
Year’s resolutions might be construed as our hopes for new habits in future days. While
there is nothing inherently wrong with thinking or using hope in this way, I want to
describe it differently. For me, for hope to carry any weight, it must add value to our lives
and direction and meaning to our passions. In this final section, I develop a notion of
hope grounded in both possibility and probability. I do this so that it can shape our habits
or help us develop new ones which might direct our passions into novel manners of
interpreting our lives. To create this understanding of hope I want to explore it in two
contexts. The first is hope apart from theology. The second is hope as a part of theology.

198

Hope Apart from Theology.
Hope is often seen as something uniquely human. As a product of our
imaginations and experiences, hope is, in part, the sense of something yet to be but
nonetheless attainable. Erikson (1964) called hope “the enduring beliefs in the
attainability of fervent wishes, in spite of dark urges and rages which mark the beginning
of existence” (p. 118, italics author’s). Erikson found hope to be present from the earliest
stages of our lives. In his estimation, “Hope is both the earliest and the most
indispensable virtue inherent in the state of being alive” (p. 115). Hope, in Erikson’s
writings, takes on an early role in the development of the self. It becomes something
which infants utilize in order to develop trust in the world around them. The responses
infants receive allow them to continue to trust and hope as the world continues to change
shape around them. Looking at Erikson’s definition of hope we can see how it is
grounded in a relational matrix that engenders possibility and probability. Erikson uses
the terms beliefs and wishes to describe both a state of being and the tangible stuff of our
hopes. These terms speak to the possibility of something occurring despite its absence in
a present moment. To believe and to wish are in many ways to hope for something’s
becoming at a future moment in time. Hope, for Erikson, encompasses more than just the
operations of the mind as it seeks to navigate the world in novel ways.
Erikson also grounds his definition in the probable by utilizing the term
attainability to further operationalize what it means to have hope. Thus, not only is hope
something imaginatively possible, like winning the lottery, but hope should also reveal
something probable and/or attainable. The concept of probability differentiates hope from
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dreams that run amuck. Psychologist Stotland (1969) examined the psychology of hope
and stated that implicit in the meaning of hope “is an expectation greater than zero of
achieving a goal” (p. 2). Thus, while I can imagine becoming an astronaut and feeling
weightlessness, I may be better served by hoping to have the resources someday to fly in
one of the commercially available low-orbit space flights. The difference between the
two is attainability. I do not have the aptitude, time or physical abilities at this point in
my life to suddenly become astronaut material. At the same time, I may be able to attain
the resources to experience some of the same things astronauts’ experience.
Furthermore, attainability of a hope that we carry with us can provide passion for
purposeful behavior. Much like fear, the emotion of hope orders our responses to
situations. It provides an emotional possibility for a particular moment leading us into the
next moment. Stotland (1969) wrote that “with hope, man [sic] acts, moves, achieves.
Without hope, he [sic] is often dull, listless, moribund” (p. 1). By understanding hope in
this manner we see that hope provides both emotional content directly effecting the
present with some inclination towards future activity. Baumgartner, Pieters and Bagozzi
(2008) described both fear and hope as anticipatory emotions, meaning that they are
emotions “currently experienced due to something that could happen in the future” (p.
685). In Chapter Two, I posited that fear is a present emotion with a direct object/threat
attached to it which sometimes gets projected into future situations. The same defining
structure is present in this understanding of hope. That is, hope is a present orienting
emotion with an attainable goal attached to it which gets projected onto a future moment.
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Hope as a Part of Theology.
It is practically unimaginable to conceive of the Christian faith without some
measure of hope being a part of its interpretive framework. At the same time, theological
constructions of hope tend towards conceptual rather than practical emotional concerns.
Looking at hope through both process and practical theological lenses provides us with
the resources to not only accept some of the conceptual framing of hope but also bring it
back down to practical terms as well.
In process theology, hope is predicated on the foundation that “there is a God who
intimately relates with the world in each instant” (Brizee, n.d., p. 1). Any initial sense of
hope that human beings might derive is based on the sense that God is with us in a world
that can sometimes feel hostile and unpredictable. Within the Christian tradition, Brizee
saw that hope often rests in “both looking forward and looking backward. This tradition
is filled with the hope that there will be an end of time” (p. 2). Process theology, in part
based on the openness of the future, tends not to base its hope in eschatology, as “There
is no fixed point out in the future at which time something is already determined to
happen” (Brizee, p. 2). God knows the past and the potentials and possibilities of an open
future. If hope cannot be found solely in the certainties of the future, then it seems
obvious to rest our hope on the visions of the past we reconstruct. We might hope to
wander the hillside with Jesus or witness the power of his words and peace of his
presence. Living in moments past tends to negate possibility or potentiality. Certainly,
there is much we can learn by remembering (positive and negative). However, a constant
sense of hope based on the understanding that things will never be as good as they were
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ultimately violates “the ongoing creativity of God. To place such emphasis on one
particular historic time or one particular environment is to miss God’s continuous
creative activity in the world” (Brizee, n.d., p. 2). Thus, a process theological hope should
be seen as something without temporal discrimination. Yes, hope is most often
understood as based on potentialities and possibilities. Yes, hope has some connection to
the ways in which we remember and reconstruct the world we live in based on the past.
Yet, hope must also encompass each moment of creation that continually occurs around
us. The concept of hope in process theology thusly “lies in the creative process rather
than what is created. Hope is in the dynamic, the bubbling, the self-creation of each
moment” (Brizee, p. 3). We cannot simply hope, with certainty, in the coming of a
particular moment in the future. Through process theology, we can hopefully interact
with a God who knows the potentialities of our lives, who examines and puts forth
creative possibilities and who continually works to persuade us to live them out. While
hope may ultimately enable us to reach for the possibilities of what may come, it also
emboldens us to remember the presence of God when our lives are broken and our
dreams die. We can hope in the moments of broken dreams because God is present in
them with us, continuing to provide the possibilities inherent in God’s initial aims if we
can prehend and act upon them.
Since process theologians base their understanding of hope on the creative
activity of God, it is obvious that hope requires a more active than passive stance towards
life. Beardslee (1972) stated that hope “embodies also the elements of fulfillment and
participation which gives this hope a processive character and makes it possible to
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interpret it in a process framework” (p. 131). Thus, much like the psychological
definition of hope, hope in theology should also reveal both anticipatory and attainable
qualities. We are active participants in our lives and the hopes we bear should reveal our
continued attempts at actively accessing the divine creativity of each moment and
attempting to relate that creativity to lives we lead. Our practical hopes rest on our ability
to live out the possibilities put forth in God’s creative possibilities in each moment. We
look forward to God’s persuasive activities with the anticipation that novelty and
creativity will bring greater harmony to the world and to our lives, remembering that God
only offers the possibility of attainable hopes; God cannot guarantee that they will be
appropriated and realized.
Seeing hope through theoretical and theological lenses provides for a definitional
structure which enables me to interpret hope meaningfully. Through the research
presented here, I think hope is best conceptualized for this project as an anticipatory
emotion grounded in the attainable potentialities and possibilities based on current
circumstances, an orientation to the future and faith in the creative and close presence of
a loving and persuasive God. Hope provides the passion for activity and reveals the
potential of an open-ended future in which novelty and creativity can increase the
intensity and harmony of the self and the world. Furthermore, by defining hope in this
manner it enables us to begin drawing some connections between fear and hope.
Although much of this work will be done in Chapter Six, there are two implications that
arise from viewing the emotions of fear and hope through a process theological lens. The
first of these implications derive from the connectivity of hope and fear as anticipatory
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emotions. Namely, that there is an undercurrent or subtext of hope which is present
before and during the moments we are afraid. The second implication relates to an idea
mentioned in Chapter Two. That is, that hope is the antidote to fear. This implication has
more to do with how hope is utilized with persons who live fearfully in order to develop
thickened fear-based narratives which see the total human response to threats and trauma.
Conclusion
This chapter argued that psychological research, while helpful, does not fully
provide an explanation of the meaning of particular concepts such as fear, freedom, and
hope. Through the introduction and use of process theology I have provided a grounding
framework for understanding fear from a theological perspective. I endeavored to provide
a framework for thinking about the connection between science and theology. I examined
the theological argument for re-interpreting God’s power as persuasive which allowed for
human freedom and an open future. Finally, I looked at the process understanding of
initial and subjective aims in order to develop a notion of what fear might mean in a
variety of circumstances. The final section of this chapter examined the emotion of hope
as both a theological and psychological construct. A definition of hope was created by
synthesizing the data presented in order to heed both its theological and psychological
roots and ground it in the human experience of God the present as it looks forward to
participating in God’s creative acts.
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Chapter Six: A Pastoral Theology of the Relationship Between Fear and Hope
This chapter serves as a bridge between the groundwork laid in the previous four
chapters and the practical applications in the following chapter. In essence, I am both
looking forward and looking back. Throughout this dissertation I have utilized
Whitehead’s image of a plane taking off and landing in order to describe the structure and
flow of this work. At this point in our flight, we reach its pinnacle. This is a place where
we can both look back at the theories concerning fear that have lifted us to this point, and
look forward to the practical applications of this dissertation for the clinic. It is also a
place where the discipline of pastoral theology takes prominence as an interpretive
discipline for all of these diverse understandings of fear and its relationship to hope.
Pastoral theology is the discipline whereby pastoral experiences and observations
are brought into conversation with theological and cognate secular resources, providing a
context for critical reflection in order to construct new theological and psychological
resources for pastoral practice. This definition of pastoral theology could be construed as
an objective attempt to appropriate resources to enable novel theological structures to
emerge concerning the emotion of fear. In part, that is the intent of this project. However,
before continuing I want to offer a thick reading of this definition. First, the definition
begins with “pastoral experiences and observations” which I take to mean that any
pastoral theological project is contextual. It arises from the theology that is deliberated
and embedded in our lives, from the crux of praxis where theory and practice meet to
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form our activities and interpretations of the world. Second, this definition requires
“conversation with theological and cognate secular sources”. The context of pastoral
theology is rooted in both theological disciplines and others like anthropology,
psychology and social work. A conversation, in this case, implies the ability for each
discipline to contribute meaningfully to the question at hand. The hope is not to
subordinate a discipline, but to fully recognize the possible contributions each brings to
bear on the interpretation of what is being discussed. Finally, the result of pastoral
theological deliberations is the emergence of “new theological and psychological
resources for pastoral practice.” Pastoral theological thoughts have practical implications.
They begin in the experienced world and end there as well. The intent of pastoral
theological conversation is to contribute meaningfully to the day-to-day practice of
human life. We aren’t just developing theological material for a community of faith. The
hope by providing the milieu for conversation is that our theological understanding of the
world changes and a contribution to the cognate secular resources is made which further
enriches the overall discussion.
As part of a pastoral theological project, this chapter seeks to critically reflect
upon the diverse knowledge presented in the first four chapters in order to develop a
novel practical theological understanding of fear and its relationship to hope. As is often
the case with pastoral theological thought, a by-product of the analysis is a contribution
to theological anthropological claims. Thus, the results of this particular critical reflection
are threefold. First, I want to affirm some theological anthropological claims based on the
research presented in this dissertation. Second, I will pull together these diverse bodies of
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knowledge into a novel understanding of the relationship between fear and hope in a
theological context. Finally, as a result of these initial claims, three themes (surviving,
coping and thriving) will emerge to help guide those in pastoral and clinical settings to a
better understanding the meaning of fear and how they might draw a relationship to hope.
These themes will be put into practice utilizing a case study and current research on
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in Chapter Seven. Finally, this chapter is built around a
series of propositions based on an interpretive lens applied to the research presented in
previous chapters. In total, fifteen propositions are developed which make a variety of
claims related to humanity, emotions, and more specifically fear and hope.
Theological Anthropology
In order to understand the relationship between fear and hope we must also
develop an understanding of human beings and the divine-human relationship. To that
end I want to develop several propositional statements that reflect what I have put forth in
the previous four chapters. When I attempt to understand human beings and activity, I
tend to fall back on my work as a clinician and social worker. In this model of thinking,
ideas about human beings develop out of a biopsychosocial-theological model of
understanding. While this model could be seen as focusing on the individual, I see it as
both internally and externally relational in focus. The biopsychosocial-theolgoical model
utilizes an internal relationality to meld together disparate sources of anthropological
understanding in order to create a particular view of human beings. Furthermore, this
model is externally relational not only in its use of the social situation but also in its view
of a person in their context. That is, while I may use research to describe particular
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understanding of human beings as individuals, it is always with an eye towards the larger
relational milieu through which that person interprets themselves. In this section, four
propositions are developed which directly relate to this model. A fifth proposition,
regarding human beings and emotions is offered to complete the development of this
particular theological anthropology.
Proposition 1. Human beings are social creatures living in an interdependent
world. We live and move and become in relationship with and reaction to the world
around us. We have built complex systems of language and thought through which a
variety of messages are shared across great distances.
We live connected lives. Human beings are intimately connected to their
environments, experiences and one another. In Chapter Five I noted that process theology
offers a view of humanity that extends our relationships to the entire world. As the world
moves in concert to maintain its physical shapes it is forced to relate. In these ultimate
relationships we see God moving throughout and within the world to persuade it to new
realities and novel becomings. We are in a constant state of interrelatedness with our
worlds and these relationships change and evolve.
We rely on our environments to sustain our physical and mental health. Human
beings cultivate and destroy land and animal species in order to maintain and adapt to an
ever changing world. The world, in return, adapts to human involvement as best it can to
continue its survival. Our experiences of the world run the gamut from joy to despair,
hope to fear. Even as we separate experiences by the conditions of their happening, they
are more interrelated than we sometimes care to admit. Wondering how God interacts
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with the world, process theologian Thompson stated that God does so “By offering the
best possibilities for that entity’s future based on that entity’s accumulated past” (p. 22).
Even in temporal circumstances we are bound by the interrelationship of past, present and
possibility. In some ways, it is the interrelationship of seemingly disparate forces that
help direct and give passion to what is occurring before us. Might we know love without
also knowing its absence? Possibly; yet, we are most apt to recognize moments of love by
contrasting them with moments when love was absent.
As we experience the world we incorporate those experiences into narratives
which further inform our lives. We tell stories about our lives, the world and the people
we encounter. These stories are another interrelated reality based on the intertwining of
emotion, thought and action relative to the experience an interaction with the world. Even
our own internal reflections about experiences carry an interrelated twist as they require
us to incorporate a variety of experiential data into a cohesive thought through which we
can develop a better understanding of the world we inhabit. In turn, these stories serve as
reminders of our lives and the interconnected web in which we live and move and
become. Thus, our ability to communicate with another human being not only helps
create the worlds we interpret, but the selves we place in those worlds. Furthermore, as
language and narratives are told communities develop and relationships form. We might
gather around a specific experience or empathize with another’s stories. Human beings
have lived in community for millennia, developing patterns of life and stories which
guide behavior and develop habits. Today, our stories are no longer bound by the
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particular communities in which we live. Instead, we have the ability to share a story or
experience across vast distances with little effort.
We often speak of the world as a global community, which expresses both its
vastness and its intimacy. The concerns and fears, hopes and possibilities of the world are
at our fingertips. We live in a world where we can experience the devastation of a
hurricane in Colorado as it happens in Louisiana. We can watch buildings collapse
through violent means as the destruction is replayed over and over again on the
television. Messages pertaining to the threats of the world are readily available for our
consumption and interpretation. We know of the deaths of protestors in Iran as they
happen, medical emergencies and terror plots in Britain make our nightly news and even
the murders, as aberrant as they are, in our own towns are the lead stories we tune in to.
As we witness these threats, they invade our communities and relationships. This results
in a heightened level of vigilance concerning our relationship to objects in the local and
broader world.
Fear requires a relationship. At its initiation, it is bound to a real or imagined
object, person, place or experience. At the end of the second chapter, I noted that fear
requires an object that can be discerned as a threat. When we are afraid we relate in some
manner to a threatening event, person or other object in the world. Furthermore, the
relationship between person and threat are mediated through a variety of first- and
second-hand experiences. That is, threats are communicated by our experience of an
object and also through the communication of another’s experience of an object.
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Moreover, a fearful relationship with a threat is not predicated on the actual proximity of
the threat, but the felt proximity of the threat.
When a threat is experienced through a first-hand relationship, it can be thought
of as “my fear” in the sense that one’s experience with a threat is providing the impetus
for a fearful emotional response. When the emotion of fear is mediated through a secondhand experience the claim on the fear becomes more nebulous. That is, if a person
becomes afraid through their relationship with another person who experienced a threat,
then what is thought to be “my fear” is actually “our fear/s.” What this may tell us is that
the social communication of fear may give rise to communities that act out preferred
identities based on a vicarious understanding that some object, person or place is a threat.
Ultimately, I see fear as being relationally grounded in the perceived threat of an
object, be it human, animal or otherwise. The notion that a threat has to be perceived or
interpreted as such speaks to the ability of human beings to accept or even counteract a
message they are receiving. While we cannot overestimate the impact of an interrelated
world, it also does us no good to underestimate the unique resources each person brings
to these same relationships. Even intertwined human beings carry with them unique
interpretations of experiences, unique physical attributes and unique modes of
interpreting the world. That said, in certain circumstances a group within a community
might harbor a collective memory or narrative that heightens their awareness to particular
threats. Together, this might provide for a relational milieu which pushes forth particular
ideas, reactions and beliefs about objects that have been carried forward as threatening.
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Proposition 2. Human beings are dynamic creatures. We are adaptive,
changing and always in the process of becoming within the interrelated structures of
the world. The human self is developed out of habits adopted throughout our lives
that better enable us to adapt to a variety of settings and circumstances. Given the
longevity of our memories and the possibilities of our imaginations, we have the
flexibility to re-story our lives in order to react differently to similar situations we
experience.
What does it mean to be a human being in process? Earlier I stated that human
beings share a significant neurophysiological location with a variety of species. The
amygdala assures that we will experience the emotion of fear just as any other animal
might when faced with a threat. At the same time, it was understood that human beings
possess an ability to interact with the world at a greater level of complexity that other
known species. That level of complexity is seen in our ability to adapt, in a variety of
ways, to a changing world, inhospitable environments and novel experiences. While we
are, in some ways, beholden to the impulses of our amygdala in the face of a threat, we
are also interpretive creatures whose reactions cannot be wholly predicted. In sum, we
change, adapt and become as we reflect and interpret experiences while they happen and
as we remember/imagine them. Furthermore, we plan. We develop imaginative
possibilities for possible encounters with real and perceived threats. Finally, our ability to
adapt relates to our production of a self at different points in our lives.
This proposition posits that human beings are not only physically adaptive to their
worlds, but also psychologically adaptive as well. As adaptive creatures we possess the
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unique ability to imagine new ways of interacting with the world and its circumstances.
To be human is to possess an adaptive and changeable self. Certainly, we do some things
habitually. As stories and interpretations of experiences are reinforced, we develop
propensities to react in certain ways. Yet, these reactions remain mere possibilities, they
are not absolutes. The basic certainty of the human self may just be that the self is always
in process. While we may form habits, habits can be broken, stories can be re-authored
and relationships with objects can change.
Our malleability is reflected in the simple inability to tell the exact same story
twice. Our memories function as guides to our experienced world. Yet, our memories
cannot capture every possible input related to a particular experience. As we story our
lives over time, our memories focus on particular aspects of an experience. Telling these
stories re-creates the worlds of those moments, but the moments are inevitably
incomplete. In a subsequent recount of the same story, new connections reveal new
details about the experience. The present moment/mind may be similar, but is never the
same. In some ways this reflects an open memory that is fluid despite the constraints of a
particular experience. By stating that our memories of particular experiences are
constructed and re-constructed in each new moment, reminds us that not only is the past
open to re-interpretation but the future remembering of our experiences can change as
well. This flexibility in our memories serves us well as we seek to understand the threats
we fear and how we might react and interpret them differently over time. While we might
fear a particular object today, our relationship with that object can change over time,
altering and challenging our remembered emotional responses.
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Proposition 3. Human beings are unique and adaptive physical actors in the
world. While we share some neurophysiological similarities with other animal
species, we also have unique capacities not found in other animals. Therefore, while
fear is expressed similarly across species, human memory, belief systems and
imagination create unique conditions for the expression of fear in human beings.
There are two claims relevant to this proposition which help us understand the
emotion of fear. The first claim relates to the neurophysiological similarities we share
with other species. The second claim reveals that while we are similar to other species,
we also have unique capacities which make our interpretation of fear unique as well. In
Chapter Three, I put forth the argument that the emotion of fear is an inescapable reality
for human beings. Given the evolved neurophysiological structures of our brains there is
no possible way to escape the experience of fear when encountering a perceived threat.
Granted, particular forms of brain injury localized around the amygdala have proven to
stunt, hinder or abolish the emotion of fear. This evidence, however, only serves to
further prove that fear is a biological reality that we will experience in our lives. Studies
with a variety of species of animals continue to point to the amygdala as the aggregator of
data related to threats. The amygdala is found in a large variety of animal species and is
plays a significant role in the behaviors we enact when facing a threat.
Human beings are not just any species though, we understand ourselves as having
the most complex brain of all the species in the known world. This complicates any
reductionistic view of fear that places our physiological capacities as explicitly
determinative of behavior. We have the capacity to experience the emotion of fear, which
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is the inevitable conclusion of any study of our neurophysiological structures. What is
also evident from these studies is the unique manner in which our experiences of the
world shape the interpretive milieu in which we live. Thus, coupled with this
neurophysiological ability to experience the emotion of fear, we also have the capacity to
remember, imagine and communicate in more complex ways than other species. The
tension between our physiological and interpretive possibilities cannot be ignored. Thus,
while I might say that the emotion of fear is inescapable, the objects that we interpret as
threats cannot be described with the same level of certainty. Our complex human minds
interpret, value and ascribe different qualities to the same objects. This complexity results
in a situation where the breadth of the things we find threatening can be increased
depending on the interpretations we apply to our experiences.
The experience of fear, as attested to earlier, is shared relationally. The empathic
capacities of human beings enable us to experience the emotions of others and react
accordingly. For example, if we were hiking up a trail and suddenly a couple people
come running down the mountain towards us bearing facial expressions of fear, then we
will most likely adopt some of their emotional reactivity even if no words are shared
about the threat. Thus, as we continue to hike up the hill (assuming we continue of
course) we will be more vigilant about our surroundings, utilizing our imagination to
develop the possible threats we might encounter. In this instance we have utilized
empathy and our unique memories, beliefs and imaginations to posit that something
threatening is forthcoming. We create a threat in reaction to the fear we have experienced
from someone else. We might search our memories for dangerous animals or a news
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article about a death on the trail. We might imagine snakes or mountain lions or bears
ahead. Furthermore, knowing how well we prepared for the hike, we might come to the
belief that we can handle whatever threat is ahead. Thus, while our brains and bodies may
be prepared to move utilizing a fear-based set of behaviors, our unique interpretive
capacities might inhibit or suppress some of the behaviors in order to continue down a
particular path. In other instances, an interpretation of the faces we see running past us
might engender such a fear-response in us that we don’t bother to continue but just turn
tail and run.
Proposition 4. Human beings share a pervasive relationship with God. This
relationship is predicated on the human possibility of co-determination and the
sense that God lives passionately and persuasively with us in the world. This means
that the future is open and the possibilities of continued or renewed hope are
available to us.
So far, I have couched human beings as actors in the world who perceive things
individually but live completely within the bounds of an interrelated existence. Many of
our interpretations of the world are derived from the sensory data we accumulate through
a variety of experiences. However, as a person of faith I also believe we interpret the
world using non-sensory data as well. Our interpretive schemas are impacted by notions
of beauty and ethics which are not totally derived from sensory data. I would say that we
are likewise impacted by notions of faith and the perception of a higher ground of being
outside what we alone can experience through sensory data.
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Throughout millennia people have sought to characterize what they have
perceived outside of the sensory data they collect during experiences. While we may
never know the complete truth of these moments of clarity regarding a higher ground of
being, it does not stop us from developing systems of thought to explore what it is we
believe we have encountered. For Christians, this system of thought developed into
notions of God as often seen through various portrayals of the life of Jesus of Nazareth
and believed to be felt through the interaction of the Holy Spirit. There has always been
space within the Christian tradition for intimacy and distance, immanence and
transcendence. What has often proven to be a source of concern is the manner in which
the divine-human relationship has been conceived. Realizing that any attempt to construct
a notion of this relationship will inevitably be incomplete, it is imperative that we utilize
the tools at our disposal to venture plausible affirmations. To be a theological human
being is to understand ourselves as part of a divine-human interrelationality which at least
impacts human beings and in certain systems impacts both God and humanity.
To that end, I have utilized process theology to elucidate the divine-human
relationship. The central ideas I have highlighted include many notions, not the least of
which are co-determination and God’s persuasive power. These two ideas about the
divine-human relationship create the possibility of an open future whereby God is
recognized as offering the best possible aims for a situation, but allows human beings to
be responsible actors in the world attempting to hear and respond according to these
aims. Given the incomplete ways in which we understand the ways God works in our
lives, human beings enact portions of the possibilities God offers, subjectively aiming
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themselves in a direction. Thus, for a particular experience human self-determination
requires a flexible God who can adapt new initial aims on a moment by moment basis
given the perfect knowledge God has of the best possible ways in which beauty can be
increased in the world. Following process theology, I understand that God must be
intimately aware of a particular situation and its impact on both the human actors and the
greater world. Furthermore, through this awareness God should be affected by the
experience in such a way that God can empathically sense what a human actor is
experiencing and continue to maintain and adapt initial aims as the subject directs itself.
Process theologian Thompson stated that God offers “the best possibilities for that
entity's future based on that entity's accumulated past; God's offer— God's aim—will
reflect that entity's ‘given’ situation but God's aim will also transcend that ‘given,’
because God seeks the best for all in all moments (2005, p. 22). It is my estimation that
God’s love is such that God continues to provide the best possible aims for our moment
to moment experiences regardless of the previous choices we make.
Through this understanding of God, I see our futures as open-ended and thus the
possibility of hope, of anticipated attainable possibilities, is present regardless of
circumstance. That is, through this line of thinking the very presence of a loving God,
regardless of how far off our subjective aims take us from God’s initial aims, is cause for
hope. Indeed, there are some circumstances in which our hopes are revealed more plainly
than others. Yet, the life of a theological being should make room for the presence of real
hope regardless of the trauma or tragic circumstances that may befall them.
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Proposition 5. Human beings are emotional creatures. Neuropsychology
affirms the embedded nature of emotions in our physical lives. Our emotions
contribute significantly to our experiences and the habits that form our selves, and
influence our relationships and imaginative possibilities. Our emotional experiences
tend to form lasting and intense memories which can be recalled with greater ease.
Just as psychology affirms the embodied nature of our emotional lives, so too should
our theology. As theological creatures embedded in relational systems, emotions can
be understood as adaptive and not inherently life limiting; moreover, they should be
understood as contributing a measure of passion, direction and possibility to the
reciprocal interactions in the divine-human relationship.
We are emotional creatures. Through the particular ways our brains have evolved
over time we can experience a plethora of emotions related to particular experiences.
Much like trying to imagine a square circle, it is nearly impossible to conceive of an
emotionless person. In Chapter Three, I explored some of the emotional centers of the
human brain, looking at fear in particular. In Chapter Four, I explored the role memory
plays in our subjectivity and how emotions impact the intensity and recall of particular
experiences. Simply stated, we live emotional lives. They color our perceptions of new
experiences and may direct our passions towards particular objects or experiences. The
ability to experience emotions is a part of our physiological make-up. Emotions inhabit
our social experiences and interpretive life. They add layers of meaning to our
experiences and can be shared across relationships. Thompson (2005) added that
“Emotions are an important part of human experience and thus are also valued. They are
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not to be ignored, stifled, minimized, or berated; humans need them to fulfill their
humanity” (p. 28). Just as our embodied emotional life helps shape our experiences and
memories, the importance of this emotional life should not be lost in our theological
formulations.
It is almost unthinkable to develop a theological anthropology without
considering the role emotions have on the divine-human relationship. We are physical
beings; we are social beings; we are interpretive beings; and, we are intimately tied to the
divine in each moment of our existence. While I won’t go so far as to say we ignore
emotions when developing our sense of who human beings are and how they interact
with God, I will say that emotions are often thought of as secondary to thought and
maybe even tertiary after action. If nothing else is clear from this dissertation, we should
be clear that each of these—emotion, thought, relationships, and action—plays a
significant role in the development of habits which give rise to the self. Furthermore, they
each play equally important roles in the divine-human relationship. For so long Christian
theology has viewed God as a passionless entity, incapable of complex emotional
reactions. With its roots in Greek culture, the impassability of God has been passed down
through the ages in order to remind us of God’s unchanging presence among us. The
impassable God is one that cannot be affected by affect (Thompson, 2005, pp 19-20).
The process notion of God challenges these assumptions through God’s
dipolarity. In this view, God is both transcendent and involved in the world in meaningful
ways. Through this understanding, emotions become serious grist for the theological mill.
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When referring to the possibility of ascribing an emotional lens to God, Thompson points
to ideas about God’s suffering. He stated that,
If God suffers, and particularly if God suffers on account of the world, then we
humans are reassured of God's care, which provokes feelings of assurance.
Furthermore, as creatures made in God's image… humans can also be reassured
that, as God suffers, suffering will sometimes be our experience, and we can
manage it with God's ever-present offerings of help… Whitehead writes, "God is
the great companion—the fellow-sufferer who understands" (Whitehead, 1978, ρ
351). (2005, p. 25)
Ultimately, this formulation of God leads to a reciprocity that goes well beyond actions
we take in the world. God doesn’t just hang around to witness our obedience. Instead,
through a process understanding we find God intimately concerned with our lives and the
experiences that develop them. When we experience joy, fear, anger, etc., God is present
with a corresponding emotional state which reveals God’s passion and compassion for
each of God’s creatures. Returning to Thompson, he characterized this emotional
reciprocity, stating that
God feels the world's feelings just like our entire body feels a sensation coming
from only one spot. God is "internally affected" by all the world's activity: "God
laughs with us, cries with us, loves with us, feels pain when we do, enjoys
satisfaction with us" (Goggin, 1995, p. 128). Just as humans can experience
periods of durable happiness in spite of episodes of illness, stress, etc… so God
can respond to the world's challenges yet remain "everlastingly, essentially
happy" (Shields, 1992, p. 57). (2005, pp. 26-27)
The effect of utilizing a process framework to understand God and the divine-human
relationship is far-reaching. The divine-human connection moves beyond mere devotion
for a greater entity, to a relationship with an entity in which there is a mutuality of
concern. A God who feels can provide a meaningful milieu through which human beings
can experience the emotional tribulations of the world, but at the same time feel how God
is present with them in a variety of circumstances. To call God emotional does not, in any
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way, diminish the creative capacities of the Creator. Instead, it adds another layer to the
complexities through which we can see God operate meaningfully in the world to affect
lives.
Emotions, in psychological language, are often characterized under the labels of
positive and negative without much further qualification as to the value these descriptors
hold. Love is often seen as an example of a positive emotion while fear is characterized
as a negative emotion. Regardless of the intent in utilizing these labels, they have an
impact on perceptions related to these emotions. Thus, while describing an emotion as
positive may ultimately signify a desire to include (and conversely a negative emotion as
a desire to exclude) even these descriptors carry with them value judgments which color
perceptions about the meaning of a particular emotional state. From a western cultural
perspective, it is often thought that to admit fear is to admit weakness. On the other hand,
to exhibit love is associated with risk and strength to endure hardships for the value of
another. However, to characterize these emotions as such is to limit their ability to impact
and shape our lives in meaningful ways. At times, love has been characterized as a
weakness and inability to exhibit strength when needed. Yet fear rarely gets the same
treatment. Fear, as I have characterized it, is an adaptive emotional response to a
perceived threat. I would submit that to act out of fear is not to show weakness but
instead to allow a normal adaptive human response to shape our interaction with an
object perceived as a threat. In my estimation, fear is as much an attempt to exclude a
threat from life as it is an attempt to include a variety of possibilities for human becoming
in subsequent moments. Thus, any emotion carries with it the possibility of being

222

adaptive or maladaptive in our relational life. Thus, for me, it is unhelpful to consider
emotions as positive or negative, despite the intent of using of such labels. They must
instead be discussed as inherently neutral with the possibility that any emotion can result
in adaptive and maladaptive responses to experiences.
A Pastoral Theology of Fear and Hope
Earlier, I described pastoral theology as the discipline whereby pastoral
experiences and observations are brought into conversation with theological and cognate
secular resources, providing a context for critical reflection in order to develop new
theological and psychological resources for pastoral practice. This dissertation has relied
on pastoral observations derived from personal experiences as a therapist. To that end,
the pastoral theological sources for the genesis of this dissertation are more global
theoretical than related to particular practices. To this point, I have provided five
propositions related to how I understand human beings and the role of emotions in any
theologically grounded construction of anthropology. These five propositions provide the
context for critical reflection on fear and its relationship to hope. In this section I intend
to examine the relationship between fear and hope more specifically. Propositions six
through twelve develop an argument related to the meaning of fear and its relationship to
hope. Through my theological interpretation of the emotions of fear and hope, two
implications arise. The first is that there is an undercurrent or subtext of hope present in
the genesis of the emotion of fear. The second implication refers back to Chapter Two
and the understanding that hope is the antidote to fear. This section will draw out the first
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implication of the relationship between fear and hope and introduce the second
implication which will be developed in the final three propositions.
Proposition 6. The emotion of fear is an inescapable part of human life. Fear
is an intense emotion related to a real or imagined threat, leading a person to enact
a particular set of behaviors. The purpose of fear in animals is to provide the
impetus to survive and cope with a threatening object. For human beings, that
purpose is further elucidated in the imaginative desire to thrive in the world.
Fear is a basic emotional capacity found in a variety of animal species. The basic
structures which produce fear, the amygdala and its connections in the brain, have been
conserved throughout our genetic evolutionary history. Thus, there is no such thing as a
fearless person, barring damage to particular regions of the brain. As a ubiquitously
experienced emotion, fear is an adaptive response which orients a creature towards
survival in the face of a threat. This orientation towards survival requires that a creature
develop a variety of coping behaviors which are enacted in the midst of a threat and
complete the impetus for survival. The behaviors associated with fearful states are also
thought to be widely conserved across the boundaries of species. Generally speaking,
when encountering a threat a creature will rely on one of four behaviors in order to cope
with what they are experiencing. These behaviors include: flight, fight, freeze and
appease. As coping strategies each of these behaviors are intended to provide relief from
the reality of a present threat.
Human beings, while utilizing these behaviors, have unique capacities related to
memories, beliefs and imagination which inform their relationship to the objects they find
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threatening. Human beings possess the capacity to make meaningful judgments about
their experiences which add a layer of complexity to their responses. Thus, for human
beings these behaviors are not just rote responses to threatening experiences. They also
include some measure of meaning and imagination related to how they are carried in a
particular circumstance. Thus, while a normal creature might literally enact one of these
behaviors, a human being might take these behaviors to a different level. Instead of
literally running from a threat they might just as soon withdraw mentally from a threat as
they would physically. The capacity to imagine multiple possible scenarios in which one
protects his or herself from a threat creates unique possibilities for human interactions
with their environments.
Proposition 7. The neurological capacities and plasticity of the human brain
creates a unique situation in human beings related to memory and imagination. Our
lives are comprised of the remembered stories we enact and tell, as well as the
attainable hopes we project into the future. Not only can human beings form habits
which direct their lives, but they can also re-form their habits and re-author the
stories that they might feel bind them to particular lives. This enables human beings
to live as though they are still becoming and moving into an open future.
To be sure, there are fixed structures within the brain which handle particular
functions. At the same time, the novel ways in which a particular human being
experiences the world ensures that unique and novel constructions of experience will
abound. Human memory is fascinating in that it allows us to both remember and forget
details of our experiences. As we narrate our lives, themes emerge which form habits that
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construct our selves. As we remember (and forget) the various stories of our lives our self
changes; we constantly become someone new in each moment of our lives. This means
that while we might feel the same or act under the direction of specific habits, the self we
enact in a particular moment is affected by each new experience we have. We reflect,
mull over, ruminate and/or react to our experiences which make it difficult to posit some
kind of perfect image of the self which exists apart from our interactivity in the world.
As we interact with our experiences, habits form which inform our beliefs and
enable us to make interpretive risks about particular situations. These habits and beliefs
form a core set of activities which come to the forefront when a particular situation calls
for a particular act on our part. Thus, while each situation we encounter is novel, the
beliefs we have developed over time enable us to make interpretive risks about situations
that call to mind specific habits of the self we want to enact. Yet, even in these moments
when long held habits are enacted, our interpretation and activity are nothing more than
possibilities. This is due to our imaginations which are coupled with these habits. Thus,
while we may have some strong habits related to particular types of experiences, we
always have within us the possibility of imagining and enacting a novel set of behaviors,
thoughts or emotions in response to a situation. Furthermore, we have the opportunity to
envision novel responses related to particular types of experiences by bringing our
imaginative capacities to bear on a particular experience.
Although human beings share similar brain structures, the outcomes of their
interpretations are unique. Thus, while God may have knitted us together in our mother’s
womb using the same thread (New Revised Standard Version, Psalm 139:13), the
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tapestry that continues to be woven differs from person to person based on how their
experiences shaped their interpretive frames. Even while the basic structures of the brain
remain fixed, the ways in which our neurons connect change over times with the use of
different parts of the brain. Our brains work in dynamic ways despite the relative fixed
structures within them. Taking a process view of this means that we see how evolutionary
history has shaped our brain structures over time. This shaping process allows the brain
to react to the environment, interpret the intentions of relational objects, create and form
lasting memories and/or act emotionally and rationally. While the structures are in place
for this short list of activities, the manner in which they come together is novel for each
person. The unique neural pathways formed by each individual, for memory especially,
provides the past that informs our current interpretive framework. As these past moments
flow together in the present, I would surmise that God is present, providing a persuasive
set of possibilities for the next moments of life.
The reformation or re-authoring of the self during novel experiences compliments
a process theological view of the self and the possibilities of a truly open future. For
process theologians, our past experiences (memories, beliefs, habits, actions, etc.) flow
together in a particular moment, leading to particular possibilities for novelty. In order to
act upon God’s persuasive possibilities, human beings must be able to imagine the
possibilities that God shares with them apart from particular habits they cultivate
throughout their lives. While I am sure that some of the habits human beings cultivate aid
our understanding of what God seeks to persuade us in to doing, we must also be aware
of the way in which God lures us toward novel methods of cultivating beauty in the
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world. The active power and presence of God relative to an open future, based on the
totality of remembered experiences in a given moment, is not just a theological quandary
to ponder. It is a practical imperative necessitated by the ability of human beings to
change, adapt and grow in the midst of their experiences of the world. The manner in
which we construct and imagine the possibilities of the world with God’s help requires
our openness to the possibilities of God’s persuasions, as well as openness to the
possibility that something (someone) new can be created within the structure of our being
to enact these possibilities.
Given the accumulated past of a particular human being, it is my contention that
God provides and persuades us to enact the best possible outcome for each experience we
enter given the circumstances that brought us into a particular moment. The reality of
human sinfulness is that at times our actions based on God’s persuasions are pale
reflections of the possibilities we have been given. At the same time, the immanence of a
process view of God allows us to remember God’s eternal presence with us despite what
happens in our attempts to relate to the world around us. Our faith as Christians, from a
process perspective, is inextricably tied to the hope of God’s continued presence and
prodding regardless of where we find ourselves in life. Moreover, through that hope in
God’s immanence we can understand that whatever we experience in a present moment is
not the end of our becoming.
Proposition 8. Given the imaginative possibilities and the notion of an open
future, the behaviors human beings enact related to fear—fright, flight, freeze and
appease—point to the desire to live out a future. They point to a hope that we might
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live another day. In this regard, fear is a vehicle through which our hopes can be
drawn out and/or revealed.
In Chapter Three, I spent some time discussing the behaviors we associate with
the emotion of fear. Fight, flight, freeze and appease are the four most common behaviors
seen when someone appears afraid. In most creatures these are more or less automatic
reactions based upon a variety of factors experienced when encountering a threat. That is,
depending on the severity, distance and sensory appraisal of the threat, a different
behavior will be enacted to take in each of these factors in order to relieve one from the
presence of the threat. At their most basic level, each of these behaviors might be
conceived as taking us from the presence of a threat. Another way of stating this is that
the behaviors are protective. They provide an immediate set of reactions which protect
our life from a perceived threat. At the same time, these behaviors not only protect us
from a threat, but they also protect us for continued life.
Therefore, a second meaning we can contrive from these fear-based behaviors is
that they somehow protect our future in the face of a threat. In this case, the behaviors
enacted related to threats push us towards something rather than only taking us away
from a particular threat. The question for behaviorists, research psychologists and others
most often relates to what is happening in a particular moment when the emotion of fear
is present. For theologians and others who posit that the life we lead is also rife with
meaning, we must also ponder why a particular set of activities is enacted in particular
situations. That is, not only is it important to understand what happens when we become
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afraid, but it is also important to realize why we bother with particular actions when the
emotion of fear is felt.
Proposition 9. The purpose of fear may be revealed in its actions, yet the
meaning of fear is ultimately revealed in the divine-human relationship. The world
is an interrelated whole in which objects sometimes collide and produce situations of
threat and trauma. In process theology, it is thought that the world evolved through
the persuasive power of God and that God continues to be intimately active with this
world. Fear, interpreted as a manifestation of God’s love and persuasive power,
may also be interpreted as a manifestation of God’s hope and initial aims in
particular situations.
Before returning to a more specific analysis of the relationship between fear and
hope I want to turn to look at the overall purpose of the emotion of fear in the lives of
human beings. Here, I want to take a broader theological view of the emotion of fear and
its inescapability. Continuing with the assumptions of process theologians that God
intends the best for each moment given the cumulative past that comes together in a
particular moment means that fear cannot be seen as a “bad” emotion. Thus, at varying
points in our life the emotion of fear serves not only an adaptive purpose towards our
environments but also serves to function as the best option that God can offer us in a
particular moment. At these times, experiencing fear can be a vital part of the active
manner in which God interacts with human beings for the purpose of increasing beauty
rather than discord.
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When a threat is so pervasive that it contains the possibility that some part of the
self (physical, mental or spiritual) may be annihilated, then the best possible emotion and
activity during that experience would encompass some protective stance. Thus, we might
hypothesize that God can utilize the emotion of fear and its corporeal manifestations as a
protective emotion in order to bring about the best possible future in a given
circumstance. In this way, the emotion of fear is not only adaptive but also a useful
emotional state through which we derive benefits that would otherwise not be available if
we ignored or suppressed the emotion. Theologically speaking, we can surmise that the
emotion of fear is a beneficial emotion which can be conveyed effectively through the
divine-human relationship in order to provide beneficial interactions with the world.
Sometimes, the best way to relate to particular elements of the world is to avoid
interacting with those elements because of their potential for evil (understood as discord
and triviality of experience). That is, the emotion of fear utilized through the divinehuman milieu may very well compel us to forgo a particular relationship in order to
maintain the possibility of future interactions which benefit ourselves and the world.
Accepting the theological ramifications of the emotion of fear means rethinking
how we talk about fear in both pastoral clinical settings (i.e.- pastoral psychotherapy,
hospice and hospitals) and pastoral settings in general (pastoral care, worship and
education settings). It requires that we look not only at the presenting issue which gives
rise to the emotion, but also beyond the present circumstance in order to take a longer
view on its impact in our lives. Just as a process concept of God allows us to conceive of
God as providing initial aims which include activities related to experiencing the emotion
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of fear, it would also surmise that our fear is equally revealing of God’s hope for our
future and the relational possibilities contained in each subsequent moment.
Finally, if fear and hope are anticipatory emotions as discussed in Chapter Five,
then they have present components which point to future possibilities. In this way, they
share a meaningful genesis in the circumstances of the present and both point us towards
possible outcomes. 38 Thusly, both fear and hope are intimately related to the ways in
which we narrate our lives. Each emotional state is affected by the details we chose to
incorporate into our stories; they are impacted by the prior experiences we have had and
the intensity of these events. If we look to God as being a loving entity whose hope for
the world is tied to persuading the world into greater harmony and beauty, then I surmise
that the emotion of fear is initiated by the hope present in the divine-human relationship.
That is, we become afraid simply because we hope and are able to connect to a
meaningful hopeful future story. Together, fear and hope are partnered emotions which
serve to direct us toward survival and fulfillment.
Proposition 10. Thus, to be afraid is to realize that we are a part of an
interrelated structure of life. When we are afraid we not only realize a threat or
recognize a traumatic event, we also act according to a latent hope that reveals the
possibilities of life for us. The full meaning of our fear should encompass not only
the behaviors that help us survive a threat or trauma, but also an awareness of the
hopes that make our behaviors relevant. We cannot be afraid without also being
hopeful that something in our lives is worth living for.
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We must begin to see fear as more than just physiological responses, conditioned
reactions and neurological capacities. It should be understood as much more complex
than just a set of biochemical reactions. Fear, threats, trauma and hope are heavy laden
with the meanings we ascribe to them. Emotional states give legs to the passions of our
lives orienting us to important objects and experiences in our environments. Fear is
meaningful to our lives in and of itself, that it also concurrently reveals hopes we
anticipate attaining adds another layer to any interpretation we might desire to give it. To
be afraid is to acknowledge that we imagine, that we project into the future a time when
our hopes may be attained. To be afraid is to realize the fundamental interrelatedness of
the world, as well as the fragility and possibilities of those relationships.
Fear points us to a future; it is a reaction to an object which poses a threat to some
component(s) of the self, be it physical, mental, emotional and/or spiritual. For us to even
ponder the ramifications of losing that component(s), we must also have some
imaginative conception of a life that continues with the same component(s) intact. That
is, running concurrently with the emotion of fear is an undercurrent of hope which
provides a latent sense of a future in which we continue to thrive.
When we are afraid our bodies enter a particular state of action revealed through a
number of behaviors which seek to remove the impact of a threat. The central theological
question related to these behaviors is why? Why bother to act to preserve our lives? The
most meaningful reply to these inquiries is simply because we have the capacity to hope.
Furthermore, this capacity for hope is readily present as a part of the emotion of fear. As
the emotion of fear rises in the face of a threat, the body reacts protectively in order to
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prepare us to survive a threat. We are appropriately focused on the possibilities for
continued life beyond the encounter with a particular threat. Once the emotion has abated
given the appropriate time, the manner in which we narrate the harrowing experience is
ripe for this infusion of hope. That is, the story is not only about the impact of the threat,
but an appropriately thickened story will also include the perspective that the threat has
revealed some greater concern or hope which has quickened us to act as though our life
were worthy of continuing. Through a process understanding of the divine-human
relationship, counselors and caregivers can offer an honest intertwining of fear and hope
that both reveals it as a subtext to the emotion of fear as well as part of an antidote to the
traumas and threats that continue to haunt lives far beyond the event that sparked us to be
afraid.
Proposition 11. There are times when we experience the emotion of fear
which run outside the bounds of its intended purposes. The memory and
imaginations of human beings can run amuck as they incorporate real and possible
threats into narratives which inform the ways they choose to relate to the world. In
these moments, it is easy to lose the hopeful possibilities of the initial aims of God in
favor of coping with the world through a hyper-aroused sense of survival.
Due to the strong emotional toll that the emotion of fear takes on our memories,
sometimes the threats and traumas we experience linger in our memories and activate our
imaginations longer than they should. As we saw in Chapters Three and Four, the
emotion of fear can prejudice our memories by making them stronger, last longer and
easier to recall. Thus, the more intense the experience, the longer the memory will sustain
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itself and the easier it will be recalled in seemingly similar circumstances. This impacts
our ability to imagine creative and novel potentialities during new experiences. As I
mentioned in Chapter Four, our imaginations are uniquely formed by our experiences and
memories. The imaginative constructions we endeavor to create are found in our ability
to creatively repurpose memories in order to view, act, think and/or emote in news
relative to the previous ways we have related to the world.
Fear, as I have explained, is an intense and adaptive emotional state relative to the
presence of a threat. The emotion of fear reveals in us a will towards survival, coping and
thriving in the face of that threat. However, like most things we experience, when
experiences/threats/traumas impact our constructed world in manners that reach beyond
our perceived ability to cope, maladaptive coping strategies can form. Thusly, there may
arise times when our will to survival is stronger than our ability to turn off the emotion of
fear, resulting in an increased sense of threat in the world. This increased sense of threat
can color our perceptions of others and of novel experiences such that we break off
relational possibilities before even knowing what will come of an event.
I think that these possible maladaptive behaviors are evident when thinking about
the culture of fear discussed in Chapter Two. In this culture of fear, threats are more
widely disseminated through an ever present media and non-stop reporting of global
trauma. At times it seems as though the threats and traumas of the globe are as
inescapable as the fears they engender. In 2010, it is difficult to escape the constant
reporting of tragedies, traumatic experiences and a variety of perceived threats. This
places us in a precarious position of having to deal almost constantly with both perceived
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threats and the actual threats that appear in our daily experiences. If God’s initial aims for
us include a greater sense of relationality that sparks a more creative and beautiful world,
then it becomes increasingly difficult to be persuaded by these aims when the constant
reporting of one’s neighbor as threat overshadows any aim we might receive. The
problem of maladaptive fear is not just a psychological one; it is a theological problem as
well.
Proposition 12. In light of these moments when hyper-arousal and hypervigilance prevail, it is important for pastoral caregivers and pastoral counselors to
be able to point to the hopeful possibilities endemic to the emotion of fear. Pastoral
caregivers/counselors should place the emotion of fear in the context of a meaningful
divine-human relationship utilizing knowledge gained from a variety disciplines.
The main themes that pastoral caregivers/counselors can point to are surviving,
coping and thriving.
Pastoral caregivers and counselors have at their disposal a variety of
psychological and theological worldviews and tools which allow them to approach issues
from a thicker perspective than someone just utilizing one worldview or the other.
Helping someone understand the psycho-physiology of fear is one step in helping
someone come to an understanding of what happens when they experience a threat. It
normalizes the response we experience with the emotion of fear in order to provide relief
from cultural messages of shame associated with being afraid. Through both
neurophysiological and behavioral education people can come to understand the
automaticity of their responses and their sometimes overwhelming activities. Knowledge
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concerning the individual ways we construct and narrate the world enables people to
engage in responsible thinking about the memories of their experiences. Finally, pastoral
caregivers and counselors provide a tentative theological grounding point through which
people can begin to explore the meaning their fearful experiences and thicken that story
with the undergirded hope expressed through it. I find process theology to be the most
compelling theological system for this kind of transformative work with the emotion of
fear. By grounding my work with the emotion of fear in the meaning system associated
with process theology I am able to develop the themes of surviving, coping and thriving
as the most appropriate for pastoral caregivers and counselors who are working with
people who have experienced and continue to experience prominent visions of threats and
traumas in their lives.
Surviving, Coping and Thriving
The final three propositions espoused in this chapter have been developed out of
the framework provided in the first four chapters of this work. The ultimate goal of this
project is to provide useful pastoral possibilities based on sound critical reflection of the
relationship between theological and secular cognate resources. Through these three
themes I propose a way in which we can re-imagine our relationships to threats and
traumas which speak both to their serious impact on our lives as well as the possibilities
contained in their implicit hopes and the presence of a loving God throughout our
experiences.
Proposition 13. The primary goal of any encounter with a threat or trauma is
the survival of the physical and mental self. Utilizing neurological data and an
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understanding of fear behaviors, pastoral caregivers and counselors can normalize
both behaviors and thoughts related to threats and trauma. Empathy with the
narrative borne by a fear-bearing person is of utmost importance as it allows the
person to re-connect to an interrelational world they may have come to distrust. The
desire to survive is normal; to remain in survival mode presents a state of being in
relationship to the world which can prevent us from developing an awareness of
God’s continued prodding towards the possibilities of novel future moments.
Our initial reaction to the threats and traumas we experience is most often the
emotion of fear. As a result, we seek a prudent way in which to survive whatever it is we
encounter. The maintenance of a physical and/or mental presence in the world is the
thrust of this survival. However, a lack of cultural empathy for and awareness of the
necessity of the emotion of fear often keeps people from understanding its inescapability
and its adaptive capacities for continued human life.
In order to take serious the accounts of fear experienced through threat or trauma I
propose placing the reaction experienced in the context of human life and physiology. We
do not have to be neuropsychologists to realize the importance of placing the emotion of
fear within a neurological context in order to understand its pervasiveness. Helping
people understand that what they experience—thoughts, emotions and behaviors—have
their roots in specific neural capacities built into their physiological systems in order to
increase the likelihood of survival is a noble goal. It is also the first step in thickening a
narrative around trauma and/or threats. The desire for survival is a normal part of human
existence experienced through the emotion of fear. To teach a person that fear is a normal
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adaptive, even positive, emotion is to provide them with new avenues for exploring its
meaning in psychological and theological dimensions.
Furthermore, survival in the face of threats and/or trauma, theologically speaking,
points to a continued hope found in the divine-human relationship expressed through
human evolution and God’s continued support and presence in our lives. I believe in
God’s continued presence throughout human history and development. As a process
theologian, my notion of God allows for God’s hand to be present as we evolved to our
current state of being in the world. Thus, for me, it is not an accident of nature that the
neurological mechanisms which guide and provide for our survival have been conserved
in our historical development. The ability to be afraid is just one way in which God’s
immanence is felt in our lives. Furthermore, it is a testament to God’s compassionate care
that there are inherited mechanisms which allow us to preserve our lives in a sometimes
hostile and unpredictable world.
Proposition 14. In the context of human activity, the meaning of the emotion
of fear is more complex than offering an opportunity for survival. The emotion of
fear also points to the ways in which humans seek to cope with threats. To that end,
there are two ways in which we cope with threats and/or traumas. These coping
strategies are found in the initial behaviors, as well as the imaginative moments of
reflection following a fearful experience. Upon reflecting on a threat or trauma, the
next step for a fear-bearing person is to develop methods of coping with the memory
and imaginative ruminations about that experience. The use of meditative
techniques, cognitive tools and spiritual/religious practices can help a person
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develop a sense of calm as they tell and re-tell their narrative. In these moments of
coping, the pastoral caregiver/counselor can provide a gentle prodding to help a
person re-author their narratives and thicken their lives.
The initial way we cope with trauma and/or threat is through the four primary
behaviors associated with the emotion. While these behaviors are present in order to help
ensure our survival they also propose unique activities we engage in order to cope with
the reality of our felt impending demise. Flight, fight, freeze and appease are all methods
of coping with the threat in front of us. They are the strategies we engage in order to
ensure our survival. Again, education about the normal bodily responses to threats and
trauma presents an opportunity to enable someone to develop a different relationship with
their reactions.
Most often, caregivers and counselors see a person after the fearful event they
have experienced. Coping in this case can begin to take on a proactive role in helping
someone re-author their fearful narratives. In these instances, persons most often arrive
with the intention of “dealing with” whatever trauma or threat they have experienced.
Whether by force or fortune, people come with the expectation that they will be able to
develop novel ways of relating to their traumatic narratives so that whatever residual
effects of the experience they have can be mitigated. Most often this means providing the
safe and empathic space where a person can tell and re-tell their stories as they seek new
perspectives on it.
At this point in time coping takes on a different meaning and role in the life of a
person. Here, we move beyond education to a proactive set of tools to help someone
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maintain a sense of safety in the midst of reliving their traumatic experiences. It is
important that caregivers and counselors take the traumatic and threatening experiences
of another person seriously. We all respond to various situations differently. Our unique
experiences, memories and imaginative possibilities allow us to create different meanings
out of similar experiences. The ability to move flexibly within the framework of a
particular story hinges on our ability to feel comfortable taking apart the narrative and
putting it back together in novel ways with new information and perspectives. There are a
variety of methods, tools and techniques that we can utilize to help someone create the
space through which novelty can be welcomed. We can help ourselves as caregivers and
counselors by paying attention to the resources a person brings with them and
augmenting them as needed according the interests and talents of a person. Just as we
seek to help a person place their experience in a larger context, we should also seek to
help them develop the coping skills to do this on their own when the time arises.
Proposition 15. Due to the pervasiveness of human imagination, as witnessed
to in the novelty found through divine-human interactivity, the emotion of fear is
related to the human capacity for hope. Furthermore, the relationship between fear
and hope reveals a human desire for flourishing despite sometimes overwhelming
past experiences. When re-authoring a fear-bearing narrative we should bear in
mind the relationship between fear and hope. That is, as a person re-authors a
threatening or traumatic narrative, a primary goal is to reconnect them to the hope
that enabled their action for survival and their desire to cope with the event.
Furthermore, by theologically grounding the emotion of fear we place it within the
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purview of a meaning system. In process theology that system states that God offers
an initial aim for each circumstance which reveals the most beneficial choice for the
person and the world. I take this to mean that the initial aims of an event seek to
provide a milieu through which human beings can thrive in the world. The
possibility for thriving in any given moment does not abate with the emotion of fear.
The hope to thrive is, in fact, endemic in any moment we experience the emotion of
fear.
Education about our survival capacities and initial coping skills are important
beginnings. Proactive utilization of the resources of the person and new coping and
meditative practices that enable the person to find safe places are promising beginnings to
re-authoring fearful narratives. Ultimately, the threats and traumas we experience need to
be placed within the context of a life-giving meaning system which enables the person to
fully incorporate a newly thickened narrative into the larger structure of their lives.
This process of incorporation is not something to take lightly. Indeed, it may be
that the suffering someone feels relative to their trauma may mean that this is a lifelong
process. The change we experience is often incremental and the memories of the past,
especially those bound to the emotion of fear, are not so easily forgotten. To thrive is not
to forget a trauma or its impact; instead, it is to associate novel perspectives related to the
undercurrent of hope with the experience in order to provide a different interpretive
frame. To do this, the hopes that a person has identified as their reasons for engaging in a
process of surviving and coping must be incorporated into the larger narrative they have
constructed. That is, they must move beyond seeing themselves as only victims of a
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threat or trauma. They must also accept that they were active participants in the
experience, utilizing their strengths in small ways to resist the impact of the trauma. As
counternarratives are brought into conversation with the trauma, a person’s values and
hopes are juxtaposed with the narrative they have formed about themselves. While this is
not a panacea for the impact of a trauma, it is the beginning steps of realizing that the
traumatic experience is comprised of more complex meanings and possibilities. The hope
of the pastoral counselor and caregiver is that the thickened narrative constructed in these
moments will provide the impetus to thrive, based on their hopes, as both a result of and
in spite of the fearful experience they bear.
As a theological project, one of the main sources for these counternarratives of
hope, strength, resistance and resilience can be found in the divine-human relationship.
By helping someone place the trauma within a complex framework of faith, neurology
and subjectivity new sources of life-giving knowledge are shared and acted upon. A
threat and/or trauma is but one experience in a vast and complex narrative life. To be
sure, these narratives have great enduring power and shape our perspectives on the lives
we lead. At the same time, placing them within the contexts of the hopes that are borne
with them allows us to remember the life-giving activity present in the divine-human
relationship and the hopes that God has for us. As the author of Jeremiah states, “For
surely I know the plans I have for you, says the Lord, plans for your welfare and not for
harm, to give you a future with hope” (New Revised Standard Version, Jer. 29:11). For
the process God of the moment, fear and hope can meet in the inevitable ways that God
persuades us to interact with the world. To believe in God’s perfect knowledge of past
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and present allows us to see God’s activity as a faithful plan for the hope of humankind
despite the tragic circumstances that befall the world. As counselors and caregivers, an
awareness of the hope that undergirds the emotion of fear can help benefit those we
encounter who live in hyper-vigilant states to see the full possibilities of their experiences
as well as the full possibilities of the divine-human relationship.
Conclusion
A pastoral theological interpretation of the emotion of fear necessitates the
inclusion of the role hope the genesis of fear and in a quest for survival in the face of
threats and/or trauma. The evidence of the inescapability of the emotion of fear requires
theologians take it seriously as not only an emotional state but also an important
connection in the divine-human relationship. Seeing fear through a process theological
lens allows us to interpret it as an adaptable normal human response. Furthermore, seeing
fear theologically allows us to develop its meaning as a normal human function. That
meaning is found in the relationship between hope and fear, and how fear is undergirded
by a fundamental hope in human beings. The divine-human relationship is necessarily
emotional in that emotions provide the passion for activity. Thus, there are times when
fear is part of the initial aims from God for a particular experience. The hope being that
removal from one relationship allows for more diverse possibilities for interrelatedness.
For those engaged in practical pastoral work, surviving, coping and thriving provide three
themes through which we can explore the meaning of fear and thicken the narratives of
those who have experienced threats and/or traumas.
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Chapter Seven: The Emotion of Fear in the Clinic
This final chapter develops a neuro-hermeneutical approach to dealing with
trauma in a therapeutic setting. Up to this point I have put forth the following arguments.
The emotion of fear is adaptive and inescapable. It helps us recognize and react
appropriately to threatening and/or traumatic objects in our midst. Our reactions to these
experiences tend to be intense. They become associated with certain memories, allowing
them to be recalled with ease and last longer. Bringing together theology and psychology
allows us to create complex meanings concerning what it means to be afraid. The most
important of these complex meanings is the undercurrent of hope which provides the
impetus for activity in the face of a threat. When conceived theologically, our ability to
express the emotion of fear runs concurrently with our ability to imagine hopeful
possibilities. Thus, theologically speaking, just as fear is inescapable, so too is human
hope. These two emotions are so intertwined that one assumes if not requires the other.
However, there are times when the emotion of fear is overwhelming. This leads to
residual effects based on our memory of an emotional state that is tied to threats and/or
traumas. Thus, the threat we perceive has a discordant affect on our ability to interpret the
world. Furthermore, it may limit the scope of hope in a given circumstance. At these
times, the hyper-vigilance and hyper-arousal associated with the emotion of fear become
dominant methods of interpreting events in the world around us. This inhibits our ability

245

to relate to the world in meaningful ways by engaging in relationships that increase the
beauty and harmony of the world.
The continued development of my thesis concerning the emotion of fear hinges on
its applicability to pastoral settings, one of which is pastoral counseling. This chapter
relates the theory and theology of fear developed in this dissertation to a clinical setting.
In western psychological settings, there are several diagnostic labels which relate to the
emotion of fear. These labels include phobias and panic-oriented diagnostic categories, as
well as Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Each of these diagnoses carries with them
social, cultural, religious medical/clinical and political meanings. The main concern of
the remainder of this chapter will examine the relationship between fear and trauma.
When someone brings a particular fear-bearing narrative with them to pastoral
therapy, they are bringing the residual trauma experienced relating to a threat. The
discourse they share reveals the impact of the threat on their lives and the subsequent
narratives that ensue. As this chapter progresses I want to examine PTSD and trauma as
separate concepts. In this case, PTSD reveals the behaviors and memories which
permeate the life of someone who has experienced a traumatic event. Trauma is a broadly
defined term that shares a number of meanings. In the most basic sense it refers to a
traumatic experience. A more nuanced understanding of trauma sheds the modern for the
postmodern by understanding trauma and its resultant states of being as more than
diagnostic criteria. Trauma, in this instance, has to do with human subjectivity and
interpretation. Following this development of trauma, I will present recent research that
helps describe the neuro-hermeneutical framework I propose. Finally, this chapter ends
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with a case study utilizing the themes of surviving, coping and thriving to help someone
re-author fear-based traumatic narratives.
Trauma
There is significant enough difference between trauma and PTSD to warrant the
inclusion of both in this final chapter. I begin this section by examining PTSD. The
strength of PTSD is in the consistent criteria for its diagnosis. This provides a stable
framework through which a variety of disciplines can develop and test hypotheses
regarding its genesis and treatment. Trauma, as stated above, is a broadly defined
category with a variety of referents. These referents include events, interpretations and
practical therapeutic emphases. In this section I want to present information from PTSD
and trauma literature. Two strands of PTSD literature help us understand its usefulness
for this project. The first is found in the DSM-IV-TR and points to the criteria for
diagnosing PTSD. The second is neuropsychological research examining the activity of
the brain in persons diagnosed with PTSD. What is helpful about examining the term
trauma is that it is more useful to the practice of narrative pastoral therapy. Utilizing a
broader concept of trauma introduces subjectivity and meaning as a part of the
intervention process. Rather than the narrow diagnostic criteria of PTSD, the client
becomes the expert on what is traumatic rather than the therapist. Narrative
understandings of trauma and the work done by the therapist and client can help us better
fit trauma literature into the perspectives used in this dissertation.
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Posttraumatic Stress Disorder
PTSD is the most common name ascribed to the aftereffects of serious trauma in
the United States. While the official diagnosis wasn’t included until the third version of
the DSM, the symptoms related to PTSD have long been observed. The inclusion of
PTSD in the DSM has been a source of consternation for some people. There are those
who decry its inclusion as the ultimate acquiescence to political and social pressures
rather than the inclusion of a true medical diagnosis. Others claim that its symptoms can
be ascribed to alternate disorders rendering the need for a specific designation
unnecessary. It is notable that the vast majority of people who witness or experience
traumatic stress do not develop PTSD (McNally, 2004, p. 1). At the same time, much like
the DSM itself, utilizing the term PTSD can be a helpful tool. For instance, the diagnosis
of PTSD encapsulates a variety of particular observations involving mannerisms which
evolve in some people following a traumatic event.
These observations make up the diagnostic criteria for PTSD. These symptoms
impair a person’s functioning and persist for more than a month. They include: (1)
witnessing, experiencing or confronting an event that threatens their or others’ physical
integrity and includes a reaction of intense fear, helplessness or horror; (2) experiencing
the event persistently through their actions, memories, dreams or other physiological or
psychological means; (3) avoiding or becoming numb to the stimuli associated with the
trauma; and finally, (4) exhibiting increased arousal which exaggerates their responses to
the world around them (APA, 2000, pp. 467-468). My conclusion is that a person
suffering from PTSD exhibits symptoms related to a fear-based narrative which hampers
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their ability to effectively relate to the world around them. Hyper-arousal and hypervigilance are hallmark reactions to the pervasive memories formed from a traumatic
event. The unique defining characteristic of PTSD is that it requires a specific kind of
event to occur in order for it to be diagnosed (McNally, 2004, p. 2).
The DSM states the following about PTSD:
The essential feature of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder is the development of
characteristic symptoms following exposure to an extreme traumatic stressor
involving direct personal experience of an event that involves actual or threatened
death or serious injury, or other threat to one’s physical integrity; or witnessing an
event that involves death, injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of another
person; or learning about unexpected or violent death, serious harm, or threat of
death or injury experienced by a family member or other close associate. (2000, p.
463)
If PTSD originates from the experience of an actual external event, then that means it is a
fear-based reaction rather than an anxiety disorder. As stated earlier, one of the unique
hallmarks of the emotion of fear was its relationship to a perceived tangible threat. That
is, there is something specific that a person reacts to which gives rise to the emotion of
fear; this suggests that PTSD is more closely aligned with diagnoses like phobias rather
than generalized anxiety disorders.
PTSD as a Fear-Based Disorder.
Research on fear provides a unique view into the neurological dynamics which
seem to be altered in the face of trauma. It is the arousal of the amygdala that seems to
support PTSD as a fear activating diagnosis (Armony, Corbo, Clement, & Brunet, 2005;
Francati, Vermetten, & Brenmer, 2006; Yehuda & LeDoux, 2007). The research into the
functions of the amygdala continues to be descriptive rather than predictive. As Yehuda
and LeDoux remarked, “It is not known, at this point, whether a hyperactive amygdala
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response to threats preexisted and predisposed the development of PTSD or whether it
was a consequence of the disorder” (2007, p. 22).
From the literature connecting PTSD and neuropsychology, Francati, Vermetten,
and Brenmer (2006) found that “Alterations in the fear response mechanism are believed
to lead to intrusive memories, autonomic hyperarousal, and flashbacks in many patients”
(p. 203). The literature supports the idea that PTSD is a fear response that has adapted to
a traumatic stressor in ways that hinder “normal” interpretations of the world. According
to Francati, Vermetten, and Brenmer, in persons with PTSD the normal adaptive fear
response:
takes a different form, in which patients overgeneralize danger cues; therefore,
they continuously perceive normally nonthreatening situations as dangerous…
Cues linked to a traumatic memory, which normally do not elicit fearfulness, can
become conditioned and there cause autonomic reactions and defensive behavior,
even in nonthreatening situations. (2006, p. 203)
In order to effectively intervene with people who suffer from any disordered activity,
correct identification of what ails is of the utmost importance. For the sake of assessment
and treatment it becomes important to distinguish between fear and anxiety-based
disorders.
Understanding PTSD as a disorder related to the emotion of fear rather than
anxiety should give us pause to think about how we treat it. As I argued in Chapter Two,
understanding PTSD as primarily fear-based rather than anxiety-based changes the scope
and types of interventions we might utilize. In Chapter Two, I quoted psychoanalyst
Ramzy, who stated that “The simplest and the most accurate way of defining anxiety,
however, is perhaps to contrast it with its opposite, which is peace—peace of the mind”
(1960, p. 18). Utilizing his statement, I surmised that while the antidote of anxiety is
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peace, the antidote of fear is hope. Moreover, I have argued that hope is a part of the
genesis of our emotion of fear as well. The dialectic created by the relationship between
fear and hope sets them on an intimate relational course with one another. Thus, while
they may feel like polar opposites where one is the antidote to the other, at the same time,
they may not be able to exist without one another. That is, to know we are afraid is to
acknowledge the expectations and hope we have in the face of our finitude. Moreover,
being afraid also allows us to acknowledge the myriad ways in which the divine-human
relationship reveals God’s hopeful possibilities for beauty and harmony in the world.
A Neuro-Hermeneutical Framework for PTSD.
PTSD is a diagnosis that requires clinicians to think on multiple levels. Research
on PTSD runs the gamut from quantitative to qualitative, neurological to existential.
These various streams of research attest to the therapeutic interest in developing
meaningful understandings and treatments. In this section, I want to summarize two
recent studies that look into fear-based memories and PTSD in order to restate the
integrated framework I have been proposing in this dissertation. The first study looks at
the reconsolidation and extinction of fear-based memories. The authors use neurological
approaches of collecting data in order to generate hypotheses about possible treatments
for PTSD. The second study examines PTSD as a disorder of meaning, ultimately
proposing that aspects of its recovery process need to be claimed by religious disciplines.
Together, these two studies provide a richer way to understand PTSD and fearbased memories as well as their impact on persons. They provide a brief look into the
major arguments of this dissertation: namely, that PTSD and trauma are based in the
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emotion of fear and as such neurological data can help us understand the physiological
impact of both the experience and memory of a traumatic event. Moreover, because
trauma involves memory it requires interpretation; thus, when traumatic memories are
recalled a subjective and meaning-oriented narrative is developed. Theology, as a
meaning-oriented enterprise, is one possible avenue for framing the impact of trauma as
well as possible remedies. The remainder of this section will summarize these two studies
and then conclude with an interpretation of how we might integrate this data into our
understanding of PTSD.
A recent study by Monfils, Cowansage, Klann, and LeDoux (2009) examined
how the interruption of the reconsolidation process of aversive memories may provide a
non-pharmacological and lasting change in relation to a fear-inducing stimulus. Their
research focused on the lability (instability) of fear-inducing memories which occurs for
roughly six hours after the memory has been retrieved. During this window of time, the
researchers (using rat subjects) introduced appropriate extinction training related to the
stimulus which was designed to “result in the storage of the new nonthreatening meaning
of the CS [conditioned stimulus] and prevent renewal, reinstatement, and spontaneous
recovery, thus resulting in a more enduring reduction in fear relative to extinction training
conducted outside the reconsolidation window” (2009, p. 951).
Utilizing various research groups the authors found that targeted extinction-based
training provided within the window of memory reconsolidation suggested that “the CS
no longer induces a fear response” (p. 954). Interpreting their own results, the authors
opined that
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This could mean that interference during reconsolidation [leads] to a progressive
deconsolidation of the memory followed by the learning of a new interpretation of
the CS, or that during reconsolidation, the new valence associated with the CS
was incorporated in the updating. In either case, the initial valence conferred by
the first conditioning session no longer seems to exist in its original fear-inducing
form. (p. 954).
The authors note that future studies along these lines will have to work with whether the
new interpretation of the stimulus is neutral or in fact creates a maladaptive safety signal
in the presence of something that may cause harm; furthermore, they note that some other
trials (with rats and humans) have met with limited success, revealing that the process
may be susceptible to subtle manipulations (p. 955). Even with these caveats, there is
much in this research that is relevant for clinicians.
Recent research such as this provides new ways of thinking about PTSD which
can aid clinicians in their practice with those who have been traumatized. Finding a way
to keep current with novel neurological data concerning PTSD and trauma can help
reframe the disorder for both clinicians and clients. In this one study there are numerous
avenues for continued thought and exploration. First, there is hope for those who suffer
from PTSD. It is possible that the fear-inducing memories that cause the general
hyperarousal to their surroundings can be altered and even extinguished. Second, one of
the conditions of change seems to be related to the timeliness of our interventions. While
these hypotheses provide promising avenues for exploration, they alone are not enough
for us to begin new treatment courses. As I stated earlier, much of the neurological data
we have collected is descriptive in nature. While this study is not unique in providing
possible prescriptive avenues for further study, we should take the data and hypotheses as
provisional and examine the caveats they contain.
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The first of these caveats is related to the ability to catch an opened fearful
memory in the window of time needed to change the reconsolidation process. One
question from this is how should clinicians handle these moments when the fear-based
memories are being experienced? Moreover, what kinds of interventions should be used
in order to help the person create an alternative interpretation of the fear-based memory?
Another caveat pertains to the characterization of PTSD and the inference that, for
humans, a behavioral intervention might be enough to suffice for the destabilization of
the fear-inducing memory. I have stated that fear contains a behavioral component. Yet,
is merely changing behavior enough for human beings who are constantly interpreting
and re-interpreting their environments and narratives? It would seem that for humans a
fear-based memory has both behavioral and subjective qualities which would need to be
attended to in our interventions. As has been the case throughout this dissertation, while
neurological data can give us some grounding information and provide possible
directions for exploration, this research should be brought into conversation with
hermeneutical or theological analysis in order for a richer understanding of trauma to
develop.
At the 2009 annual meeting of the American Academy of Religion, psychiatrist
Kinghorn presented an argument for PTSD as occurring on “the level of meaning and
requires, in many cases, an irreducibly moral mode of analysis” (p. 6). According to
Kinghorn, “the indispensability of subjectivity for the interpretation of trauma as ‘trauma’
renders it highly unlikely that either neurobiology or any form of behaviorism which
excludes subjectivity could offer a sufficient causal account of PTSD” (p. 6). Basically,
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PTSD is a “disorder” of meaning and subjectivity. The fear-inducing memory is one of
unique interpretation by the experiencing being.
Kinghorn’s work helps us conceive of PTSD through an additional lens, adding to
its meaning and possible interventions. Utilizing Kinghorn in conjunction with the earlier
neurological research moves PTSD beyond being just a fear-inducing behavioral
reaction. Instead we have to account for both the neurological, behavioral and meaningoriented components of PTSD in order to accurately develop a course of intervention.
Our thinking about PTSD should include our reactions and the (often existential)
meanings that are locked together in the memories which induce our fears.
Kinghorn continued by stating that PTSD “points toward a human phenomenon
which cannot abide any reductionism, which requires our strongest ‘second-order’ moral
vocabulary, which cannot segregate the descriptive from the evaluative” (p. 13). If PTSD
is a “disorder” of meaning, then theology is an appropriate discipline for reflection on its
impact. This enables us to provide richer descriptions of someone’s fear-based memories.
Thus, Kinghorn’s work would seem to provide an appropriate complication to the work
of Monfils, Cowansage, Klann and LeDoux. Thinking of PTSD as a disorder of meaning
requires us to see human subjects carrying interpretive capacities which stretch into
ethical and moral realms. At the same time, if we are to broaden our perspective on
PTSD, as Kinghorn suggests, then we cannot discount the possible ramifications of
research related to the reconsolidation of fear-inducing memories.
Looking at these two studies together we can begin to develop an integrative
framework of possible avenues for the treatment of PTSD. The neurologically developed
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hypotheses provide us with an understanding of the necessity of timeliness in our
interventions related to the recall of fear-based memories. PTSD, resulting from fearbased traumatic memories, may be affected by our ability to intervene in critical moments
of a person’s life. Furthermore, there are two possible avenues for intervening that need
attention. Meaning-oriented and behavioral interventions may provide helpful avenues
for people to re-interpret their fear-based memories and provide relief. Thus, as we are in
conversation with people for whom fear-based memories provide a significant
interpretive hurdle, a neuro-hermeneutical approach can help them reframe these
memories in meaningful ways. For pastoral counselors specifically, this plays out in the
ways in which we help someone develop the practices of faith which can mitigate some
of the behavioral consequences of fear-based memories. Furthermore, we can also utilize
theological meanings in order to reframe fear-based narratives to provide a richer
component of hope. As I argued in Chapter Four, I find narrative therapy to provide
pastoral counselors with effective treatment strategies that can accurately reflect this
neuro-hermeneutical approach to PTSD and trauma.
From Posttraumatic Stress to Trauma
PTSD is one way of discussing the impact of traumatic events on the lives of
people (and communities). I have established that PTSD is more likely a fear-based
“disorder” that hinges on the memory of a trauma. However, trauma means more than
just a particular event. Given that we interpret the world subjectively, postmodern
philosophies are more apt to lean towards a broader understanding of trauma. This allows
the person to define what is traumatic for them. The effort to broaden our understanding
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of trauma is both advantageous and deleterious. While it allows us to stick closely to
postmodern understandings of subjectivity, it also loosens the standards set forth in the
DSM which help us understand clinically relevant data.
As a pastoral counselor and caregiver, I am acutely aware of the strain that
sometimes haunts the relationship between clinical research and practice. There are times
when diagnostic categories seem cold and formulaic; times when they do not fully
capture the complaints of the person before me. Most often I seek to meet a person
wherever they might be in life. From there, I hope to help them describe what they bring
with them; often this means utilizing their language about their experiences, including
broad definitions of trauma. In general, I will find myself erring on the side of the client
regarding what is traumatic rather than strictly following a prescribed set of criteria. Our
therapeutic conversations are not debates about postmodernism or DSM criteria; they are
conversations about the impact of specific events a person experienced and how they
interpret them in the movement of their lives.
I believe I have been advocating that we understand what is traumatic through
emotional lenses. That is, trauma is related to the emotional state it engenders in the
human being experiencing the event. Trauma will have a perceived tangible threat that
gives rise to intense feelings of fear that result in behavioral responses – most often fight,
flight, freeze and/or appease – which become residual interpretive criteria for that
person’s interactions with the world. This emotional carryover may reveal itself as a
higher level of vigilance, often decreasing their ability to experience creativity and
harmony in their relationships. At times, a person will live through lenses of hyper-
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vigilance and hyperarousal that overwhelm their coping mechanisms even around
previously nonthreatening stimuli. These reactions develop out of the initial fear response
and are interpreted using meaning-oriented categories relative to a person’s life.
Trauma, seen through an emotional lens, attends to the focus in clinical research
literature that our reactions to traumatic events are fear-based responses. It also allows for
the possibility that specific experiences not diagnosed as PTSD may have traumatic
effects as well. The benefit of this characterization of trauma is the focus on emotions and
their effects and meanings. Seeing trauma as a fear-based response to a threatening
experience should open the scope of therapeutic possibilities for helping a person reauthor their experiences and interpretations.
Understanding Trauma Through Theological and Narrative Lenses
In Chapter Four, I put forth the idea that narrative therapy is one way of
implementing strategies which can help people live into their preferred identities. While I
am certain other therapeutic modalities could utilize the relationship between hope and
fear, narrative therapy seems uniquely poised to incorporate a neuro-hermeneutical stance
towards trauma. Narrative therapy takes serious the dynamic nature of identity, the
probability of re-authoring our identities and the ways in which we actively resist threats
to our preferred identity. As such, narrative therapists are open to the interpretation
people carry with them relative to their experiences. Part of the work of narrative
therapists is to help facilitate the creation of thick descriptions. The use of
neuropsychological data is one resource that can help inform this thickening process.
Moreover, they realize that an initial story is apt to change as conversation continues.
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Consequently, narrative therapists find themselves listening for the counternarrative
indicating active resistance to a particular narrative. This “double-listening” is necessary
for pastoral counselors and caregivers who wish to find the embedded narratives of hope
in a fear-based experience. The remainder of this section examines how one narrative
therapist characterized his work with trauma. While explaining his position, I want to
apply a theological lens to his work in order to fully develop this neuro-hermeneutical
lens.
The double listening approach narrative therapists take toward therapy highlights
the possibilities inherent in an experience. Narrative therapists see the traumatic
experience people share as but one interpretation of the event. White (2006) explained a
narrative view of trauma 39 by remarking that
No one is a passive recipient of trauma. People always take steps in endeavoring
to prevent the trauma they are subject to, and, when preventing this trauma is
clearly impossible, they take steps to try to modify it in some way or to modify its
effects on their lives. These steps contribute to the preservation of, and are
founded upon, what people hold precious. Even in the face of overwhelming
trauma, people take steps to try to protect and to preserve what they give value to.
(p. 28)
This view of traumatic experiences is closely related to the view I have proposed in this
dissertation. The missing elements of this explanation are the emotional and theological
impact of a traumatic experience. However, I can see that the roots of for exploring fear
and hope are implicit in White’s views of trauma.
White believed that people actively attempt to relieve or prevent trauma. I see this
as a reframing of the behaviors associated with a fear reaction. He also remarked that
people ground these behaviors in what they value, adding that “People’s responses to
trauma are based on what they give value to, on what they hold precious in life” (2006, p.
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28). In other words, hope guides our activity in the face of threats and trauma. White
generally supports what I have specifically laid out in this dissertation. Namely, that fear
is a reaction undergirded by our hopes to survive, cope and thrive. For the theologicallyminded, the question we must wrestle with is what is the locus of value that a person
seeks to protect and preserve? Furthermore, is there something greater than themselves
that grounds their ability to see and seek to thrive in the future? For those who seek
solace in the possibilities of the divine-human relationship, then the answer to that
question is found in the construction of that theological and faith-oriented relationship
which grounds our hopes.
In order to develop these hopeful stories White actively seeks counternarratives.
He described his posture of double listening by stating that “When meeting people who
are consulting me about trauma and its aftermath, I hear the story about the trauma, but I
also hear expressions of what people have continued to accord value to in their lives
despite what they have been through” (2006, p. 30). I interpret this to mean that hope
undergirds the fears we experience, and also provides the first evidence of hopeful
counternarratives in the aftermath of trauma. As therapists, our goal is to help develop
these hopeful counternarratives so that they provide as rich a source of interpretation as
the trauma-saturated narrative. As theologically-minded therapists, we are tasked to listen
with a third ear that seeks out the theological themes raised in traumatic narratives. As
double listeners, we should also seek to develop theological themes of resistance to a
traumatic narrative. These themes form the grounding material for movement towards
meaningful theological interaction with a traumatic narrative.
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Finally, I see the emotion of fear as an adaptive emotion which seeks to aid a
person in surviving and coping with threats. Process theology helps provide a strand of
meaning-oriented thought which further interprets the emotion of fear as intimately tied
to human hopes. This theological understanding completes the picture of the relationship
between fear and hope. With the input of narrative therapy we can see that a process
theological understanding of the relationship between fear and hope provides a tangible
method of helping people utilize overt and covert narratives which can enhance their
ability to cope and thrive.
Statement of Perspective
Every therapist enters a therapeutic conversation with a perspective on human
beings, what ails them and what provides relief. This dissertation developed a particular
perspective on the emotion of fear and its relationship to hope. Before turning from
theory to practice, I want to offer a brief summary of the work in this dissertation. This
final summary proposition is based on my understanding of the materials offered in this
project. It begins with my perspective on human beings; continues with an examination
of fear and hope and concludes with the three themes that will guide a neurohermeneutical therapeutic conversation.
Human beings are social creatures living in an interdependent world. We live and
move and become in relationship with and reaction to the world around us. The human
self or identity develops through narrative habits we adopt in order to adapt to a variety of
settings and circumstances. Our long memories and active imaginations help reinforce
these habits; at the same time they also give us the opportunity to re-story our lives.
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Human beings are also unique physical actors in the world. We share particular
neurophysiological similarities with other animal species such as the amygdala, yet we
also have unique capacities. These structures have evolved throughout human history in
order to help us adapt to our environments. Therefore, while fear is expressed similarly
across species, human memory, belief systems and imagination create unique conditions
for the expression of fear in human beings.
Human beings are emotional creatures. Neuropsychology affirms the embodied
nature of emotions. Emotions contribute significantly to our experiences and the habits
that form our selves; they also influence our relationships and imaginative possibilities.
Our emotional experiences form lasting and intense memories which can be recalled with
greater ease. Just as psychology affirms the embodied nature of our emotional lives, so
too should our theology. As theological creatures embedded in relational systems,
emotions can be understood as adaptive and not inherently life limiting; moreover, they
contribute a measure of passion, direction and possibility to the reciprocal interactions of
the divine-human relationship. Our theological systems cannot afford to ignore the
impact and importance of emotions. Process theology provides a framework for taking
embodied emotions seriously. Thompson he characterized the emotional reciprocity of
the divine-human relationship, stating that:
God feels the world's feelings just like our entire body feels a sensation coming
from only one spot. God is "internally affected" by all the world's activity: "God
laughs with us, cries with us, loves with us, feels pain when we do, enjoys
satisfaction with us" (Goggin, 1995, ρ 128). Just as humans can experience
periods of durable happiness in spite of episodes of illness, stress, etc… so God
can respond to the world's challenges yet remain "everlastingly, essentially
happy" (Shields, 1992, p. 57). (2005, pp. 26-27)
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This relationship is predicated on the possibility of co-determination and the sense that
God lives and acts passionately and persuasively with us in the world. This persuasive
power provides for an open future where we are able to enact novel stories and reimagined narratives. Thus, the possibilities of continued or renewed hope are available.
I see the emotion of fear as an inescapable part of human life. The amygdala is an
active participant in the genesis of this emotional state and the behaviors that it includes.
The emotion of fear is an intense reaction to a real or imagined threat, leading a person to
enact a particular set of adaptive defensive behaviors. The purpose of fear in animals is to
aid them in surviving and coping with a threat. For human beings, that purpose is further
elucidated in the imaginative desire to thrive in the world. This ability to thrive develops
out of our neurological capacities and plasticity of the human brain, which create unique
opportunities related to memory and imagination. Thus, our lives are comprised of the
remembered stories we enact and tell, as well as the attainable hopes we project into the
future. Not only do we form habits which direct our lives, but we also can re-form our
habits and re-author our stories.
Through our imaginations and the true openness of the future, our fear-based
behaviors reveal a desire to live out a preferred future. These fear-based behaviors direct
us towards the hope that we might live another day. Thus, fear is a vehicle through which
our hopes can be drawn out and/or revealed. While the purpose of fear may be revealed
in its actions, we can derive the meaning of fear through an understanding of the divinehuman relationship. The interrelated world is not perfect. There are times when
relationships collide and produce situations of threat and trauma. Fear, interpreted as a
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manifestation of God’s love and persuasive power, may also be interpreted as a
manifestation of God’s hope and initial aims in particular situations.
I see human beings as relational, physical and emotional beings who act in the
world through the divine-human relationship. Thus, a theological anthropology informs
my interpretation of the emotion of fear and its importance for therapeutic settings. In
process theology, it is thought that the world evolved through the persuasive power of
God and that God continues to be intimately active in it. To be afraid is to realize that we
are a part of an interrelated structure of life. When we are afraid we not only realize a
threat or recognize a traumatic event, we also act according to a latent hope that reveals
the possibilities of life for us. The full meaning of our fear should encompass not only the
behaviors that help us survive a threat or trauma, but also an awareness of the hopes that
make our behaviors relevant. We cannot be afraid without also being hopeful that
something in our lives is worth living for. Fear does not just protect us from something; it
protects us for something as well.
While it is helpful to think that at the genesis of fear there is hope, there are times
when an experience of the emotion of fear is overwhelming. The memory and
imaginations of human beings can run amuck as they incorporate real and possible threats
into narratives. In these moments, it is easy to lose sight of the hopeful possibilities of the
initial aims of God. Instead, we cope with the world through a fear-based interpretive
scheme. When these moments of hyper-arousal and hyper-vigilance prevail, it is
important for pastoral caregivers and pastoral counselors to be able to point to the hopeful
possibilities endemic to the emotion of fear. As pastoral caregivers/counselors we should
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place the emotion of fear in the context of a meaningful divine-human relationship. The
main themes that we can utilize to develop this complex relationship between fear and
hope are surviving, coping and thriving.
Utilizing neurological data and an understanding of fear-based behaviors, pastoral
caregivers and counselors can normalize reactions to threats and trauma. Empathy and
education can help a person take a meaningful perspective on the narratives they bear.
The desire to survive is normal; to remain in survival mode prevents us from developing
an awareness of God’s continued prodding towards the possibilities of novel future
moments. In addition to survival, fear helps us cope with threats. To that end, a person’s
coping skills are revealed in the ways they handle a relationship with a threat. A primary
task of the pastoral caregiver/counselor is to help a person develop the skills to enact an
alternate narrative more closely aligned to their preferred identity. Finally, our active
imaginations provide access to novel possibilities. The emotion of fear is related to
human hope. As a person re-authors a threatening or traumatic narrative, one goal is to
reconnect them to the hope that enabled their survival behaviors and their desire to cope
with the event. Utilizing a process framework and the enriched narratives developed in
therapeutic conversation, a person can reclaim the goodness of life that they felt had been
lost through their traumatic experience. With that in mind, I want to turn to the case study
to see how this might be accomplished.
Illustrating a Neuro-Hermeneutical Approach to Therapy
This final section is about Rachael. 40 At the time of our consultation, Rachael was
a single female living in a transitional urban environment. Since her graduation from
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college a few years earlier, she worked for a local business and lived in an apartment
nearby. Rachael was engaged (she is now married) to a longtime boyfriend. Her family
lived about an hour away from her apartment downtown. Rachael called to talk with me
about a recent traumatic experience
About a month before our first meeting, Rachael was mugged in the atrium of her
apartment building. After unlocking the main door to the building her perpetrator slipped
in behind her and violently pushed her against a wall. Her assailant grabbed her purse.
Rachael described feeling frozen as the moments of the attack slowed and seemed to take
forever. Her memory of the event was vivid. She knew the exact spot on the wall where
she bruised her head when the assailant attacked. She knew where the plants where in
relationship to her position. She could recall numerous details about her surroundings.
Rachael, with her words, drew an accurate picture of the room and the event, as though it
was taking place again before her eyes.
In the month after her attack, Rachael moved from her apartment. She was now
living in the basement of her future in-laws until her wedding a few months later. Her
family felt that Rachael needed a safe place to live until her wedding. Physically
speaking, it worked. When she was inside the house, Rachael felt safe and secure. When
she left the house, life was a different story.
Despite her knowledge of the event, Rachael only knew limited details about her
attacker. Whenever she would come across someone resembling her memories she would
find herself withdrawing relationally. Sometimes the voice of a co-worker would engage
her fear-based memory; another time the shadow of someone walking by her office
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would frighten her; in another moment, she reacted with frightfully, practically jumping
out of her chair, when someone appeared at her office door. She reached the point where
her ability to work was being hindered by the memories she carried with her.
Work was not the only place that she noticed the memories surfacing. Rachael
observed that she rarely went out at night with her friends. Once a highly social person,
Rachael now preferred to stay in at night. Going out was no longer worth the risk to her.
Part of this, she rationalized, was her wanting to be a good guest while living with her inlaws. At one point she let it slip that the walk from the driveway to the front door of their
house was unnerving to her. In front of her in-laws house was a high row of hedges that
were poorly lit. As she would walk by in the evening or at night, the shadows would
spark her imagination. She would see a man crouching in the bushes or feel a threat
emerge with every rustle of leaves. It got to the point where, Rachael required an escort
by her future father-in-law from the front door to the driveway. To Rachael, the world
seemed to lack security, and threats loomed in every shadow or surprise.
When I met Rachael, I was a new therapist. The primary method of assessment I
felt comfortable with was the DSM. Based on the information Rachael gave me in our
initial interviews, I diagnosed her with PTSD and proceeded to work with her through the
best methods I could find. These included the insights of clinicians at the counseling
center, resources they offered and whatever therapeutic acumen I possessed. At the time I
embraced both the anxiety orientation of PTSD and the practice of psychodynamic and
cognitive interventions. While these therapeutic disciplines grounded me, it would be a
mistake to say that my therapeutic identity was established. I was quite fluid in my
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appropriation of strategies to the benefit and detriment of clients I saw. To be sure, there
were moments in therapy that were helpful to Rachael. However, utilizing this new
framework, I think I could have done better. Most of the work I did with Rachael dealt
with the symptoms she described after the traumatic event. Very little of our time was
spent on the trauma itself. Given the chance to revisit our therapy, I would focus a bit
more on the narrative of the trauma (the event) in order to thicken and seek out the
counternarratives. This does not mean I would ignore the symptoms she was facing,
which were more closely aligned with PTSD. However, this new focus would allow me
to utilize a neuro-hermeneutical frame which would appropriately deal with the fearbased memory she carries with her. The remainder of this chapter is a re-visioning of the
care I would hope to offer Rachael today.
Helping Rachael Survive, Cope and Thrive
My intent in re-visioning the care I offered Rachael is to construct a theologically
grounded approach to therapy which pays attention to the role fear and hope play in her
interpretive frame. To that end, I will explore how the themes of surviving, coping and
thriving might play out while revisiting our therapeutic conversations. I present these
themes in the same order that I have presented them throughout this dissertation. This
doesn’t mean that there is a linear protocol or that one theme necessarily precedes or
follows another. I recognize the fluidity of therapy and the manner in which emotions and
narratives flow in random patterns. You may find glimpses of a person thriving in midst
of their survival narrative. However, for the sake of this presentation I will discuss the
themes in the order listed above. In Chapter Four, I described four narrative tools that are
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a practical fit with this paradigm of thought about fear: externalization, counternarratives,
taking a stand and re-authoring preferred identities. In addition to these tools, themes of
resistance and resilience will emerge as important touch points of change. In the midst of
this therapeutic re-visioning it is important to remember that as counselors and caregivers
we are witnesses to intense and intimate moments of people’s lives; we are outsiders who
are accorded the rare opportunity to listen to the experiences of others. In these moments
we share in a small way the burden they bear concerning their fear-based narratives.
Surviving.
Looking at Rachael’s narrative, she exhibited three fear-oriented behaviors. In
addition to the initial freezing moment, there was a physical appeasement as Rachael
released her purse, as well as a mental flight which enabled Rachael to protect her self.
All three of these happenings – freezing, mental flight and appeasement – provide cues
that should enable a therapist to understand this experience as a fear-based response.
Each behavior is linked to a set of actions which helped Rachael survive her experience.
Put simply, her physiological and mental adaptive behaviors responded appropriately to
the circumstances to the event. All in all, she protected herself as best as she could, given
the circumstances she endured. Aside from her behaviors, Rachael also described
physical sensations akin to a fear-based response. These included a rapid heartbeat,
muscle tension and a keen awareness of some of the details of her surroundings.
Part of treating a fear-based event from a neuro-hermeneutical perspective is
helping someone develop an understanding of the story they tell themselves. In therapy
we are dealing with both the event (trauma) and resulting behaviors and meanings
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(possibly PTSD) that are constructed. In this case, Rachael’s adaptive survival
mechanisms worked; however, in subsequent weeks these mechanisms did not abate as
Rachael withdrew from her relationships, was hypervigilant and reacted was experienced
a sense of hyperarousal towards previously nonthreatening stimuli. In order to help
Rachael, I would provide additional information which might help add a sense of richness
about her particular experience. One way to begin doing this is to share some knowledge
concerning normal physiological reactions to threats. This would include neurological
information about fear, its behavioral cues and effect on our memories.
Engaging in a process which normalizes our survival behaviors can have a
number of possible effects on people. First and foremost, it helps provide an embodied
perspective concerning the physiological issues we deal with when authoring our
identities. Additionally, it helps ground the process of externalization by separating the
event from our reactions to it. Finally, it can provide some spiritual benefit by helping
people take a perspective on the behaviors as they relate to the activity of a loving and
caring God. A second piece of this survival puzzle relates to how we understand the
memories that impact our behaviors. To that end, I would want to discuss the impact
emotions have on our memories and how our brains privilege this information.
Rachael’s story revealed other clues about her embodied fear reaction. These
included the kind of vividness related to the dilation of pupils and heightened awareness.
As she was pushed against the wall, with her back to her assailant, she focused on what
she could see. During her first telling of the event, she could visually remember little
more than the wall, plants in the atrium and a few other visual cues. However, these
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details were something that stuck out in her mind. As the event unfolded, Rachael’s fear
response system kicked into high gear as she sought to survive. Beyond the initial
freezing moment, Rachael could not remember being very aware of her body. After the
event she felt the tension in her muscles as they returned to their normal state. Rather
than fight her attacker, Rachael released her purse and retreated from the situation. She
couldn’t remember much about her assailant, nor could she recall the content of the 911
phone call following the attack.
As a corollary to these embodied reactions, Rachael described a sense of shame
related to not being able to fully describe her attacker to the police. Furthermore, having
taken self-defense courses, she felt as though she should have fought back. These feelings
provide another possible entry point to discuss the physiology of intense fear; especially
since survival is a key element to our fear-based responses to threats in the environment.
By describing the impact fear has on the body, Rachael might come to understand her
reaction to the event; she may even begin to see her reaction as adaptive, helping her
protect herself and survive the attack. Rachael’s ability to vividly describe what she could
see revealed an adaptive response to the event. By giving up her purse without a fight,
she reacted with a fear-based response of appeasement. Given the circumstances of the
event and her interpretation of what was happening, this was probably the best course of
action. Her mental flight and subsequent lack of memory concerning the moments
following the trauma are within a normal range of behaviors for someone feeling the
intense emotion of fear. Helping Rachael understand that her reaction to the event fits a
normal pattern of fear-based reactions may alleviate some of the shame she felt.
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Furthermore, it prepares her to look at her subsequent reactions within a new framework
related to fear-based behaviors.
Rachael’s continued need for safety and survival played out in meaningful ways
following the trauma. She was hypervigilant, reclusive and intensely aware of her
surroundings. Given what is understand about memory and the effects that emotions have
on our subjective interpretations of the world, Rachael reacted to her environment
normally. Her interpretive framework shifted under the weight of the overwhelming
memory of the traumatic event. Memories such as these are easier to recall, last longer
and are more intense. Thus, when she experienced reminders of the event in
nonthreatening situations, she continued to act out of the novel framework acquired
during her traumatic event.
Using the process theological framework outlined in Chapter Five, I see Rachael’s
initial reactions to this event as a moment when the persuasive power of God enabled her
to react with the emotion of fear in order to survive. There were a lot of unknowns to
Rachael’s story. Did the person have a weapon? Was there more than one attacker? If she
yelled would anyone hear her or would it enrage her attacker? The best possible fearresponse in this particular moment (other fear-responses such as fighting may be
appropriate elsewhere), given the unknowns in the situation, may have been appeasement
and mental flight in order to attain the greatest chance to survive for another day. Making
a theological assertion such as this within the framework of a caregiving or counseling
relationship may not be appropriate at the initial outset of the relationship. Instead,
keeping with the process theological framework assertions about God’s immanence
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(closeness) and God’s intimate emotional reactivity to the pain and fear felt by Rachael
would provide an initial theological framework for later understandings of how to place a
traumatic event within the realm of meaning and hope. Furthermore, helping Rachael
understand that the instinct for survival is nothing to be ashamed of and is instead a part
of the intricate ways God persuades humans into being throughout the years in order to
survive a sometimes hostile world.
With Rachael I used a lot of normalizing information relative to the human
response of fear in particular situations. From a narrative perspective, this presents novel
interpretations of Rachael’s story and what it means to be human; moreover, it gives
Rachael a new interpretation which can be incorporated into her story and help thicken
her reaction to the trauma. Understanding that the body reacts in specific ways to
threatening stimuli helps create a multi-faceted therapeutic milieu where Rachael could
begin developing an alternative story concerning her role in the narrative. Finally, this
could provide a way to distinguish between Rachael’s residual fear reactions and the
counternarratives that operate in other times of her life. This would help draw out
counternarratives and alternative stories, aiding Rachael to see where she resists the
trauma and copes and thrives relative to nonthreatening stimuli.
Coping.
Fear and its associated behaviors are basically coping mechanisms for threatening
situations. The ability to fight, flee, freeze and/or appease are coping strategies used to
deal with the immediacy of a particular threat. They are actions related to an “in the
moment” physiological response. What this means is that the emotion of fear and its
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behaviors quickly arise and are meant to quickly abate as well. In Rachael’s case, the
coping actions her physical self employed in the moment of her traumatic experience
were freezing, appeasing and a mental flight from the event. While these coping
mechanisms were not her first choices (using her training in self-defense would have
been a little less shameful to her), her body and brain actually reacted normally to her
circumstances. Rachael experienced difficulty when her imagination and fear-based
memory of the event could not be reasonably controlled. Her memory and the
imaginative possibilities it created overwhelmed her ability to cope with the event and its
aftermath. While Rachael’s physical self functioned as planned during the event, it
became apparent that she needed new coping skills to help her deal with a memory that
was intrusive and sometimes overwhelming.
As stated earlier, PTSD results from the experience of a trauma which
overwhelms a person’s coping mechanisms disallowing them to resume what they would
consider a normal life. To that end, psychiatrist Allen (2005) noted that two types of
coping skills are often needed to help those with overwhelming traumatic memories
navigate the world more effectively. The first of these skills relates to “emotion-focused
coping” or “efforts to regulate your emotional state” (p. 226). The second set of coping
skills is “problem-focused” or “direct efforts to modify the problem at hand” (p. 226).
Allen focuses more on emotional regulation and recognition; these skills help someone
develop a small measure of control over their situation through honest emotional
appraisal. Recognizing the emotions that one feels while remembering/reliving a
traumatic experience may help someone find ways to confront and/or cope with the
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conflict that arises in certain relationships, whether they are threatening or not (p. 226).
This type of emotional appraisal is not often found in narrative therapeutic literature.
However, I believe emotional states, examined and dealt with appropriately, add to the
narratives a person develops about a particular event. Just as information about
physiological responses to trauma helps Rachael to normalize the emotion of fear,
developing coping skills which help her access alternative narrative provide a form of
resistance to the traumatic narrative.
In Rachael’s case, she might have been helped by recognizing the reverberations
of the emotion of fear that arose in some nonthreatening situations. Since her memory
and imagination were giving a fear-based memory priority in nonthreatening settings, she
may have been able to develop the kind of pause needed to circumvent the intrusive
behaviors she experienced. The utilization of calming techniques in order to produce the
pause needed to regulate the strength of her emotional responses could help Rachael
access additional narrative possibilities which could then counter her reaction. These
techniques might range from simple meditation and mantras to bi-lateral stimulation or
more complex imaginative processes in order to help a person begin to self-regulate the
emotions that are dominating their interpretive frames. Emotional regulation is only the
beginning of helping someone cope with a traumatic memory though. While these
techniques don’t fit within strict narrative therapeutic frameworks, their effectiveness
with particular persons can aid someone in enacting a preferred identity by providing an
alternate narrative to enact.
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The stance of narrative therapists towards the traumas people bring with them is
that these people are not passive witnesses to trauma; rather, they are active participants
in their narratives. To that end, narrative therapists are bound to be more problemfocused in their interpretation and conversation with others about their traumatic
narratives. Before turning to how a problem-focused approach in therapy could help
Rachael cope with her narrative, I want to return to the interplay between emotions and
memories to add a significant twist to traditional narrative therapy.
Payne (2006) remarked that narrative theory “emphasizes that people interpret
(make sense of) the experiences they bring to therapy primarily through seeing them
through cultural and social lenses, rather than inherited biological or psychological
factors” (p. 21). If this is the case, utilizing a neuro-hermeneutical framework as a
guiding principle for practicing narrative therapy would seem to be an oxymoron. Based
on the research in this dissertation, I can only come to a different conclusion. I agree that
the narratives we tell are heavy-laden with cultural and social interpretations, yet
traumatic narratives are unique. Their uniqueness develops through the emotional content
derived from physiological sensations felt during an event and in subsequent
nonthreatening situations. Thus, while our interpretive frames will never escape their
social and cultural conditioning, there is physiologically-based emotional information
which may be useful to the therapeutic process. I think it behooves narrative therapists to
be more conversant in how emotions impact the force of a memory and its imaginative
repercussions. A person’s activity relative to a traumatic memory is strengthened by the
emotional association with that memory. This emotional association is physiologically
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derived and interpreted socially and culturally by the story teller. These emotions give
passion and direction to our memories and thoughts. Narrative therapists should honor
the emotional content of a particular traumatic narrative. Furthermore, an understanding
of the ways emotions shape and drive particular narratives provides additional resources
and thematic paths for exploration. Payne’s emphasis on the cultural and social to the
detriment of physiological and psychological data is short-sighted. All facets of human
life are important if narrative therapy is to truly be helpful to people.
Additionally, pastorally focused therapists should feel a special connection to the
embodied experience of emotions derived through the “created” self and shared in the
stories we tell about the divine-human relationship. As pastoral counselors and
caregivers, we share a basic theologically-oriented view of the self and the wholeness and
brokenness brought to each situation. Emotions provide valuable information about how
we are created to respond to threats and other stimuli in our environments. Through the
concept of the emotion of fear in this dissertation, we develop a sense of both God’s care
for us and God’s hope for our futures. Without paying attention to the physiologicallyderived benefits of our emotions and their impact on our memories and imaginative
narratival creations we lose a valuable resource that helps us provide a place of care
where people are valued for the stories they bring with them.
Returning to Rachael’s case, I already laid the groundwork for an understanding
of God’s immanence in her life. Additionally, I helped her recognize the role that
emotions play in the creation and remembering of traumatic stories. By carefully
explaining the ways in which the brain reacts to threats, I attempted to provide a way of
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explaining her reaction to those traumatic moments as normal behavior rather than
something aberrant or shaming. I sought to thicken her story and make it more complex
by talking about the need for survival in the midst of a threat. Additionally, I added some
calming techniques which can help her regulate the continued experience of the emotion
of fear in nonthreatening situations, as well as add a narrative of resistance and resilience
when she is successful. My attention to helping Rachael should not be limited to these
interventions alone. Coping is not just about the development of skills or a thickened
narrative related to the abatement of the emotional and situational stress related to
residual traumatic activity. From a narrative therapeutic perspective the ability to cope
with a traumatic experience ultimately comes from two sources: resistance and resilience.
This is where White’s insistence on double-listening becomes important. As we
hear Rachael’s traumatic story, our second ear is listening for the counternarratives that
arise from each telling. Deconstructing questions would provide a specific direction to
help Rachael thicken the unique story she remembers. Was there a moment during the
threatening encounter that Rachael felt herself resist what was happening? Rachael was
told by her attacker not to call the police, but as soon as he left she dialed 911 (an
emergency number in the U.S.). How did she muster the strength to do this? What did she
tell the operator before the police arrived? Even the ability to dial the phone shows a level
of resistance to the threat and resilience in the face of trauma. In the moments following
the trauma were there other things Rachael did to covertly and overtly resist what
happened to her? Did she tell or warn her neighbors about what happened? In this way
she would be resisting the impulse to pull within herself.
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Though Rachael’s story about the trauma was rife with an appropriate sense of
feeling victimized by another person, there were other ways to thicken her story by
naming her resistance to the event. Furthermore, these moments of resistance also reveal
the possibility of a latent hope Rachael experienced related to the event. For her to resist,
even in some small way, reveals a counternarrative of hope challenging her dominant
fear-driven narrative. It could be her hope that this wouldn’t happen to someone else; it
could be a hope of recovering a sense of control over the event; it might even be a hope
related to strengthening herself in the midst of an unsettling time. Additionally, we would
seek to develop the theological themes apparent in her counternarratives. Was there a
moment of feeling closer to God? How does this event challenge or conform to her faith
in and about God? How does she understand the source of her strength to resist the threat,
in whatever way she recognizes? Exploring the event with Rachael may provide myriad
avenues for discovering the ways in which she resisted the trauma and thicken its impact
on the self she constructed as a result of what happened.
Helping Rachael explore her resilience as she re-experiences the trauma in
nonthreatening moments is a way to help her examine how she lives alternative narratives
in the times when the memory seems pervasive. Questions about Rachael’s resilience
identify moments of her life when the identity she performs is more in line with the
identity she prefers. Are there moments when Rachael feels safe and secure? What does
she experience in those moments? Has she experienced being surprised without feeling as
though she was overreacting? How does Rachael navigate the bushes in front of her inlaws house when no one else is around to escort her? How does she overcome her fears in
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order to make it from the car to the house when no one is there to help? Are there times at
work when she is surprised without being afraid?
Rachael was able to go to work and spend time with her fiancé outside of the
house. This exhibits a certain measure of control and strength. In these moments of
strength, how did Rachael define herself differently? Even though the trauma inhabited
much of her thinking, it was obvious that there was a lot more to her life than just this one
story. What were the stories Rachael told herself in these moments?
Another method of helping develop these stories would come from the
perspective of outsiders. Johnson (2002) stated that “improving an individual’s closest
relationships can be a crucial element in addressing multidimensional problems that
involve the whole personality, such as posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD)” (p. 5). This
could be accomplished by having her in-laws provide a letter describing their perspective
concerning how Rachael was dealing with the traumatic event; her fiancé could attend a
therapeutic session in order to provide his perspective on Rachael’s ability to cope with
the event with strength and resilience. Through letter writing or the witness of an
outsider, Rachael has the opportunity to build a new narrative for herself. It also
reinforces the communal bonds that can strengthen her resolve for dealing with the
trauma. Johnson continued by noting that “if a person’s connection with significant
others is not part of the coping and healing process, then, inevitably, it becomes part of
the problem and even a source of retraumatization” (p. 7). A narrative pastoral therapist
might broaden the definition of significant to include others who had been traumatized in
order to allow Rachael to act upon the injustice of her trauma. Even if none of these
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persons were available, the therapist could ask Rachael to put herself in these other
peoples’ shoes and provide their perspective as to how she was doing.
In order to provide Rachael with the milieu to develop a complex understanding
of the event and its subsequent memory and imaginative possibilities a narrative therapist
would be very active in helping Rachael describe alternative stories about the “inbetween” times. Developing these stories of resistance and resilience help Rachael add
additional complex meanings and descriptions to her traumatic story. They also provide
the environment through which a narrative therapist can listen for “signs of what the
person has continued to give value to in life despite all they have been through, and for
any expressions that might provide some hint of the person’s response to trauma” (White,
2006, p. 28, italics author’s). Listening for these counternarratives to the traumatic story
provides the fuel for identifying how a person lived or reminded themselves of what they
hope for next.
As Rachael identified some hopeful possibilities, I would have asked her to take a
position on the self she described in her traumatic narrative. Is the person she described
revealing herself in the fullest? While it is obvious that this traumatized person exists in
some stories, is it truly the extent of how she understands herself? How does she want to
relate to the person she describes in her narrative concerning the future? How will she
choose to take a perspective on this person that fully reveals what she knows about her
life, her experiences, her faith and her responsible embodied response to the event? Once
Rachael has taken a stand relative to the fullness of the self she has developed, it is time
to wonder with her what the future will hold.
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Thriving.
Up to this point the pastoral therapy conversation centered on developing a
narrative that fully describes the impact of fear on Rachael’s life from the event to the
present. Our conversation revolved around developing moments of resistance and
resilience and sought the input of others from Rachael’s community of family and
friends. Throughout the therapeutic conversation Rachael revealed different glimpses of
the preferred self she was seeking. These glimpses were tantamount to the hopes Rachael
carried as revealed through the fear she was experiencing. They were also the beginning
point of helping Rachael think about what it means to thrive. Thriving means to act upon
the hopes we have for the future despite (or even because) of our experiences. In a
narrative context, to thrive is to grasp and act out a preferred identity. In process thought,
to thrive is to realize the impact of the total experiences that the past have on a present
moment, but to hold that in tension with the persuasive call of God towards beauty and
novelty. Through an awareness of this convergence of experiences someone can seek to
reclaim some of the goodness of their life. Taken together, the pastoral therapy
conversation reveals an orientation toward the future that doesn’t negate the past but
seeks to incorporate it in new ways in order to act upon a preferred identity often hidden
in the relationship between fear and hope. Seeking opportunities to help Rachael flourish,
through the reframing of her story in light of the hope revealed in the emotion of fear, can
help her take a stand on the identity she prefers. In a pastoral theological context, we
should be prepared to recognize the ways that people thrive despite the circumstances of
their lives. However, we should also be aware that some people might never reach the

282

point where they can accept/access the latent hope and the possibilities for thriving that
come with their fears.
For some people, the main components of pastoral therapy will be surviving and
coping. It is important to note that not everyone will reach the point where something
positive and hopeful can grow out of a traumatic experience. As psychologists Calhoun
and Tedeschi (1999) noted “Posttraumatic growth is common, but it is not universal…
there are some sets of circumstances where even the consideration by outsiders that
posttraumatic growth may be possible can be regarded by trauma survivors as naïve or
even obscene” (p. 16). From a theological point of view, Farley (1990) utilized the term
“radical suffering” to denote “suffering that has the power to dehumanize and degrade
human beings…and that cannot be traced to punishment or desert” (p. 12). For some
trauma victims, the notion of radical suffering is very relevant. As a result of their
experiences, any road taken to find a preferred identity seems too difficult, and the notion
that we might actually “grow” from our suffering would feel naïve and offensive. This is
why the emphasis on resistance and resilience is so important. As Farley later noted, “If
suffering and destruction cannot be overcome, they can be resisted. It is in the resistance
itself, in this refusal to give up the passion for justice, that tragedy can be transcended”
(1990, p. 27). Thus, our first steps are listening for a person’s ability to take a stand
relative to the traumatic event that signifies the readiness to move towards re-authoring
their identities. This ability to take a stand and resist a traumatic narrative recognizes the
desire to thrive in spite of the memory that sometimes feels consuming. For a person to
thrive through their traumatic experiences, they must find some way to reclaim the
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goodness of life beyond just resisting a fear-based memory. Recognizing someone’s
resistance opens them to the undercurrent of hope in the emotion of fear; reclaiming the
goodness of life utilizes their imaginative capacities to create alternative hopeful
scenarios for their lives. The work of the caregiver is to help foster the best situation for
posttraumatic growth and the re-authoring of identities. This takes time as people discern
the small or large steps that will take them in the direction they wish to go. Therapists
should be able to acknowledge people’s work, encourage the steps they take, create an
environment which recognizes resistance and resilience and offer the opportunity for
someone to reclaim goodness as they are able.
For a pastoral counselor or caregiver, it helps to think that God provides initial
aims which reveal the most hopeful possibilities for a particular experience. As such, a
theological grounding for thriving through trauma might include the notion that when
fear is felt in the presence of a threat, undergirding it is an essential hope conveyed
through the persuasive power of God for the continuity of life and possibilities entailed
within it. That is, trauma can provide the kind of complex contrasting experience
whereby not only fear is overwhelming but the presence of hope may be as well. Thus,
when exploring the relationship between fear and hope with Rachael it would be
important to keep this process perspective on the divine-human relationship in the back
of our minds. Practically, this exploration might begin with Rachael’s understanding of
the relationships in her life. How did they give her strength? How was their importance a
part of the will to survive and cope with the trauma? For Rachael, there were significant
loving relationships which provided tangible points of contact for her past, current and
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future hopes. In order to help Rachael thrive, helping her see how these relationships
provided a significant source of hope for her to act appropriately during and after her
trauma. My role as a conversation partner with Rachael would grow in these moments to
move beyond just finding times of resistance and resilience to also helping Rachael
develop the contrasting narrative to her traumatic experience. That is, what narrative is
pushing Rachael to reclaim the goodness of life she feels is lost? What relationships or
passions provide the impulse and desire to move beyond her captivity to the traumatic
narrative? Certainly, there are narratives involving family, friends and her fiancé that
provide some of these impulses. Rachael’s visions for her preferred identity provide the
initial steps in her reclamation process. One of Rachael’s goals for therapy was to
reconnect with her stolen social self. By connecting the emotion of fear to the
undercurrent of hope threaded through her narrative, we develop a juxtaposing narrative
which can mitigate some of the impact of the fear Rachael experienced. Furthermore, by
looking at the meaning—the reasons why Rachael acted out of fear—we make an explicit
connection to Rachael’s continued relational vision throughout the past and current
experience of her trauma. In essence, Rachael never lost that social self. Instead, her
interpretive frame shifted by only being able to see through the impact of the emotion of
fear. Weaving the narratives of hope Rachael carries into this fear-based memory
provides a richer understanding of the experience. This should alter her interpretive frame
one more time. Helping Rachael reconnect with this relational frame offers one avenue of
exploration for her. It gives Rachael a tangible narrative through which she can re-
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examine her trauma in order to re-assess its importance and utilize the useful parts of the
experience for further interactions in her life.
Another therapeutic goal of Rachael’s was to reduce her feeling of shame related
to her behavior in nonthreatening situations. Her shame was tied to her experience of fear
and the impact of its reverberations. To this point we have established an alternate thread
which highlights the points of hope woven within her story. Having experienced herself
as others see her and discussing the significant ways she acts to live out a hopeful future,
empowering Rachael to tell and share her story with others might provide significant
relief for her feelings of shame. To that end, I would encourage Rachael to write a letter
of support for others experiencing a similar situation. If they were available, I would also
ask Rachael to read similar letters written by others so that any sense of isolation could be
dealt with openly in the therapeutic conversation. The most practical narrative and
process-oriented task related to Rachael’s shame would be to reconnect her with a cloud
of witnesses to a similar event. That Rachael is able to go to work and function is a
testament to her strength and resilience. Offering her the opportunity to tell and share that
story with others could provide her with a sense of encouragement and empowerment
that counters her shame. Rather than wither as the victim of a trauma, Rachael becomes
an expert witness and advocate for others who share a similar experience.
In the midst of this trauma work around thriving, the pastoral counselor or
caregiver has additional opportunity for encouragement and resistance. Rachael’s faith
was something that provided comfort to her. Helping Rachael realize how she might
reclaim the goodness of life should develop in conversation with the strength of her faith.
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The neuro-hermeneutical framework includes a process vision of the divine-human
relationship. This means that past moments come together in the present to create novel
possibilities for the future. Utilizing a process perspective, a therapist could rely on an
interpretation of God’s immanent activity in the world as seeking to provide persuasive
possibilities in each moment. Realizing that both hope and fear are part of the divinehuman relational milieu provides an additional perspective on what it means to act
adaptively and responsibly in the world. A therapist utilizing a process framework might
propose to Rachael that God utilizes the emotion of fear in order to persuade someone out
of a relationship with a threat and into a greater possible relationality in an open-ended
future. To see the emotion of fear through this lens is to understand its physiological and
behavioral components as not only protecting us from a threat, but also protecting us for
the continuation of our lives.
Thriving involves helping someone develop a sense of the hopes they have for the
possibilities of living out a preferred identity. In Rachael’s narrative we found moments
of survival and coping. Woven in her story are glimmers of hope which directed
Rachael’s actions toward a future and the relationships she values. Through our double
listening as pastoral caregivers, our theological perspective helps develop the relationship
between hope and fear. As we help Rachael weave together this new narrative of fear and
hope she gains the opportunity to choose from and live out many possibilities. Her
awareness about the enriched narrative she initially shared empowers her to take a stand
and develop the preferred identity she chooses. For Rachael to thrive doesn’t mean that
the trauma is forgotten; instead, when the narrative returns there are novel and creative
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ways of engaging it. This helps Rachael reframe her relationship to the trauma in a
manner which allows her to claim some goodness from it. Ultimately, connecting fear
and hope through the same narrative Rachael first provided can facilitate the kind of
meaningful theological and relational growth she seeks.
The neuro-hermeneutical therapeutic process revolved around the expansion of
Rachael’s initial traumatic narrative. Awareness of the initial motivation for survival
could help Rachael reframe the fear she experienced during her trauma. Discussing the
embodied nature of fear and the adaptive physiological responses that threatening
experiences engender normalizes the emotional state. As she sought to cope with the
event, we continued to thicken her narrative by seeking out moments of resistance and
resilience. These counternarratives provided moments of strength when Rachael covertly
and overtly resisted what was happening to her. Furthermore, we sought the input of
others in Rachael’s circle who could describe her strength and resilience. These moments
of strength provide initial clues into Rachael’s values and hopes. Intertwined in these
moments of survival and coping we sought an understanding of God’s presence during
the trauma. Rachael’s consistent desire to reconnect with the meaningful relationships in
her life provided another glimpse of the things she hoped for in her future. Her relational
motivation was utilized to connect her with a broader community of trauma victims.
Additionally, it provided an avenue through which we could explore how Rachael might
reclaim the goodness of life. Rachael was encouraged to see how hope was present
throughout her ordeal and how she continued to live for something, rather than only
running from something. Finally, by utilizing both the event and the subsequent activities
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Rachael may have come to see the relationship between her fear and hope, adding
complex meanings to the emotional states she felt. Thus, while her traumatic memory
may not have abated completely, she was armed with the tools to re-interpret the
experience as she felt it intrude on her life.
Conclusion
Throughout the course of this dissertation I sought to develop the meaningful
impact that an interdisciplinary understanding of the emotion of fear and its relationship
to hope can have on the therapeutic process. I began this project by arguing that we
should pay attention to the differences between fear and anxiety. These differences began
with the perceived emotional antidote of anxiety and fear. For anxiety, a sense of peace
or calm is what is sought; for fear, it develops out of our acute sense of what we hope for
and is abated by the realization and incorporation of those hopes into our preferred way
of living. Besides advocating for a separation for these two different emotional states in
the clinic, I argued that we currently live in a larger milieu which makes us more acutely
aware of the things we fear, presenting us with opportunities to develop real or imagined
relationships with a variety of threats ranging from crime to terrorists to hurricanes and
tsunamis. In this “culture of fear” I believe we need new ways of thinking about the
impact of fear on our lives as well as new methods of thinking about what it means to be
afraid.
Three theoretical positions informed my description of the emotion of fear. In the
third chapter, I examined the embodiment of fear through the systems of the brain, our
evolutionary history and the behaviors passed down through successive generations. This
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lead to a number of ways of understanding fear: (1) the emotion of fear is inescapable
barring particular types of brain injury; (2) there are systems in the brain that produce the
emotional state of fear and its subsequent physiological reactions; and, (3) these reactions
are conserved across species. The amygdala is activated when we are afraid. It is
distinctly possible that the memories which develop out of threatening situations are also
tied to the amygdala. The final section of this chapter examined our evolutionary history.
I proposed that we utilize a dual inheritance theory of evolution. For the emotion of fear
this means that the emotional state differs from the particular threats we come to fear.
Human interpretation of the world provides the genesis for the things we fear.
Through our experiences we develop memories and beliefs and imagine new possibilities.
These things form the basis of our interpretive structures. Thus, while the emotion and
behaviors are conserved, the threats we experience differ. We develop our relationships
to threatening objects through various forms of communication. These range from family
members to peers, television to first-hand experience, communities to culture. These
threatening objects are woven into narratives which we share with one another, and they
become part of the narrative framework which produces the identities we perform
throughout life. At times, specific identities develop through narratives derived from
traumatic experiences or fear-based reactions. Narrative pastoral therapy is designed to
help people work through these fear-based or traumatic experiences. As a therapy of
resistance, narrative pastoral therapists help people develop opportunities to take a stand
against their fears or traumas. Process theology grounds the hermeneutical framework
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which provides the therapeutic interventions in this dissertation. It also provides an
important interpretive link between hope and fear.
Process theology provides a framework for assessing the meaning of fear. This is
in contrast to previous chapters which dealt with fear from a psychological perspective.
This chapter drew on connections between process thought and science in order to
provide a framework for reviewing the data presented in earlier chapters. Process
theology’s use of the term persuasion to describe God’s power enables us to see an open
future and understand humans as relationally-determined creatures. Utilizing the ideas of
initial and subjective aims I came to understand the meaning of fear through theological
lenses which added complexity to its meaning. This chapter concluded by introducing a
theologically and psychologically grounded definition of hope.
The sixth chapter introduced 15 propositions which provided a framework for
understanding fear and hope. These propositions developed a theological anthropological
framework, a pastoral theology of the emotion of fear and its relationship to hope and
three themes to help guide therapeutic conversations. The seventh chapter examined both
PTSD and trauma as separate but interrelated phenomena. Each term provides a helpful
insight into fear-based memories and their lasting impact. The final portion of this
chapter examined the case study of Rachael. Utilizing a neuro-hermeneutical framework
the themes of surviving, coping and thriving were used to hypothetically treat Rachael’s
traumatic memory. Together they formed a novel way of interpreting her experience and
helping her reclaim the goodness of life that she felt was missing.
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Epilogue
This epilogue is meant to serve two purposes. First, it is an opportunity to discuss
the context of this dissertation and why certain areas of study were not included. Second,
it provides me with the opportunity to briefly discuss one additional area where I feel this
constructive pastoral theology of fear and hope can be utilized with some effectiveness.
To the former point, I look at history, gender studies and philosophy at secular cognate
disciplines which could be brought into this interdisciplinary project. To the latter point, I
want to discuss the relationship between public and pastoral theology. Without too much
detail I want to outline some thoughts about how this constructive pastoral theology of
fear and hope might be articulated as public theology. Furthermore, I believe this
constructive pastoral theology of fear and hope might be useful in places where shared
narratives operate around threats and trauma. With this in mind I want to present some of
the work narrative therapists have done with group trauma.
What’s Not Here
A dissertation is a limited container focused specifically on creating and
sustaining an argument within the context of particular disciplines. Inevitably, the author
has to make a decision about material that is included and excluded from their work.
Some things just do not fit within the framework of the argument being made. In this
case, three meaningful avenues of discovery were intentionally not included in this
discussion. From the outset, I realized their importance; however, despite this fact
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including these disciplines would have distracted from the psychological and theological
argument I was building. These disciplines included: historical perspectives on fear,
gender studies and a sustained philosophical argument about the nature and use of fear
and hope.
Our emotional life pervades the fabric of society and the ways in which we
construe history. Mention 9/11 and most likely a citizen of the United States will have an
initial emotional reaction of fear, disgust, anger or frustration. Likewise mention the
Constitution of the United States and a wide variety of emotional states may become
apparent depending on their interpretation of the document and its uses. Not only do our
emotional reactions feed our understanding of the historical premises of our society, our
emotions shape the current society we live within. While I discussed some of this in the
second chapter of this dissertation, I did not have the time to elaborate how our society,
relationships and even religions have affected our understanding of fear and hope. Both
fear and hope are constructs defined, reviled, shaped, used and abused by cultural and
societal forces. The history that shapes our views is important. The use of propaganda to
incite particular emotional states would be an interesting study to conduct. At the same
time, a sustained argument regarding these historical uses of fear would divert us from
focusing on the psychological and theological meanings of fear. While our
understandings of fear and hope are shaped by the historical meanings projected onto
them, I have chosen to focus on the neurological and hermeneutical understandings of
fear in order to construct new theological meanings.
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Another area that was not covered in this dissertation, but certainly merits some
consideration is gender studies. In the society that pervades the United States, emotions
are generally viewed as feminine. While men are often permitted to express anger, they
are not meant to express the wide variety of emotions they experience, and if they do they
may be chastised for it. This has multiple ramifications for the physical and mental health
of men. Moreover, it has relational and communal impacts that are far reaching. Much
has been said about the acceptable emotions that men can display, and fear is generally
not one of them. Studying the impact and experience of fear in men may provide some
insights into the embedded emotional attitudes of men. On the flip side, women are
subjected to situations where fear is used in disempowering and controlling ways.
Women are, by far, more likely to experience physical threats and abuse in their
relationships. Emotional and sexual abuse from childhood creates narratives of fear that
persist far into adulthood, limiting the experience and ability to experience the fullness of
hope at times. Women are much more likely to be diagnosed with PTSD than men.
Gender studies may provide important information concerning gendered attitudes about
the relationship between hope and fear. Studying the impact of culture on fear and hope
in men and the impact of violence (implicit or explicit) on women could help us develop
targeted interventions to help both the individuals and communities experiencing fear.
My choice to develop non-gender specific themes is related to the over-arching
constructive theological meanings I believe are relevant to any interpretation of fear.
While a foray into gender and emotional attitudes may be helpful in the future, I believe
laying the groundwork in this dissertation comes first.
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The final discipline concerning fear and hope not included in this dissertation is
philosophy. Some philosophical discourse was included throughout the dissertation;
however there was not a sustained philosophical examination of how fear and hope have
been constructed by philosophers. Again, while this may have provided an additional
source of knowledge pertaining to the constructs of fear and hope, it would have been
distracting from the major thrust of the dissertation. This is a theological project, and
while philosophy plays a great role in helping us understand human thought and activity,
building a theological anthropology was more important than a purely philosophical one.
Thus, rather than fully engage certain philosophers, I chose to utilize process thought and
theology as the best metaphysical system of meaning to fully develop the arguments I
was making.
Finally, I am sure there are other areas where this research into hope and fear
might intersect our understanding of human activity. There is no way for me to stake a
claim to all of the novel and creative associations I hope people make as a result of
reading this. I truly believe that this dissertation is a limited vehicle; at the same time, I
hope it provides meaningful imaginative discourses so that others can make their own
assertions concerning the relationship between fear and hope.
What’s Next?
Pastoral theology is a discipline that should operate on both micro and macro
levels of care. This dissertation has worked at the micro level in order to develop
meanings about hope and fear for clinical practice. Utilizing a neuro-hermeneutical
framework, I pulled together some vastly different resources in order to develop new
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theological meanings for the relationship between fear and hope. The next logical step for
me is to apply these meanings to the macro level of care. This means using the themes
and meanings developed from a neuro-hermeneutical framework to look at both the clinic
and other communities of care. My goal would be to see how this interpretive framework
can help us understand and re-imagine, through critical examination, the public rhetoric
used by politicians, homiletic discourses by preachers and shared narratives in a variety
of settings. Furthermore, in keeping with Graham’s (2002) emphasis on justice as one
obvious meeting point for public and pastoral theology, I would hope that novel methods
of empowering people to act in relationship to narratives of fear might develop. To do
this kind of work means engaging both pastoral theology and narrative therapy at
different levels. For pastoral theologians the connection to public theology becomes vital.
Moreover, a way of practicing narrative therapy in group settings can provide additional
resources for working in communal settings. The result of this kind of work would be
both novel insights for justice within the systems which purport to provide care and
insights for working with communities who feel threatened or have experienced trauma.
The connection between public and pastoral theologies has been articulated by
many pastoral theologians recently; in one such article Graham (2000) speculated that
pastoral for the public meant defining it as “the theological discipline that critically
examines the organizing myths, symbols, and belief systems operating within caregiving
enterprises, and seeks to modify these so that care might be more effective” (2000, p. 11).
The outcome of this kind of theological work is two-fold. It seeks to critically examine
the theories of care that organize institutions of care. Furthermore, it offers methods for
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care which re-organize these systems. The thrust of Graham’s argument for pastoral
theologians who want to engage in public theology is that justice must take center stage
in our reconstructive processes for the clinic.
For this next project I would contend that the themes developed in this
dissertation provide a good foundation for exploring the public use of fear and hope. Fear
is a relational emotion and the next step in articulating a pastoral theology of fear and
hope is further exposition of its relational and communal use. Utilizing the image of a
living web, Graham asserted that “All are a part; all have room to move around; all are
spinning the web; all suffer from its breakage; all reap its benefits; all celebrate its
durability; all engage its repair” (2000, p. 14). This understanding of an interconnected
reality is closely aligned with both process thought and narrative understandings of the
social construction of the self and community. Utilizing these two disciplines as reference
points provides additional grounding disciplines for studying the use of fear in public
settings, as well as remedies that provide justice for those victimized by its usage and
challenges for those inciting fear for their own purposes. Furthermore, these disciplines
can continue to guide us in developing methods and practices for a variety of settings that
experience or use fear/threats/traumas in maladaptive ways.
Process thought provides a source of knowledge which privileges relational
understandings of life and faith. I find theological insights from this system of thought to
be a contextually meaningful and relevant way to closely embody the love ethic (love of
God, self and neighbor) that guides Graham’s quote above. As a result, any practical
developments coming out of process theology cannot help but include these relational
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concerns. While they were acknowledged in this dissertation, a more complete
understanding of the relational structure of life would be paramount to the completion of
a project concerning collective care and the methods of the clinic.
Narrative therapy is, arguably, the most justice-oriented of the therapeutic
paradigms. Looking at the practices of narrative therapy, social worker Denborough
(2008) asks the following:
How can we receive these stories and engage with them in ways that not only
alleviate individual sorrow, but also enable and sustain local social action to
address the broader injustices, violence and abuses in our varying contexts? How
can we provide forums for the sorrow, anguish and hardship of the stories we
receive to be transformed into collective actions? I don’t mean grand social
actions, I mean local, meaningful, resonant, sustainable, social action or social
contributions. (p. 192)
Collective narrative practices stem from a theoretical orientation of justice, resistance and
social action. They provide meaningful ways in which the fears of a larger community
can be heard and acted upon in a way that not only changes and challenges individuals
but also the threats/traumas that affect them. Any further work on this relational
examination of fear and hope would undoubtedly include collective narrative practices
and the need for social activism.
What I have attempted to do in this brief epilogue is address some of the ideas I
heard at the outset of my writing this dissertation. Furthermore, I tried to look at the
future use of this research and pick a direction that fits for me, briefly outlining how I
might plan a project focusing on the relational and communal use and experience of fear.
We must remember that theological care is not just for the few who access therapy.
Theological care is meant for the masses; it is meant for the systems we put into place to
offer respite and healing from a broke world. Just as process theology reveals the
298

interconnectedness of reality, so to must our practices and theories of care. Graham
(1992) provided these simple words about pastoral care and theology “to care for persons
is to create new worlds; to care for the world is to build a new personhood” (p. 13). This
dissertation has put forth new theological meanings meant to help care for persons who
have experienced trauma. The next step is to envision the kind of world where our
theological systems of care are oriented toward helping communities develop the
resources to survive, cope and thrive in the midst of trauma. In this way communities can
take part in claiming the fears and hopes that direct their lives and discover the beautiful
and novel ways God calls us into life together.
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Endnotes
1

Two searches using the following databases: Academic Search Premier, PsycNotes, and PsycArticles
were conducted in late 2007. The first search using the terms “fear” and “psychology” yielded 16,000+
articles. The second search using the terms “anxiety” and “psychology” yielded 40,000+ articles. There
was some overlap between these two searches; however, there was a significant amount of difference
between the results.
2

The references in this section reveal the thoughts of both social constructivists and social constructionists.
I realize this may be confusing at times; however their shared skepticism provides a compelling case for
looking at the DSM critically. The nuances of the location of meaning making with each perspective are not
lost on me. However, my intention is to build a case from concern regarding the DSM rather than elucidate
these nuances.

3

There are other definitions of anxiety, including Rollo May’s (1977) existential theory concerning the
emotion. While these present nuanced descriptions of anxiety, they bear some resemblance to the two being
used in this dissertation.

4

One brief observation concerning emotions and their antidotes is that during the Vietnam War, the cry
from a vocal constituency was for peace in the midst of great anxiety about the purpose and scope of U.S.
involvement in the conflict and what might happen next. What is different about the current age of war is
that in the midst of our fears about terrorism, crime, or the stranger our cries of protest scream for hope in
the midst of fear.
5

Freezing – do you remember where you were and what you doing at the moment you heard about the
attacks, is that moment frozen in time for you?, Flight – do you remember the reaction of the nation, the
grounding of airplanes, closing of businesses, and the admonitions to stay home during the immediate time
around the threat?, and Fight – what has been the reaction to these attacks by the nation and those in
power?
6

The delineation of fear and fears results from my interpretation of Johnson and LeDoux’s (2004)
conceptualization of fear as, “subjective states (the feeling of fear) and bodily responses (behavioral,
autonomic, and endocrine changes) elicited by threatening stimuli” (p. 228).
7

Alternatively, to talk about the brain without paying attention to the mind is equally careless, and we will
spend time understanding human subjectivity in Chapter Three.

8

I use the term pathways to talk about the vast neural networks. Neurons are the primary cells of the brain.
With the aid of neurotransmitters, impulses are passed via synapses, or gaps, between neurons. Depending
on its purpose, “each neuron receives synaptic input from hundreds or perhaps thousands of neurons, and
its axon distributes this information via collaterals (branches) to hundreds of neurons” (Hendelman, 2006,
p. 1). Particular neurotransmitters are released into the synapse in order to help the impulse continue its
journey. Different neurotransmitters are required in order to direct and pass along different impulses. These
neurotransmitters help the new neuron figure out how it should deal with the impulse it receives, usually by
exciting or inhibiting the neuron to pass along the impulse. This ensures that our original impulse (seeing
words on a page) gets to the right part of the brain (language centers) for decoding. It takes about 1/1000th
of a second for a neuron to receive information and send it along the appropriate pathway (Dubin, 2002, p.
10).

9

Additionally, the cerebral cortex may be mapped according to regions, or lobes. The four lobes (frontal,
parietal, occipital and temporal) provide a geographical description based on the location of gyri and
fissures in a typical brain. Gyri are the ridges of the brain, and fissures describe the deeper crevices

310

between the gyri (Hendelman, 2006, p. 40). The sensory and motor cortexes are found along a deep vertical
fissure close to the middle of brain when examined from the side (a lateral view). If you imagine viewing
the left side of someone’s brain, the motor cortex is located at the end of the frontal lobe (which is the lobe
closest to the forehead) before the fissure and the sensory cortex is located at the front of the parietal lobe
after the fissure.
10

The term nuclei (nucleus) refers to “a local group of neurons with a common function” (Dubin, 2002, p.
25).
11

Many of the regions we have identified thus far play a role in motor functioning. If you think about the
quality and quantity of motor activities we engage in, it is a wonder that more of the brain is not dedicated
to coordinated motor activity. From me typing this page (a fine motor skill) to your eyes moving back and
forth across the page or squinting to read the small type of a footnote, the brain needs to organize, assign
physical resources, and complete sequenced tasks. This all happens while you process the words, relate
their meanings to your experiences and seek to develop an understanding of their context and relevance. If I
think about all of the actions I commit to just by typing this note (ie – the movement of muscles to help me
inhale and exhale, the coordinated movement of ten fingers which allows me to hit each keypad in the
correct order to form words, the movement of eyes that scan each line for spelling errors, the contracting
and relaxing of the appropriate muscles to allow me to sit erect, the movement of my head and neck as
someone walks into the coffee shop where I am working, and so on.) and there are a multitude of things
that can go wrong, but here I sit, hitting the correct keys, breathing, blinking and reading. Considering the
amount of activity that is required just to sustain life, it is a wonder that the brain can be organized to
produce anything more than motor activity.
12

LeDoux offers two reasons for doubting the traditional view of a limbic system. The first reason is that
“there is no widely accepted criteria for deciding what is and what is not a limbic area” (2000, p. 290) (See
also Wehrenberg & Prinz, 2007; Citow &Macdonald, 2001; Hendelman, 2006; Dubin, 2002 for similarities
and variations on this way of understanding the limbic system). Second, he believes theories about the
limbic system do not “explain how the brain makes emotions” (p. 290). Additionally, Dubin, believes that
use of the term “limbic system” is decreasing, “except as anatomic shorthand, because it does not
accurately mirror parts of the brain involved in emotion or that that matter, any single set of associated
functions” (p. 60).
13

Hendelman refers to the different parts of the limbic area as structures (p. 203). He also uses the term
limbic system without problem. My hope is to provide an alternate way of talking about the limbic area
without the baggage of it becoming the “emotional brain.”
14

Smell is the only sense not initially processed by the thalamus before continuing on to other portions of
the brain. According to Dubin, olfactory signals “go, instead, directly to the olfactory cortex and
surrounding regions that deal with emotions” (p. 35).
15

Imagine taking a “Y” shaped rubber band where the top ends are thicker than the bottom and wrapping it
a little over three-quarters of the way around a baseball and you can somewhat visualize how the
hippocampus and the thalamus physically relate to one another.
16

It is important to note that almost all of the structures of the brain are bilaterally symmetrical. This means
that in most cases there is two of everything in the brain. Thus, as we talk about the amygdala, we are
talking about a pair of amygdala.
17

Fear conditioning is also known as Pavlovian conditioning. LeDoux explains that “In Pavlovian fear
conditioning, an emotionally neutral CS [conditioned stimulus] is presented in conjunction with an aversive
US [unconditioned stimulus]. After one or several pairings, the CS acquires the capacity to elicit responses
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that typically occur in the presence of danger, such as defensive behaviour,… autonomic nervous system
responses,… neuroendocrine responses,… etc” (2000, p. 292).
18

Joseph LeDoux believes that this “thalamo-amygdala” pathway still performs an evolutionarily helpful
function in most mammals. In rats, the response time related to the activation of this pathway is 12
milliseconds (12/1000th of a second) enabling a quicker response to possible threats in the environment than
if the impulses were sent from the thalamus to the cortex to the amygdala (thalamo-cortico-amygdala
pathway) (1996, pp. 163-165).
19

Phylogenetic and ontogenetic fears have to do with the genesis of a fear. Phylogenetic fears are those
fears believed to be handed down through genetics (in this case the authors discuss spiders and snakes as
examples, but strangers, heights and enclosed spaces have been used as other examples). Ontogenetic fears
are those fears that have been conditioned since the birth of a particular person. These fears might include
guns, knives or syringes as examples.
20

For a more in depth review of theistic naturalism and the theory of evolution see Griffin’s (2000)
Religion and Scientific Naturalism.
21

In Chapter One, I distinguished between fear and anxiety utilizing earlier psychological formulations in a
deconstructive format. I augmented this research with sociological data that calls for a separation of fear
and anxiety. Some new psychological research has tested for a measurable difference between fear and
anxiety. For example, Perkins, Kemp and Corr (2007) found that there are psychologically measurable
differences between fear and anxiety. Their results implied “the surprising possibility that existing
personality models have somehow overlooked the importance of fearfulness as a personality trait and might
be usefully supplemented by such a construct, both to provide a more comprehensive sampling of the
personality factor space and also improve their capacity to predict applied performance” (p. 259).
Additionally, their research corroborated the theory of defensive direction proposed by McNaughton & Corr
(2004) which separated fear and anxiety based on defensive direction.
22

It is important to note here that many people only discuss three defensive behaviors. Fight, freeze and
flight tend to be the most readily witnessed with regard to defensive behaviors. Deflection and submission,
which fall under the category of appeasement, are talked about less in most research studies. This could be
due to some difficulty understanding the “intentions” of this defensive behavior. Additionally, there is
some research that looks into differences between fear and anxiety based on the defensive direction of the
behaviors associated with particular emotional states. McNaughton and Corr (2004) distinguish between
fear and anxiety by proposing that fear behavior takes one away from a threat while anxious behaviors
cause one to approach a threat. Their theory further delineates the differences between fear and anxiety and
the outcomes of the behaviors associated with each. While their work is outside the scope of this chapter it
does help frame some additional differences between fear and anxiety.
23

Richardson (2007) provided a brief refutation of the notion that we are predisposed to fear snakes and
spiders based on the actual ratio of poisonous to non-poisonous varieties of these animals (p. 16).
Furthermore, the APA reported that phobic responses to any threat fall in the 4-9% range of the human
population (2000, p. ??). If there was some veracity to the claims of evolutionary psychologists for
particular phylogenetic fears, we could expect that the rate of phobic responses might be quite higher than
it actually is at this point in history. To me, it seems more likely that we have maintained the capacity for
the emotion of fear, but the specific things we fear arise ontogenetically either through experience or
through the evolved wisdom of the communities and cultures in which we live and become.
24

Faith, I surmise, is the crux of belief and action. It is certainly a form of theory-laden practices.
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25

One of the roles of psychotherapy is to offer a safe semi-public audience for these imagined possibilities.
We are in a position to listen to the memories and beliefs and hear the future-oriented imaginings created
by the client. We can then offer alternative interpretations which allow the person to imagine new
possibilities through gained knowledge, reconstructed beliefs/memories and novel creative tools.
26

I have chosen to use Atkins’ Narrative Identity and Moral Identity: A Practical Approach as a
conversation partner in defining and explaining narrative constructions of the self. Atkins work constructs
narrative identity around three perspectives which I find particularly helpful in explaining how we come to
know who we are and how we should live.

27

In fact, there are numerous researchers who are looking into a connection between narratives and the
brain. Pastoral theologian Hogue (2003) wrote that “Storytelling is a universal human activity. Persons in
all cultures of the world tell stories. Like perceptions, images, and memories, stories are also products of
our brains… Our brains automatically put images and memories together into stories in the brain’s ongoing
automatic processes of making sense of experience and of the world” (p. 82). Neurological research is not
advanced enough to be able to pinpoint areas of the brain which are specifically involved in the
comprehension and construction of narratives (Mar, 2004). At the same time, we are learning more and
more each day about our capacity for language and the meaningful ways in which this is shared. I believe
we can safely say that when we construct our realities, we do so through internally and externally
constructed narrative discourses. This capacity is only afforded to us because our brains are capably
organized to produce such narratives.

28

Early leaders of the narrative therapeutic tradition White and Epston (1990) rejected the traditional
meaning of the term therapy as a descriptor of their understanding of narrative processes. They stated that
believed the term therapy to be “inadequate to describe the work discussed here. The Penguin Macquarie
Dictionary describes therapy as the ‘treatment of disease, disorder, defect, etc., as by some remedial or
curative process.’ In our work we do not construct problems in terms of disease and do not imagine that we
do anything that relates to ‘a cure’” (footnote, p. 14). They have shown some preference for the term
therapeutic conversation. I will utilize both terms in this context.
29

Many of those practicing narrative therapy reject the term client. I will continue to use it, acknowledging
that “client” is an imperfect term laden with historical meanings which are not altogether positive. I do this
because it is the dominant term in therapeutic circles, and one cannot challenge the meaning of something
by merely ignoring it. I will most often use the term person/client as a reminder of the person first language
often used in postmodern therapeutic practices.
30

Post-structuralism is a reaction against structuralism. According to Payne (2005), structuralists “claimed
to perceive ‘deep structures’ in all human life and activity, and proposed that it was these structures which
mattered rather than local, individualized variants and differences” (p. 28). Thus, through structuralism we
are essentially the same; we are motivated by the same general principles. Our common human structure
has been taken to mean that some core being resides in all of us and our task in therapy is to find it. My
understanding of post-structuralism stems from Payne’s description of structuralist analysis which “ignores
and therefore implicitly dismisses those very elements which through an author’s unique voice give literary
works their particular, individual quality as descriptions and expressions of life” (2005, p. 29). As the
structuralist will search for the unique essential being thought to be hiding in each of us, the poststructuralist will look at the person presented before us and see that unique being in the narratives they tell
about their lives.
31

Payne remarked that externalization is not to be used with “selfish, damaging or abusive actions” (p. 12).
He stated that “the beliefs and assumptions used to justify the abuse may be externalized” (p. 12) but not
the actions themselves. His rationale for this distinction is that “Naming abuse is a signal to both abuser and
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victim that I will not go along with the abuser’s attempts to avoid responsibility for his acts, and it
encourages the victim not to understate, and thus underestimate, what she really experienced” (p. 44).
32

Payne and White have both mentioned that externalization isn’t necessary in all circumstances.
Sometimes it doesn’t fit the story being told; other times it will seem too forced to work appropriately. The
goal is to help a person move past believing they embody the problems they bring with them. Sensitivity to
any situation will help dictate whether a practice will be useful or not.
33

Payne lists three categories of questions which help guide therapists: landscape of action questions,
landscape of consciousness questions and experience of experience questions (p. 85). Each of these
platforms of questions seeks to examine a different aspect of a person’s life and encourage them to discover
and empower their own relationships to problem-saturated narratives. In the end, these questions also help
people develop strategies for living out new identities relative to the problems they feel they face.
34

The reciprocal may also be true as well. Namely, that our hopes for the future might also reveal the
things we fear most in the present. That is a dissertation for another time and place.
35

Process philosophy shares some roots with specific Greek traditions and Buddhist thought. Pierre
Teilhard de Chardin provides another strand of process thought which shares similarities and differences
with Whitehead and (later) Hartshorne’s work.
36

For examples, see glossaries in L. Graham (1992) Care of Persons, Care of Worlds, R. Mesle (2008)
Process-Relational Philosophy, J. Cobb, Jr. (2008) Whitehead Word Book.
37
I am fully aware that in other cultures this example might not be applicable, but there are other standards
of behavior which are culturally influenced and place constraints on human behavior and action.
38

In Christian theology, the most meaningful event which can help us understand the relationship between
these two anticipatory emotions may be the eschaton. For those whose faith depends upon the reality of this
event there are two anticipatory emotions which inevitably come into play when discussing or thinking
about it, fear and hope. Simply put, there are some whose theological stances encourage them to fear the
eschaton, while others look to it with great hope. Yet, these theological camps are not that far off from one
another as both look to the same event with the hope of its arrival. The difference is seemingly in how they
view their current circumstances (and that of the world and their efforts in it) related to what they expect to
happen at the arrival of the eschaton.

39

White’s case study is with a person who is living with complex traumatic symptoms. While he never
actually names it, he utilizes a narrative form of therapeutic practice where he is still able to help the person
describe the things she values despite the trauma she has experienced. Herman (2004) advocates for a
marked distinction between simple and complex PTSD. She described complex trauma as resulting from
“prolonged, repeated victimization” (p. 45).
40

Names and some details have been changed in order to protect the client.
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